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FORWARD 
The seeds oftbis thesis began in 1978 during my early career 
at the University of Lagos. This coincided with the promulgation 
of Nigeria's Insurance Act which ever since has remained one of 
my key academic interests. 
Most of the thesis was written prior to .988 and reflects a 
point of view which I have held for many years. It was with 
great pleasure that I note the recent decisions of the Nigerian 
Government to consider moving towards a more free enterprise and 
less protectionist environment within which the Nigerian Insurance 
Industry can develop in the future. 
This new policy direction is in line with the philosophy 
advanced in the thesis and I hope that the detailed proposals 
contained herein will assist in its successful implementation. 
John Faleqan 
July 1991 
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A3ST~.A.CT 
In reviewing the efforts of the :~igerian Government to control the 
insurance industry in Nigeria ,.,rith a view to improving the tarnished image 
of the industry which was a prominent feature of the late 1960 l s and the 
early 1970
'
s this study briefly describes the evolution of the control 
framework, surveys the types of direct control measures ~~d attempts an 
examination of the control mechanisms. 
In the main, these control mechanisms are the supervision of commercial 
insurance to ensure financial stability and good management, legislation 
requiring equity shareholding in foreign owned subsidiaries, direct government 
participation in insurance business, the making of some types of insurance 
compulsory and a number of miscellaneous measures. 
The main contention of the study is that rather than promoting the public 
image of the industry, government policy in a number of areas is detrimental to 
competition and efficiency with serious deleterious effect on the optimality of 
resource allocation in the Nigerian economy. 
Given the importance of the insurance industry in any economy the 
management of pure risk, the transfer and pooling of risk, its role in the 
financial intermediation process, the provision of funds for investment opport-
unities, etc, the study focuses on the urgent need to understand its industrial 
dynamics and formulate appropriate competition or regulatory policies for it. 
The study is important, at least from the viewpoint of policy implications 
particularly as it relates to the efficiency of the Nigerian insurance industry, 
the aim being to provide a set of detailed estimates to show the relative impor-
tance of the various elements of market structure and their implications for the 
conduct and performance of firms operating in the industry. 
Given the limited nature of the data, some parts of the study utilise a 
multivariate statistical analysis while some other employ a probabilistic model. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Purpose of Thesis 
Insurance is the pivot of any economy (Soleye, 1984). It provides 
against risk by spreading the financial losses of the unfortunate few 
over the fortunate many. The economic importance of this risk spreading 
mechanism in the community is that it increases welfare both by providing 
a feeling of improved financial security and by easing the financial 
burden of accidental losses (Carter, 1980). As an economy grows, so 
also insurance grows. Thus, insurance grows concomitantly with the 
growth and development in the economy. 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a detailed analysis of 
the evolution (part 1) and efficacy of the regulation (parts 2 and 3) 
of the insurance sector in Nigeria since 1960. 
In order to do this it is important to look at the wider economic 
structure and policy that exists in Nigeria. In addition there is need 
to look at the structure and development of the Nigerian insurance 
industry. It should be recognised that there is a dynamic relationship 
between the structure of industry and the regulatory environment. In 
other words, the structure of industry is influenced by regulation, 
and therefore official regulation has fashioned the shape and develop-
ment of the 1ndustr,y. 
There is a growing literature on the regulation of insurance 
business in the developed countries (Hindley, 1983). This is not the 
case in the developing countries because it is a neglected sector. 
A discussion of insurance regulation in a developing setting can, 
therefor,;~ot be done except by international comparisons. 
21 
It is therefore the contention of this thesis that one cannot 
evaluate a regulatory syste~ let alone make recommendations without 
recognising the unique characteristics that prevail in a given 
country. ~ven so the thesis does produce insights into the adverse 
impact of restrictive regulation on the development of a local 
insurance industry which has implic~tions for other developing 
countries. 
The thesis provides the only det~iled analysis of the nature 
and impact of government intervention in the insurance business in 
Nigeria. It is also, as far as ~~e author can ascertain, the only 
detailed analysis of official regulation of insurance in a developing 
country. 
1.2 Need for the study 
The two decades following Nigeria's political independence has 
witnessed the promulgation of laws1 regulating the business of insurance. 
These laws arecundoubtedly intended to modernize and overhaul the 
regulation, supervision and control of insuranoe. In addition, they 
are aimed at proteoting the oountry's insurance seotor against foreign 
penetration (Nigeria, 1975) in line with the general phenomenon most 
oommonly identified with, but not limited to, developing oountries to 
erect barriers to international trade in services (Shelp, 1976). The 
inoreasing Oonoern with insuranoe and other finanoial inati tutions is 
related to the reoognised role of these industries in the oapital 
formation process in generating savings, providing investment funds, and 
extending oredi t. Insurance is often viewed as an industry requiring 
no speoial expertise and best kept out of the hands of the foreigners.' 
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All these factors translate i~to national policies demanding, at a 
minimum ownership and control by nationals and at a maximum, ownership 
by the state itself. In addition, there is the socio-political value 
derived from legislation that seeks to provide protection for individuals 
and national institutions. Hence the overwhelming acceptance of the 
policy recommendations of UNCTAD (eh2..pter 6) for insurance supervision 
by the state in the developing countries. 
The end of the 1910's coincided with the end of the Second United 
Nations Decade (UNCTAD, 1983), whiCh placed emphasis on the insurance 
sector. UNCTAD, therefore , deemed it useful to review, at that crucial 
point, the situation of insurance markets in developing countries and 
issued its first assessment from which the following emerged: 
" ••• Third World ins'U:t'ance markets operate 
in accordance with up-to-date insurance 
legislation. How well such legislation is 
implemented in practice is a different 
matter; there seems to be some serious 
problems, due to a certain lack of 
sufficient political support of insurance 
supervision on the part of the ministries 
responsible therefor, as well as to a lack 
of adequate insurance training of the 
staff of the supervisory authorities. 
Bearing in mind the importance to the 
insured public and to the national economy 
in general of effective insurance super-
vision, more efforts should be made to remedy 
the situation, whiCh prevails in many deve-
loping countries" (UNCTAD, 1981). 
One consequence of these "serious problems" is that insurance 
rates are high. A recent UNCl'lJ> report speaks of " ••• the relatively 
----J 
high insurance costs in developing countries, compared with those in 
developed countries" and continues: 
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"Cbviously, high p::'emium rates discourage the 
public fr::lm COV8::':':1;' tl.ei:::- ri;J~cs by insur:mce, 
particularly in t:1e 8.bsence of sufficient 
awareness of the benefits of insurance. This 
discouragement causes ~ contraction of the 
market, resulting in loss for the insurer ••• 
To safeguard themsalves, the insurers retai~ 
for their net account only a small proportion 
of the business the;r ' .. Jri te, reinsuring the 
bal,mce abroad ••• yet excessive reliance 
upon reinsurance deprives the insurer of his 
income ~~d prevents him from achievL~g g=owt~. 
At the same time it burdens the national economy 
and the balance of p~~ents with unnecessary 
transfers of hard currency." (UN8T .. I\D, 198C). 
The above assessment by the 1L.ICT .. ;:J) Secretarial of insurance practice 
in the developing countries highlights the lapses of their state supervision 
and cont:::-ol of insu=ance business. Attention is focused here on ITigeria. 
Moreover, a review of official supervision and control of insurance 
has received little attention, a situation which provides a further justi-
fication for the study of government intervention in the Nigerian insurance 
industry. 
1.) Literature Su-~ey and Analysis 
Existing studies are classified into two sections. The first is the 
literature on insurance regulation in general, followed by that on insurance 
in Nigeria. 
1.).1 Selected Literature on Insurance 
Regulation in General 
Not much has been published until recent years on insurance regulation 
in the United Kingdom. 2 Cockerell (1974) bla~es the trail. Cockerell's 
study of insurance regulation i; part of a much wider discussion of the 
-,. 
relationship between insurance and the state including public policy, 
taxation and social security. His contention is that there is hardly a 
country in the world where the operations of insurers are not subject to 
state regulation and control. The reasons for this are st~ted to include 
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tr..e need to p::'otect COnSU2:le::'s 3.rld to ::"oster the local insur:mce ::12..r:·:et. 
ilthough official regulation is uncerst~dable. its hidden cost is ~e~ 
by :;:olicyholders having to ];:ay hi~":c::, p:cemiums thal'1. they \·lould. u.."1der a 
system 0: free competition. 
Cockerell (1980) is a.n expa.."lsion of t:'1e above theme. The motives 
for state control are expanded to :L~clude economic and political f~ctors 
and consumer protection. Although public :L~volvement in the transaction 
of insur'moe business before the nineteenth century was limited, in the 
twentieth oentu:=y state monopolies, \'!i th their attendant problems of concen-
tration, have been the order of the day in the developing countries. 
Shelp (1976) describes the V2xious forms of operation international 
insurers traditionally employ overseas, classifies the restrictive regula-
tions they encounter, and comments on the justification generally adv~ced 
in support of restrictive measures aGainst foreign insurers. Finally, the 
discussion suggests various alternatives ,~hich international insurers might 
consider in attempting to oope with the restriotions. 
Carter and Dickinson (1977) foous on the steps that have been taken 
by the governments of many developL~g countries to reduce their dependence 
upon foreign insurers and reinsurers. First, the economic aims of the 
governments are mentioned. followed by the types of measures and finally 
the economic effects of the restrictions on international trade in reinsurance 
are examined. The analysis, in conclusion, makes a strong case for 
greater freedom in the flow of international reinsurance. 
The implications of these restrictions are considered at some length 
in Barriers to Trade in Insurance (Carter and Dickinson, 1979). This 
~ublication considers in turn the reasons for protectionist legislation, 
types of restrictive legislation, analysis of the effects, orientation to 
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restrictions and a plea for liberalisQtion. 
:-:indley (1982) examines the c:::gurr.ents put forward by the U-::'J':'.~:> 
Secretariat for the! protection of 10c21 sellers of insur3X:ce at t!1e ex;ense 
of local buyers of insurance. 1:e :inds them almost entirely devoid of 
content. Koreover, because direct insurers and state o\vned reinsurers in 
developing countries demand reinsurance through international markets, the 
policies recommended have not had any rrajor impact on the balance of PaJ~ents 
of developing countries. Hindley concludes that a withdrawal by the 
governments of developing countries from the kind of policies advocated by 
the UNCT.~ Secretariat will produce clear gains for their residents. 
Finsinger, Hammond and Tapp (1985)3 is a comparative study of the 
lightly regulated UK insurance industry and the highly regulated Ge~an 
insurance industry. It concentrates on the life insurance and automobile 
insurance markets of the two countries and analyses the potential sources 
of market failure in the supply of insurance services. It examines the 
effectiveness of different forms of regulation in dealing with instances 
of market failure as well as their effects on the level of performance of 
insurance companies, in order to answer the ~uestion whether certain forms 
of regulation impose too high a cost in te~s of loss of efficiency. 
The study concludes that the German price and profit regulations on 
insurance companies have caused a serious loss of efficiency without 
improving the position of insurance consumers. The British insurance 
regulations on the other hand demonstrate that there are ways of protecting 
consumers from the adverse conse~uences of insolvencies without stifling 
market competition.4 The lesson of this study is that competitive markets, 
with adequate safeguards, seem to serve customers better in the long run 
by promoting efficiency, than attempts to protect policyholders b,y strict 
regulations on all aspects of operation.' 
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1.].2 Lite~'ltu::e on --i;;srLm :nsur::.r..ce 
besn ttose c~r=i~d out se condly by t:~e 
. ~ 
:?:.nanciC',l S~rs:em Jevie'tl Corr~l1ittee"" ".:hic:J. vias set 'Jp on 
and thirdly by 3mi th L"'l. 1981. 
]eichel's recommendations are ~ouped into :our areas - indi~enous 
participation in insurance busL"'l.ess including the establis~_~ent of t~e 
~ational Insurance Corporation of ~:iG::;:,ia (XICO~T), the revision of the 
InSUral'lCe Companies ~'..cts of 1964, t::e enforcement :nachinerJ and other 
miscellanceous ~atters. First, "he'nade detailed reco~endations on how 
NICO~ should be allowed to operate on commercial lines rather ~~an on 
governmental working pattern. :{e also urged government to promote 6=~dual 
increase of the participation of ::iG'erian share capital in insur2l1ce 
companies. Secondly, he urged gove=nment to replace without delay the 
existing Insurance Acts with an insurance legislation Which provided for 
detailed supervision of insurance bus:L~ess (appendix 1). Thirdly, he 
pleaded ~i~~ government to for.m a consultative co~ittee consisting of 
5 Nigerians who have contributed to the sound development of the local 
insurance industry to supplement the ,'lOrk of the Insurance ::>epartment. 
The latter was enjoined to make detailed insurance statistics available 
to insurance companies and the public; scrutinize large risks emanating 
from Nigeria and determine the amount which could be kept in the country 
before giving permission to insure them abroad; examine the feasibility 
of entering into exchange of reinsursnce with neighbouring countries; 
and sponsor the extension of the present training in insurance at the 
Facul ty of Business Administration of the University of Lagos to include 
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to 3. possible trainir1g centre 0: i:":3ur:-nce for '!'ro:?ic::~l :.:ric:.. 
Four'"thly, h-:? '..lrged. gove::n.'Ile~-t to ::~·c:.',cte the es-!;a blisr.:1ent of a 
co-operative i."1s1..lr3 ... ·1ce society ' .... hic1:'l could CO!TI!Ile:::lce oper::.tio::s \dt~ 
special forms of life insurance. 
The Fi:::l~~cial System Review Committee's investigation of the 
insurance industry ' .... as part of a much larger enquLry into the Nigeri:ln 
fi."1ancial system. In particular it provided the background ~~at led to 
the formation of NICON in 1969, the promulgation of the Insurance Act of 
1976 ar.d the establishment of the :'Tigeria Reinsurance Corporation 
(Nigeria Re) as well as Africa Reinsurance Corporation (Afric2n ~e) in 
1977. 
Its recommendations were not fully supported with reasons and 
uncritically accepted the views of 1eichel. Firstly, it recommended 
that the Nigerian interest in all foreign insurance companies both 
private and public hitherto limited to 49 percent should be raised to 60 
percent. Secondly, the national reinsurance corporation should have the 
choice of first refusal of any reinsurance business from Nigeria before 
such business was placed on the international market. Thirdly, although 
NICON should be regarded as the leader of the industry and therefore 
should take on leadership responsibilities, its monopoly of Federal 
Government insurance business should be revoked in the light of the further 
~igerianisation of the equity of foreign owned insurance companies. 
Fourthly, there were detailed reco~endations on the fiduciary regulation 
of the industry on the lines suggested by Reichel including the provision 
that monetary authorities should playa more significant role in deter-
mining the rate structure and in formulating investment guidelines for 
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companies operatL~g in the industrJ (ch~pter 9.5). 
Alasdair Smite undertook research in 1980 to find out whether there were 
significant effects on international transactions arising from the localisation of 
insurance in Nigeria. He examined the measures which have been adopted to 
promote and protect the domestic insurance industry. He argued that a 
major danger of these measures is that by restricting competition they can 
reduce the range and quality and raise the price of the products offered to 
consumers. His conclusion is that ~~e policy of restricting outward and 
inward investment retards the g=o,.,rth of the industry which other policies 
(at a significant cost) are simultaneously trying to encourage. "1..re the 
objectives of policy makers sensible?" he asked in conclusion. 
Smith cameto Nigeria when the Insurance Act of 1916 was only 4 years 
old. There were no statistics to back his claims which had to be made on 
a priori basis. Moreover his focus was on the effects of restrictions. 
Eence the limitations of this work. 
8 The other studies are journal articles on certain aspects of the 
insurance industry. Because of this restricted scope, they are not 
considered sufficiently broadly based for further examination. 
The present study will attempt to remedy these deficiencies. 
1.4 Methodology Used in the Thesis 
This section outlines the scope of the survey and data collection 
procedure as follows: 
1.4.1 Purpose of Survey 
The purpose of the sU:t'vey is t\·rOfold, firs tly to identify the aims 
of official regulation and, secondly, to determine its efficacy. 
The initial phase of the s tu::.ly in ;;vitubly invol"red :.r. c:~~Ll.'..1.sti ve 
search for a:ny Ii tere>. ture deali:lG "ri tl: the ]igerian ins~:mce i::.G:~Gtr~". 
This source of info~tlon includes con:erence papers of the Insurar.ce 
Institute of 5igeria (Ir~), the ';iest .d.':rican Insurance Companies .':.ssociation 
('.lAIC.;'), African Insurance Crganiss.ticn (.:~IO), the Fed.eration of ::.fro-.. :"sian 
Insurers and ::teinsurers (F.'.n) and the Third ',vorld Insurance Congress. 
other sources are the annual seminarG of insurance .students' associations 
and their journals, the national insurance seminars annually organised by 
the Times Leisure Services, the annual Loss Prevention Conference of the 
Fire Protection Association of Nigeria, the marketing seminars ~~d house 
journals of insurance companies ~~d ~ticles and supplements on insu~ance 
which appear in the daily papers f~om time to time. 
Government investigations of the industrJ have produced reports9 
which have provided useful insights into the industry. These investigations 
have become preparatory to the promulgation or revision of insurance 
legislations. 
1.4.3 Selection of Groups and Research Instrument 
The literature survey indicated above assisted to show the scope of 
empirical investigation to be carried out. This involved the selection 
of groups such as the chief executives of insurance companies, local and 
London brokers, the major consumers of insurance, consulting actuaries 
and UNOI'AD officials. 
The roles of these groups are not always complementary, but are 
sometimes exclusive. It was therefore expected that the responses would be 
biased, leading to incorrect interpretation. Hence the need to develop 
a researCh instrument, mainly in the form of structured questionnaires for 
the leading members of the groups (appendices 2 - 6). 
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1.4.4 Conduc~ o! ~ield Jesearch 
It \.,ras necessa...--y to find out i:;.d"Jstry attitude tOi..-a;r:!s '!''J,:ulc.. tion c..r..d 
t~e areas o! the legislation th-:"t need to be i::1;:=o."ed. :ienca the necessity 
to cond~ct field :=esearoh utiliz~~ ~ailed Questio~~ires ~nd personul 
interviews (appendL'IC 3). Fer tl-:is ?u::'J?ose the resea=oh instruments developed 
above \.;ere used. -:ihile the mailed. liuestionnaire su:=vey was utili3ed to 
cover a broad spectrum of the constituents of the industrJ, the personal 
interviews were conducted in Lagos and the State capitals where ir£urance 
offices are located and in London where Lloyd~ brokers and consulting 
actuaries with experience of the ~i6erian market ope:=ate. Corres~ondence 
was opened with the U::CT.tD Secreta:=iat located in Geneva. 
Because existing data is not det~iled to test the efficacy of policy, 
the empirical aspect of the thesis consist of evaluation of available 
statistics to supplement empiricil findings. However, the questionnaires 
are the main source of informaticn. 
1.4.5 Structure of "yuestionnaires 
In order to achieve the objectives of the study as outlined above, 
emphasis was placed on two broad groups of va=iables in designing the 
questionnaires. The first is id.entifying the aims of official regulation 
and the second is assessing the efficacy, impact and effects on the struc-
ture, conduct and performance of the industry. 
1.4.6 Administration of Questionnaires 
An original questionnaire (appendix 2) was tested in a pilot survey 
and this led to some changes in the wording of the questions. In February 
1985 the pilot survey was applied to the leaders of ~~e industry. Although 
20 of these practitioners were approached only one of them responded. 
The respondent, Mr. A. O. Ogunshola, a confJulting actuary, is closely 
associated with academia and was for more than 10 years an associate 
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lecturs:: in tte Insurance Jep3.rt:r.211-t 0: the Universit:.r of L.:l.gos. 
This i3 probacly t!1e reason for ::is r,~sponse which · .... 3.3 in fa.ct leSte 
in comi...'1g. :Ie:lce it ca..'1 be in~er:::,ed t::8.t ~~igerian b.dustri2.lists 2.l1d 
busi..."lessmen are a.verse to ,iivu16i~G' -their business secrets and th-2rcfore 
to filling ~uestior~aires. 
3ecause of this low response, i-t ·I{as decided to ad:ninister the 
questior~aire by in terVie\is. It \>!C;.S ~10Weyer realised t:-.la t this was 
going to be a slow and laborious process whi~~ it proved to be. 
In the mic.d1e of FebI".lary 1986 t:1e researcher was rel"'.,1.:e3ted by the 
National Universities Com:nission (appendix 14) to serve on the G-::lG.Il 
Insurance Inves-tiga ting Panel 'oI:'lic1;. '.12..8 appointed in January to i.,:vesti{;3.te 
abuses in the reinsurance 3.ctivi::'e3 of insurance companies (chapter 7.7.12). 
The Co~~ttee was inaugurated on 24 ~ebruary and soon adopted the revised 
questionnaire (appendix 3) ,~hich "ra6 considered central to the enc;.uiry. 
This official L~vestigation of the insurance industry the~efore p~ovided 
the researcher the ttnely opport~'1ity to administer t~e questionn2..ire on 
all the companies operating on the m~ket. It was ~'1 opportunity well 
exploited for all the companies were compelled to complete the questionnaires. 
In addition to those completed by the insurance companies, question-
naires were sent to 10 London insur~ce brokers, 25 local brokers, 2 overseas 
reinsurers (appendix 3)) 3 Local reinsurers (appendix 4) 50 private consu-
mers' of insurance (appendix 5), ~~e Director of Insurance (appendb: 6), 
the Central Bank of Nigeria (appendix 7), 4 overseas actuaries (appendix 8) 
and the UNCT.~ Secretariat (appendix 9). In addition a cross-section of 
these groups was personally intervie, ... ed by the researcher. Five research 
assistants were employed for a period of 4 weeks to assist mostly with 
reminders. 
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Dr. Karl Reichel, the Federal ~ove~nment's consultant on insur2~ce 
matters from June 1966 to December 1970 was interviewed in Lagos in 
September 1979 during his one-1;leek long visit to Lagos in connection 
with the 10th anniversary celebration of ~HCON. One major outcome of 
this meeting is that he agreed to despatch to the researcher copies 
of his diary during his official duty in Nigeria. The documents have 
proved to be very valuable in elucidating the problems of the 
insurance industry in Nigeria. 
1.4.7 Analysis of the Findings 
Appropriate analytical procedures \.,rere developed and incorporated 
into part 4 of the thesis (chapters 10 ,and 11). 
1.5 outline of Thesis Structure 
The work is arranged in 5 parts. In the first past, the overview 
of insurance in Nigeria is presented (chapters 2 and 3). uext, the 
principles and objects of government policy regarding the insurance 
industry are examined (chapters 4" and 6). Then, we tE'ke an exhaustive 
look at the measures which have been employed by the ~,'state to monitor 
and control the industry (chapters 7,8 and 9). Furthermore, we tum 
our attention to the impact and evaluation of policy (chapters 10 and 11). 
Finally, we gather the conclusion in the last chapter. 
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1. 6 ~~otes 
1 • See Insur~ce Companies .i.ct 1961, 1/~arine Insurance 
Act 1961, Insurance (r.:iscellaneous provisions) Act 
1964, National Insurance Corporation of Nigeria Act 
1969, Companies Act 1969, Insurance Act 1976 and 
Nigeria Reinsurance Corporation Act 1977. 
2. See, however, Hurren (1964). 
3. This study was a reaction to the Gover Report (1984) and 
Government proposals based on it (';Jhlte paper, Financial 
Services in the UK, 1985). 
4. See Tapp (1966) also. 
5. The same conclusion has been arrived at by Cummins and Harrigton 
(1987), Finsinger (1983), Ippolito (1979), Joskow (1973), O' Connor 
and Carlson (1979), pauly, Kunrenther and Kleindorfor (1986), 
Samprone (1979), \fitt (1973 and 1978). Witt and Miller (1980 
and 1981). Witt and Urrutia (1983), etc. 
6. See Nigeria (1976). 
7. See 1976/77 Budget Broadcast. 
8. See Akinkugbe (1976) .1kintola-3ello (1985), 
Anifalaje (1986), Durojaiye (1981), Irukwu (1978). 
Ojo and Adwunmi (1982), Okigbo (1981), Omoruyi and 
Demuren (1980), Olawoyin (1985), Oretuyi (1978/79), 
Oyejide and Soyode (1976 a & b), Ozomah (1972 & 1976), 
and Smith (1981). 
9. See Nigeria (1960, 1964, 1976 and 1986). ~lso, 
Reichel (1966 - 70). 
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PART ONE 
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2.1 I!lt:::,c~~ction 
:<'ollmvin;; tte patte.:::n of economi:::: '~evelop::lent percei'led by ],os:o'.! 
(1961), t:le evol '"ltior. of insur3.uce i."1. ::'2veloping countries might be 
considered to pass tr~ough three st~;es before fin~lly reaching the st~ge 
of maturity. In the first instance, the insurance industry in these 
countries passes through a "colonial :phase" which is characterised by 
forei31l oymership of the business c2;teri."lg for the needs of ave=:! 
restricted market basing its operations on foreign laws and practice. 
The second stage is the "transitional period." During this phase, t.~e 
national economy develops and so insurance becomes more productive and 
expands into various fields, accompanying other economic activities. 
The local business community, becoming conscious of the opportunities of 
insurance as an investment, penetrates t.'11e insurance industry by the 
formation of new companies. Severe competition ensues, leading to hori-
zontal spread of the limited technical know how. It is at this point in 
time that government intervenes to control insurance activities. The 
third stage witnesses the "take-off stage" which fosters the development 
of insurance business in the light of national planning. During this 
period local companies take the lead. and state-owned companies dominate 
the market. The final stage is the "period of maturi tylt which shifts the 
attitude of business from product orientation to market orientation. 
During this period a large sclle i~~ovation takes place by the introduc-
tion of new forms of cover to achieve optbnum consumer satisfaction. 
Instead of restricting their operations to service the commercial and 
industrial sectors, insurance policies are tailored to fit the individual 
consumer need (Se~ueira, 1975). 
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This se~ond chap~er is intended to find o~t whether o~ not the develop-
ment of the i::.surance industry in 1::i6'8:-i<:', broac.ly fol10't/8 this patte:::-n. :t 
classifies the evolution of com:nerci..:;l L'1suror.ce in the country under three 
major periods: the pre-independence ps~iod, roughly up to 1960; ~~e decade 
following political independence which coL'1cides with the First National 
Development Plan, 1962-69; and the present stage (since 1970) which \'li tnesses 
the toughening of the framework of control and represents a radical change 
in government's attitude toward the control of the industry. 
This classification demonstrates not only the usefulness of breaking 
down the story of a sector of the economy according to the established set 
of stages - of - growth but also dramatizes the uniformities in ~~e sequence 
of modernization and the uniqueness of a nation's experience. 
2.2 The Pre-independence Period, Up to 1960 
2.2.1 Early Era of Insurance: General Agency Period 
Although trade has occupied a prominent place in Nigeria's economic 
activit,r throughout its recorded history, the concept of insurance in its 
modem form was not introduced until the late 19th century (Barback, 1964) 
by the early British merchants who had established trading posts on the 
. cover West Coast of Afr~ca (Irukwu, 1978). They arranged insurance / ' for the 
trading concerns on the London market. It was not long, in consequence of 
lengthy and unreliable communications, before some British insurance compa-
nies started to appoint merchants with whom they had been connected to act 
as their general agents with power of attorney to accept risk, issue policies, 
adjust and settle claims and generally to undertake all insurance transac-
tions on behalf of their overseas principals. These agents consisted initia-
lly of expatriate banks and trading companies enga&ed in the importing and 
exporting bUSiness, and, later Nigerian traders and merchants of reasonable 
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1981). 30:ne 0:" t~;~, :J.ot,-',ole a6~nt.33.re indic:lted. ir.. 
.:"n.ents 
S ir ~o bolaj i Ban .. '< _j: thor.y La· .... Union 
Norwich rnion 
UAC Northern Assur'IDce 
CFAC \I'lli te Cross 
Pearl Assur3.l1ce 
Source: lIN Conference Papers, Vol. II. (1973). 
Table 2.1 
Leading General Agents in the Colonial ~ra 
Many of these representatives were so successful that they found it 
necessary to create insurance departments managed by an insurance specia-
list recruited locally or by an official sent out by the principal's office. 
As business developed, the general a~~nts appointed sub-agents like accoun-
tants, lawyers, bank managers, motor dealers and the like in other parts 
of the countr.y. In the case of the larger British insurance companies 
writing Nigerian business the agency system led eventually to the establish-
ment of branch offices in Lagos and later in some other principal towns, 
with a network of agencies and sut-a.gencies tb,rouehout the territory 
(Earback, 1964). Al though the general agency system has now disappeared, 
it was the foundation on which most of the expatriate insurance companies 
were built (Cadmus, 1973). As a matter of fact the pattern of development 
of the British insurance companies abroad, from agents to branches,was 
typical in many countries as in Nigeria (Raynes, 1964). 
'-
·/r:.ilst at least t· .... o Eri tis~ c~;;::;;::'nies we:::-e known to have <).p:?oir.";ed. 
ager.ts in ~:igeria as fCl.r back 3.S 1908 (:;:'ijadu, 1981), tte 3.oyu.l '-:::c::".m.;:.: 
"''''ur'.l'''ce wa!'; the f'~r~~ to h'>v"" '"-1 .J.-""'l br''''''ch 0~-"1ce ;'" 'T;~-e""';'::1 ! "'e--c'r-,o ........ 0.;) CI..I..i. _.l .. ..&.. .., \I .... "'" ' .. ,II 1.4.. c.:;........ ..... _ ... ~ -'1.0 .. __ \ .... 1",... u L. , 
1972;, having established an a6--enc~r ' .. ::. th the lawye:=s, IrvinG' 3..."11 :or..nar 
in 1902 (Farn3wo:=th, 1975). It set up an office in LaJos in 1321 
(~!igeria, 1976) under the managenent of the late George Golding (Farn5~ 
worth, 1975) and until 1949 remained t~e only locally established company 
with an office in Nigeria (Farns'Ilorth, 1975). Some overseas companies 
with a long-standing and substantial share of the market preferred to 
operate through the general agents. ~or example, as observed above, the 
Northern Assurance Company established an agency with the UAC. The 
National Employers Mutual had also appeared on the scene, again through 
a general agent, looking entirely after ~~e motor insurance of civil 
servants (Farnsworth, 1975). 
During these early days of agencies the insurance market was not an 
active one. Business consisted of marine cargo insurance for produce 
exports, a few fire and burglar! insurances of personal and therefore 
" 
non-commercial nature (Lijadu, 1981), bank mortgage security and a few 
motor insurances for the ~autious "~ccording to }1c~es~ (197 3) it \oTC:.S 
unusual for any losses giving rise to a claim under fire policies to occur, 
and such was the state of the market that it took five ye3.rs to complete 
the front page of the fire loss register. 
The development of the business followed a fairly even course with 
few outstanding events. However, special impetu~ for the growth of 
',' \\ 
insurance in this country was provided by the eventsdesoribed below. 
2.2.2 Expansion of Insurance and Foreign Branoh Establishments 
A number of factors contributed to the early growth of insurance 
business in Nigeria. 
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First, t:le Second ~;;orld "Jar "I1:ich projected )Tigerians cut of a 
colonial bac!(' .... ater into a modern ",fOrld 3lld beca:ne the outstanding inst::u-
ment of social progress in ',jest .':.frica (Cro',.;der, 1962); the ::!?jor f:.:.c~or 
~as undoubtedly tee great tec~~ological advances made in ~ar t~e ~:d the 
subsequent application of these adv~ces to peace time uses, and the need 
for factories on a war footing to maintai."l output in the peace (r,Ic:restry 
1913). :Hotor transport particularly was greatly increased; machinery 
sales and exports from Europe and the United States expanded; and communi-
cation by air became common practice. people travelled during the war and 
had effective contact with the current of ideas of the ',{estern ~.lorld; 
this led to ~~e opening up of minds to new possibilities. lnd, after 
the war, there was a social upheaval leading to the formation of indepen-
dence movements. In this atmosphere of leaping for' .... ard, of novelty and 
excitement, of energies released from war conditions, there began the 
idea of industrialisation in this country that continues today (Ogunlana; 
1972). The implication of this national awareness for the insurance 
industry is that pressures were mounted by employees and trade unions 
for increased welfare benefits (Lijadu, 1981). 
Second, government legislation in the forties and early fifties 
imposing liabilities on the public, for example, the Road Traffic lct of 
1945 which came into force on 1 april 1950, and the '.formen's Compensa-
tion Act of 1940 (Farnsworth, 1975). The resultant increase in the 
volume of bus1ne~s led to a wild scramble by the general agents to 
appoint sub-agents throughout the country (Farnsworth, 1975). 
Third, there was the need to finance ~~e marketing of produce. 
Until a few years preceding· Nige=iats attainment of political indepen-
dence, a large number of the indig~nous businessmen, with very few exce-
ptions, were small traders. They \'lere the middlemen between the fa.---mers 
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t · , . 'h ~ons ',UllO .. exported proc.l.i.ce OV'2:::-:;ec~s. ~tey also had ~ s~l propo~tion 
of the districutive trade in rGSp'2e"t of imported :na.'1.ufactu:::-ed 
n,,_~~~ ·~e e~~'~ . d 
,u"- ...... ..., ".. <:.. •• " perl.O s, as no\·! , t::e bCJ''':cs '",hieh ad. vaneed t::e:n ::C1:2;,/-
always insisted on policies of ins'E'cnce as sec"J::,i ty for the '3.dv:::r:ces 
(Cgunlana, 1972). 
The combined effect of t::ese developments was to inc=e2se the 
volume of insurance business in :Tigeria. This in turn encouraged more 
expatriate firms to establish branch of:ices in the place of the general 
agents and ended the domination of the market by the Royal ~change 
Assurance Company for more than a ~u~rter of a century. 
In 1949, three companies, the Legal and General Assurance Soci(~ty, 
the Norwic:.h Union Fire Insurance 3cciety (now merged with the Guinea 
Insurance Company) and the Tobacco Insurance Company (Nigeria, 1976), 
were registered to herald a sudden flood of companies establishing 
themselves throughout the 1950's (3arback, 1964). However, some overseas 
companies with a long-standing and substantial share of the market, such 
as the Northern Assurance Company, had continued to operate through 
agencies (Barback, 1964). 
The domination of the Nige=Lm Ularket by foreign companies ' .... as 
absolute between 1900 and 1949 (F."i.I.~., 1971). This dO!Ilination vl2.s 
challenged in April o· 1955, when the ".1estern Region Production Develop:::lent 
Board awarded two insurance schol~ships to Messrs Bode ogunlana and 
K. A. Onala (Ogunlana, 1980). both of the Royal £Xchange and both of whom 
, , 
we~l repaid their Regional sponsors. In 1959 the Federal Government 
gave six insurance scholarships (ozornah, 1980) for two successive years 
41 
(7-·~ "·,·o""t''1 1 07c:" \ ...... -... , ........ l~.1 .J..0i ...... ' "' • ..,/)_ "'he roc';p; ~V"I,J.. ... n_':-- +"_"_~sn h'llr3arias, :~. _l.. ~:....J.s~,-lU.-... ·-i, .I.. ~ "'_"''-'._~'J _ _ __ '-' _ 
• -1-' • .,., •• • • + (L' . ~ names III "De l~~ger~an ~nsurance ~~:.us "r;;r ·.lJa .... u, 1930) • 
The first indigenous insurc::nce comp~~y to be est~blishaj 
: .. fric2.!1 Insur8l1ce Company for:wed in 1950 (Nigeria :"e, 1979-8C; by 
Dr. K. O. Hbadiwe (3'arnsworth, 1975). The rige:::-ian General Insura.nce 
Company was incorporated on 21 ~pril i951 (Nigeria ~e, 1979-80) followed 
by the lion of Africa Insurance COl!lpany in 1952 (Sarbaclc, 1964). 
The years 1949/50 marked the beGinning of a period of expansion in 
the number of insurance companies op·erating on the ma:::-ket. In 1960, 
questionnaires were sent to 59 firms (Nigeria, 1964) operating in the 
industry. '.-/hen the Lagos Stock Sxch<:!1..ge was established in 1961 some 
of the insurance funds began to be invested in Nigerian industry for 
the first time (Barnack, 1964). statistics on the insurance business 
for the year, 1960, are shown in tables 2.2 and 2.3. 
2.2.3 Insurance Intermediaries: Early phase 
In the intermediaries sector, activities were also taking shape. 
The first expatriate firm of insurance brokers to establish in ~1igeria 
was C.T. Bowring who arrived in 1955 (;Ugeria Re, 1979-80) to handle the 
Costain's acco'tmts (Farnsworth, 1975). They were soon appointed by the 
Nigerian Ports Authority to look into the insurance needs of the Corpora-
tion and recommended measures for improving their existing policies, ~mich 
were issued direct to them by the insurance companies (Cadmus, 1973). 
The job must have been so well done that the government corporations like 
the Electricity Corporation of Nieeria, Nigerian National Produce Corpora-
tion, Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation, etc, soon appointed them as 
their brokers. In 1957, another expatriate firm of brokers, Glanville 
Enthoven, appeared on the market with 50 percent Nigerian participation 
in its shareholdinq (Cadmus, 1973). 
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w 
Income: 
premiums (net) 
Other 
outgoings: 
Claims(net) 
Commission 
Expenses 
other 
Total 
Source: Smi th (1981 ) 
~£1 = ~2 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
307 503 640 1,251 1,834 
--1t ...l2 ..1§. 2~9 268 
311 532 676 1,490 2,102 
16 44 63 132 203 
32 72 80 171 271 
23 73 112 254 337 
2 !l 2 10 12 
73 193 257 567 823 
Table 2.2 
Life Insurance in Nigeria (el;' 000) 
1965 1966 1967 1968 
2,569 3,190 2,860 2,391 
246 ~51 485 664 
2,815 3,541 3,345 3,055 
233 503 515 411 
279 387 233 289 
564 643 4L~7 498 
22 162 625 .IB.. 
1,111 1,696 1,820 1,935 
• 
o 
N 
:E= 
o 
Souroe: Smith (1981 ) 
l;£1 = tl2 
, 
s 
; 
s 
1960 
h39 
83 
2,211 
138 
320 
70 
3,261 
122 
42 
1,249 
95 
118 
1.1.;26 
2,762 
1961 1962 1963 1964 1961: 
517 608 1,022 1,602 1,331 
79 112 242 261~ 235 
2,529 2,479 2,628 3,496 3,636 
131 219 179 341 394 
423 417 612 621 697 
88 68 
-1Q1. ~ 210 
-
3,767 3,903 4,790 6 ,I! 19 6,503 
171 154 233 436 312 
32 46 111 230 115 
1,452 1,420 801 1,489 2,01.j.1 
64 120 56 171 233 
169 232 202 255 270 
~ 1.201 1.60,2 2.10!i 2.~22 
2,846 3,173 3,006 4,685 5,426 
Table 2 • .;2 
Non-Life Insurance in Nigeria (£','~. 000) 
1966 1967 1968 
841 [318 736 
134 F:''7 /4 1119 
3,379 3,145 2,353 
334 319 266 
624 723 601 
340 ~ 297 
5,652 5,1.74 4,402 
185 212 184 
65 69 61 
1,732 1,695 1,266 
165 219 98 
249 299 188 
2128,2 2.180 ~1066 
5,379 4,674 4,863 
1957 (::!igerie. ::Ze, 1979-80) set up tl:eir respective brcking ~irms 2nd. '.;it~in 
a sr.ort t:L"Ile \'le~e placing the busines:: of, a::d sharing t~e com:nissior:.s, on, 
all the ,;uasi-govern.'D.en"t business previously :placed by C. T. :3owrin;. I·:e8.Il'.·rhile, 
Chief John Akin-George, and Thomas !nsur,~ce Brokers stood by hopinG for 
similar participation (Farnsworth, 1975). 
The initial period of t~e indigenous brokers had problems, since like 
any new ventu=e, tr:.ey had to learn by t=ial and error. They controlled 
only a small proportion of the market, but the brea.1{through carne i-Then follo-
wing the country's independence the Federal Government's cor~orations' accounts 
formerly held by the expatriate firms 'flere taken over by t!le ~TiJerien brokers 
(Cadmus, 1973). 
It is a matter for regret that some of the indigenous brokers did not 
live up to expectation in that they adopted poor business practices 
(chapters 5.4.2 and 9.3.1) and this failure which could be attributed to 
many factors did tarnish their reputation within and outside the insurance 
industry. The failure of the brokers in this instance, must have influenced 
them from 
the decision to cut/off/tne insurances of all Federal Government corporations 
and place them direct with the Uational Insurance Corporation of ~ageria 
(~~CON) when it was formed in 1969 (Cadmus, 1973). 
2.3 Transitional ?hase: 1961-1969 
2.3.1 Nationalism and Economic Expansion 
This section looks into the decade following the attainment of indepen-
dence by Nigeria in 1960. 
The strUggle for, and attainment of political independence p=ovided 
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the catalyst much needed to acceler~te the pace of economic ~d social 
development. Desuite the a~sence of a large indigenous capit~l o,~g 
class in Nigeria prior to 1955 (;Jceredole-ale, 1978), the period ~~edia­
tely preceding national independence was one of momentum gathering for 
the entire economy (Lijadu, 1981). 'l'l:e small traders of the pre-indepen-
dence years had, in partnership with foreign investors, or, in some cases, 
sL~gle-handedly, been transformed L~to large commercial undertakings 
(Lijadu, 1985). This situation resulted in an extremely rapid rate of 
economic development. In this atmosphere of leaping forwa-~, the nation 
was gripped by a new kind of political and economic nationalism (Lijadu, 
1981) and recognised the importance of indigenisation of the co~~ercial 
and industrial sectors. Thus, the erosion of the domination of insurance 
services by private foreign investment had begun. The development of the 
oil industry in Nigeria further helped the rapid industrial growth which 
consequently produced the need for very specialised insurance services 
that were previously unlmown in the country (I-1ajundar, 1982). The 
"colonial phase" of the insurance industry was on its way out and the 
"transitional phase" was emerging. 
2.3.2 Control of Insurance Industry: 
The Changing Fa ttern 
Shortly after Nigeria's attainment of political independence, an 
increasingly large number of indigenous companies commenced their 
insurance business. The pattern of ownership rapidly changed from 
foreign owned companies to indigenous companies. In 1963, there were 
about 48 foreign owned companies as against 13 indigenous (Barback, 1964) 
whereas, in 1971 there were 45 indigenous companies as against 20 expatr-
iates operating on the market (ogunshola, 1973). 
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Jt:.ring this tr2.ns.i tional pe:,.:!.oc. s::;ec:'al im~etus 'Nas proviued 
hav-e uposed V2..::iou~ i~s~able li2~:;il::t':'es en the pucl:'c, for e:{J.:.l~l·a, 
the 3.oad. Traffic a.."1d ';Jor~;len's ::;O~!1::211s:;:.tion .>cts (section 2.2.2). Tl:e 
3'ede:-s.l 8.."1d. State Gove:TI..ments emo~-":::ked. u-:;on various de'Velc"Coent ·o::o.s;:r3.-
• &. -
~es ar.d. t~e g:'gantic reconstruction ;:::ogr~~~es necessitated by the end. of 
the 19t~,-7n Cl.'Vl."_· ~ar (~i~~~a 1q~~' 
, ~ .. -~ 0--"'-' "IV;. ':'hey :tlarticipa ted directly :L'1 the 
insu:-ar.ce business by establishL~g tteir own companies in order to p:-ovide 
leadership in the insurance market. During the 10 yea::: period, 1960 to 
1969, v~ious legislations were prc~ulgated, viz. Insurance ~ompanies 
Act 1961, }!a::ine Insurance lct 1961, I!lsurance (IwIiscellaneous Provisions 
Act 1964, Companies Act 1968, Insuxsnce Companies Regulations Act 1968 
and the National Insurance Corporation of Nigeria Act 1969 (chapter 7.3). 
All these actions produced the much needed catalyst for accelerating the 
pace of the development of the insux&nce industry in Nigeria. 
statistics on the size of the market and of its different classes for 
the period 1960-1968 are published in different issues of the Annual 
Abstract of Statistics. These are summarised in tables 2.2 and 2.3. 
The transitional phase, thus, witnessed an increasing adoption of 
direct control mechanisms, a changing .situation which was the inevitable 
result of the growing belief that effective control of the economy must 
necessarily accompany the achievement of political independence. 
Furthermore, official policy, enshrined in the First National Development 
Plan, encouraged partnerships between foreign private industrial enter-
prises and the various Nigerian governments, as well as the development 
of government owned corporations operating industrial concerns (Usoro, 1911). 
The period of the civil war, 1961-10, particularly witnessed sustained 
governmental direct control measures of industry. The immediate explanation 
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of t::is iz that tl:.e e:{pe=ience 0; tl;.e ',[ar and the n8ed for post-..,r2.r 
rscor.struction jol~ed the governm0nt ir-to tighte~i~g up the system of 
control :lecessi tating the stre: .. ::!li::i::; 0: t::e 1e33.: frane':/ork of t:-.e 
ccuntry to facilitate effective ~nd e::icient control ar.d ~~~aee~ent 
of the eccnooy through adninistr2J.;iveaction (':'e=ib~ and Kay-cde, 1977). 
2.4 The ?resent ?l:2.se (Since 1970) 
2.4.1 3conomic Dev3loDment: :ublic Fo1icy 
In the previous stages no policy pe::'ceived the o',~'1lership and cont:ro1 
of industrial ente:rprise in its ag~Tegate form as ~eing essential to p1,~-
ning nor by implication took cogniz2nce of the difference between the 
objective of foreign private enterprise and that of the !Ugerian economy. 
In the present take-off phase, these '..:ea..1messes a:=e recognised by policy. 
1tlhi1e, for example. the private sector had hitherto led the public sector 
in the drive towards industrialisation, policy had bridged the g~p between 
the two sectors. In doing so, foreign private investment could no longer 
be given unqualified guarantees against nationalisation (Usoro, 1977). 
Indeed, in this present phase, policy maintains that it is vital for 
government to acquire and control, on behalf of the Uigerian economy, the 
greater proportion of the productive assets of the country (Nigeria, 1970). 
"The Federal Government will, therefore, occupy the commanding heights 
(of the economy) in the quest for purposeful national development" 
(Nigeria, 1970). 
In the Second National Development plan, 1970-4. industry was 
accorded "the highest order of national priority" (Nigeria, 1970) because. 
according to the Plan document, industrial growth had "become a crucial 
factor in the pace and pattern of iUgeria's general development" (nigeria, 
1977). The fact was also recognised that industry had "moved from the 
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peri;herJ of the country's gro':i"th :12chc..nis:n to a pota:'lti::.lly dcmiu:::.nt 
posi tien ::1S :m i::lFo:=bnt engine 0: economic trar~si'or::na.tion" (:;i6~:·'::2., 
197C). 
The doc1.mlent emphasized th:;d; :oyernment would enco'.1rage r:.~tio:l',dde 
equity participation in all iniustries as a ::natter of general policy. 
Shares were to be allocated to t~le ::?ederal Govern:nent, tr..e state in 
wr..ich a particula~ industry was loc~ted, other states and to :!igerian 
nationals willing to participate in indust~ial develop:nent. ':'he e::ect4tion 
of this policy was to be carried out by joint participaticn with private 
enterprises (foreign or L~digenous) and as occasion demanded, tr~oubh 
complete government control or exclusive public ownership of verJ 
strategic industries. 
The policy of the Feder~ :·::ili taJ:"lJ Government to participate in a 
number of strategic industries was implemented. The first method adopted 
was by setting up its own institutions; the second was by participating 
in the . equity holdings of viable foreign o~ned enterprises. Both approa-
ches were adopted for the most sensitive sectors of the economy namely, 
mining, banking and insurance (.\.je, 1978). 
2.4.2 Insurance IndUStry: public Policy 
1s regards insurance business, government had establiShed NICeR 
as far back as 1 July 1969 (chapter 8~)).Despite this action, the 
insurance business was still dominated by expatriate companies. 
Although there were only 15 foreign owned companies out of a total of 
74, they nonetheless still controlled 80 percent of the total insurance 
business as at 1970.1 Therefore, in an effort to balance the ownership 
structure and in pursuance of its policy to indigenise the key sectors 
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0: the ec~no:ny t govern:nent decided i..--: :~ove:nber 1313 (3h:.l·,.3., 1977) to 
pa.rticipc:. te i.'1 the eq,ui ty ~old.in:;s 02.' ::.11 vLl.ble :ors-izn o'.med i:::::n:::";:'.rlce 
ac~uired not less t~~'1 49 percer.t of t~e shares of e3.c~ expat=iate 
cc:n;any exc-:pt t~ose 'i1here the::e ::2.8 0. suost3.ntial :~ig9ris..n sha=e'hcld.i;::: 
(cr..apter 8.2 ). .is a matter 0: f:.ct, the =811ge of goverI"_rtent p2..rtici-
pat ion in these insurance cOrllp.:m.ies i . .r.:..S bet· .... een 44 to 49 percent (.~Z'!:J.je, 
1975). By the provisions of the :-riceri2..Il :Snterprises Promotions Act of 
1971, indigenous participation L'1 the ex~atriate com?anies was r~ised 
6 ... 2 to 0 pe_cent. 
other areas in which government took positive action are in the 
promotion, supervision and control of the insurance industrJ. The task 
of improving the poor image of the L'1dustry (chapter 5.3) and of profess-
ionalising the business appeared extremely important. This is essential 
because of the special or peculiar nature of insurance transactions and 
the responsiblit,y of government to protect ~~e interest of members of the 
insuring public against exploitation by unscrupulous insurers (Chapter 
4.2). The corrective actions which took place included the lawful esta-
blishment of insurance companies, brokers and agents. To this end, 
government passed the Insurance lct of 1976, which laid the foundation 
for financial stability in all the insurance companies and provided 
machinery for their effective control and supervision (chapter 7.6). 
The Act has removed existing anomalies, checked the mushrooming of 
insurance companies and fostered a high standard of insurance practice 
in the market. The localisation, by section 46 of the Act, of insurance 
of imports is a unique feature of this present stage and is aimed at the 
conservation of Nigeria's foreign exchange on the one hand and at provi-
ding a solid boost to the market on the other (Okwor, 1978). SuCh a step 
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has forced the market to develop c.dQ_ua.te manpower 'wi th proper expertise 
to cepe idth tr:e changed situation (r:'··Uk.'llU, 1979). 
~avL~g passed the insur,~ce central l~w, governuent G~sure~ its 
s~.,rift enforcement. Plans were -:;,uickly devised to reorganise the Insurance 
Department of the Federal Ministry of Trz.de, so that the section vlhich had 
been hi therto u...~derstaffed would be c.ble to :perform ade;uately and effect-
ively the functions of ensuring that the insurance companies conduct 
their business in the best interest of the insuring public and of the 
national economy (chapters 7.6 and 8.3.2). 
One of the most important developments in recent times on the 
Nigerian insurance market is the grm.,ring interest of government in the 
business of reinsurance. Until recently, foreign reinsurers, mainly 
from Europe, used to dominate this class of business. Even other parts 
of the world, especially some Third '.-/orld countries, established a 
business tie with Nigeria on account of the country's reinsurance 
(Majundar, 1982). As an aid to conserve foreign exchange and provide 
the infrastructure for increased retention of business on the domestic 
JIlarket, government promulgated on 14. June 1977 the Nigeria Reinsurance 
Corporation Act3 Which established Nigeria Re. A bold step by gover.nment 
in its insurance control measures, the Corporation commenced business 
on 1 January 1978 (Nigeria Re, 1979). One of the most important changes 
that took place on the market during this period is the Corporation's 
new role to accept 20 percent compulsory cessions of all policies of 
insurance issued b,y every registered insurer operating on the market 
apart from participating in the treaties written by the insurance compa-
nies (chapter :~.~3J. 
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Tl:.e establishment on 1 ';J..j,'1uc.:.'..7 1978 of :~frica Re under the 
auspices of the Organisation of '::.fric:m 'tini ty (C"U) is another 
momentous development in the insurance scene in t::e late 1970's 
(chapter 8.3). It pa=ticipates in the treaties of all member 
companies in Africa to provide extensive local retention capacity 
(Nigeria Re, 1979). 
The present stage has thus exhibited the features of the 
"take-off phase." The market is greatly boosted by legislative provi-
sions for compulsory insurance; state owned companies have come into 
existence again, with the indirect effect of boosting the insurance 
business; new legislation is passed with a view to indigenising the 
insurance industry and providing a strong financial base for the insu-
rance companies and ensuring a high standard of insurance practice in 
Nigeria. 
As a result of these developments, some progress has been made by 
the insurance industry during the take-off phase. Smith (1981) reveals 
"the very visible evidence of a market growing in real terms." This 
picture is confirmed by table 2.4 which shows an industry growing faster 
than the whole economy. Between 197, and 1984, the total gross domestic 
product (GDP) was growing at an average annual rate of approximately 12 
percent while the industry was growing at an average annual rate of 22 
percent. When the premium figures and the GDP figures are corrected to 
take account of the rate of inflation over the period, the real growth 
rate of the industry and athat of the economy would be considerably lower. 
Class of Business 1~75 1976 1977 1218 
Ge 
M· 
T 
L 
T 
T 
~ ( 
m-lif'e: 
Fire 20.75 26.5 30.6 43.8 
Motor 49.4 15.9 103.9 113.1 
neral Accident 15.9 32.4 52.9 66.5 
rine & Aviation 11.4 19.4 53.3 82.1 
tal Non-life 91.6 154.2 239.9 306.0 
fe 25.1 34.5 50.9 65.3 
tal GPI 123.3 188.1 290.8 371.3 
tal GDP 
urrent Prices) 20,957.1 26,655.6 31,283.4 34.002.2 
Sources: (1) N.R.: Insurance Year Book 1985 
(2) Central Planning Office 
1979 
54.8 
104.1 
10.6 
65.4 
295.4 
69.1 
364.5 
41,914.1 
Table 2.4 
1980 ~981 n982 
58.9 70.7 88.9 
109.7 135.5 141.8 
107.6 143.6 134.1 
85.2 103.c; 117.2 
361.3 453 ... 488.6 
95.9 121.9 122.8 
457.2 575.~ 611.4 
48,538.6 ~o, 658.353, 859 .l~ 
Gross Premium Income of Insurance Companies in Nigeria, 1915 to 1984 
(Naira Million) 
~983 1984 
98.3 113.1 
140.0 152.6 
137 .!~ 151.1 
74.1 75.6 
41~9. 8 492.h 
145.0 165.3 
594.8 657.7 
~3,341.2 55,249.2 
, '---ll·0\:t~i. 
, -l-
_t..'. LC 
I> i ,,- -. .,-' 
. :). :--~. 
,:::1.1[; 
;-1!-~.79 
;·31.21 
dh. ")2 
. ')1 1'4 i"',,- • ' .... 
i·23.m~ 
i·22 •05 
,·11 • 72~ 
~J~ 
The contribution of each submarket to t~e gross p=emium L~come varies from 
year to year as table 2.4 shows. 
2.5 Gonclusion 
The evolution of the insurance industry has been considered under t~~ee 
distinguishable phases: the colonial era, the transitional ~hase and the 
present stage. 
As we witnessed above, the "colonial period" was dominated by European 
firms which virtually held the monopoly of this sphere of economic activity 
over the vast continent of Africa and vast sums generated from the business 
of insurance were transferred to their home-base and therefore unavailable 
for local investment. There was hardly any effective indigenous endeavour 
in this field of business and e~ually absent was any adeqpate local control 
over the activities of insurance operators. However, the process of gradual 
but solid development and diversification of the business began after the 
Second World War. 
The second phase witnessed a definition of priorities and, therefore, 
of the guidelines for sustained government action, the intention of government 
to enable Nigerian businessmen to control increasing portions of the Nigerian 
economy became enshrined in the First National Development plan. There was 
an increasing adoption of direct control measures which encouraged partnerships 
between foreign and local investors as well as the development of government 
companies operating industrial concerns. 
In the present phase, policy is focused on 1nd1genisinq the ~urance 
industry. Hence the banning of exclusive ownership of insurance companies 
by foreigners, the introduction of compulsory reinsurance with Nigeria Re 
and Africa Re and the creation of the monopoly of governme~t business by 
NICON and other state owned companies. Therefore, the distinguishing feature 
of this stage in the words of UNCT.Ul (1981) is "near-or-full monopolies of 
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the domestic market, compulsory cessions of reinsurance and di~cr~in~tion 
in favour of national cornpani-as." ?l:is fea tu:::-e i.i.lcludi:lg the l.:.ck of 
technical insurance expertise makes t::le market ve-::y dependent on both the 
underwTiting capacirJ and, even ~ore, t~e expertise of the insurance 
markets of the developed western cOlh~tries. 
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2.6 :~otes 
1. See iJew Nigerian (25/3/70 an::' 28/1/74). 
2. 3ee item 20 of 3chedule r;:;'lIO to the :~igeri311 
Enterprises Promotion ~ct 1~77. 
3. See TIecree ~o 49 of 1977. 
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CH.wr:sR 3 
MARKET STRUCTURE IN THE NIG:23LUT DlSURANCE INDUSTRY 
).1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the important aspects of industry structure such as 
the types and number of firms, the size distribution of firms, the trend 
in market concentration, the inequality in the size distribution of firms 
t 
and other important aspects of size of firm structure which are vital for 
public policy, are examined. The purpose is to demonstrate the relevance 
of the methodology of the economics of industrial organisation, particularly 
the market structure framework, to the understanding of the problems of the 
insurance industry, the conduct and performance of firms operating in the 
industry and the implications for government regulation of the industry. 
The contention is that the application of the analytical. techniques 
employed in the eoonomics of industrial organisation does provide a fruitful 
insight into the economic problems of the insurance industry and the conse-
quences of government regulation of the industry. 
The discussion is conducted in three parts. In the first section, the 
concepts and hypotheses of the economics of industrial organisation are 
ana.lysed. The second section utilises some of the concepts to explain the 
structure of the Nigerian insurance industry. The final part draws out the 
implications of the structural appr~ for the public regulation of the 
industry. 
).2 ~e MethodolOgy of Industrial Organisation 
The postulate of the economics of industrial organisation is that 
every indUstr,y or market has certain definable characteristics (SCherer, 
1980). These ares the structural features, a pattern of behaviour or 
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conduct of the participants in a ma=ket and the performance of the industry 
or market. Of central interest is the relationship between three features 
of a market. ~Nhile the structure of a market or industry is determined by 
its underlying technology, the hypotheses assert that the structural fea-
tures of an industry influence the behaviour of firms in the industry and 
the prices, costs, profits and innovation activity, etc, resulting in its 
market (Shepherd, 1979 and 1972). The direction of the relationShip is 
not entirely from structure to conduct and performance. Both conduct and 
performance of firms in the industry can also affect the structure of the 
market. 1Nhatthen are the attributes of structure, conduct and performance? 
3.2.1 1 Structure - Conduct - Performance Paradism 
Structure represents the relatively more permanent and persistent 
features of the market environment that are not easily changed by 
short-ran b'tminess decisiene er the more atable and. exogenoua enviro-
nmental. forces surrounding the firms :in an industry. The basic elements 
of market structure include the number and size distribution of sellers 
and buyers.l"-"': _~:'::-:'"'~~) the combined market shares of leadiiig firms 
creating the conllitions ot oligopolY', the conditions fer .try into 
the industry, the nature of the product (differentiated or homogeneous, 
etc), cos t conditions and tecllno~ogy and the type and degree of vertical 
integration which exists. 
Conduct or behaviour of firms in the industry refers to the 
patterns of internal. decision making and interactive behaviour that 
the firms develop. Attributes of conduct cover such factors as: 
collusion among the competitors regarding price or volume of output; 
exclusive contracts; and price discrjmination. The behaviour of firms 
in the industry can range from purely competitive or price-taking 
behaviour by firms constrained b,y atomistic structural conditions, to 
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the typical maximising behaviour of a single monopolist. 
Conduct plays a central role in the determination of market struc-
ture. The behaviour pattern chosen by firms is heavily dependent in 
the short run on the market structu~e that surrounds them, but with 
important random components. Conduct patterns, however, can feed back 
and influence market structure in the long run. 
Performance relates to the results of the operations of an industry 
or market. The most commonly used tests of performance include profit 
levels or the rate of profit. Low profit rates indicate poor perfor-
mance because of high management expenses or low demand. Others include 
the rate of growth of the industry, the flexibility of prices .in 
relation to costs, the size of selling costs in relation to o~~er opport-
unities for competitive performance, the propensity to innovate, to 
adopt improvements in technology, and to pass the benefits along to 
buyers, the utilisation of capacity, and the responsiteness of investment 
flows to profit opportunities. 
These classifications are not watertight. There is considerable 
overlapping between the indicators. In fact, it mq be difficult to 
classifY' a particular attribute as belonging to structure, behaviour 
or performance. 
3.3 Market structure in the Nigerian 
Insurance IndustJiY 
In the 118ht ot the above discussion of the structure-conduct-
performance framework, it is possible to apply these concepts to 
explain the structure of the insurance industry in Nigeria. In the 
main, one seeks to answer the following questionsl Ylbat types of 
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firm operate on the market? What is the size distribution of firms in 
the industry? \¥hat has been the trend of change, if any, in the 
size-of-firm structure? What is now the average size of firm? How 
unequal is the size distribution of firms in the industry? Is entry 
into the industry by potential entrant firm easy? How important is the 
barrier to entry into the industry? 
The analysis of market struoture in the insurance industry excludes 
the large number of intermediary firms who act as agents and brokers. 
In 1985, there were about 180 registered insurance brokers and 10,000 
licensed insurance agents. However, the analysis will concentrate on the 
registered insuranoe companies and exolude the intermediaries. This is 
not to s~ they are unimportant in ma:rket struoture analysis. On the 
contrary, they can substantially affect the competitive oonditions in the 
industry particularly when one considers the vertiCal elements of market 
structure; in particular, the effeot of vertical integration on market 
conoentration and hence as en entry barrier, (Carter, 1979). 
3.).1 Type - of - Firm Structure 
'rhe firms operating in the Nigerian insurance indust1'7 can be classified 
in a number of ways. The first is the W8'g authorisation affects the nature 
of business written by the companies. Firms operating on the market are 
currently regulated by the Insurance Act of 1976 (chapter 7.6). Under the 
Act, the Director of Insurance is given power to issue authorisation to 
compa;nies wishing to carry on insurance business in lU,geria and able to 
, "" , \ \~ , ' \. \ 
,: compiLy with the requirements of the Act. 
It divides insurance business into two main classes2 life and 
non-1Ue buSinesses. Non-life busineSS is further sub-divided into fire, 
accident, motor vehicle, workmen's compensation, transport and miscell-
aneous insurance businesses. It is further provided that no organisation 
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shall carry on any class of business unless it is a company duly incor-
porated as a limited liability company under the Companies Act of 1968, 
a cooperative insurance societ.y registered under anyenactment or law 
relating to oo-operative societies or a mutual insurance company.3 
Two bases of classification can be derived from au~~orisation. 
The first is the funotion of the fir.ms, that is, the insuranoe business 
they write. Thus, it is possible to distinguish between life and 
non-life companies. According to the List of Registered Insurers issued 
by the Insurance Department in the Federal Ministry of Finanoe on 3 June 
198.5, 4 insurers were authorised to write life only business, .59 non-life 
bUSiness, 21 all olasses of insurance business and 1 non-life reinsurance. 
Table 3.1 shows the distribution of insurance oompanies over time. In 
1969, life only companies aocounted for 22 peroent of the total number of 
firms. This peroentage has sinoe steadily deolined to about 4 percent in 
1985. Although the percentage share of non-life companies was 48 peroent 
in 1969, by 1985 it had risen to over 70 peroent. As for the oomposite 
companies their proportion of the total was 30 percent in 1969, deolining 
to about 25 percent in 1985. It is thus olear that whilst the peroentage 
shares of the life only and oomposite companies are deolining, the group 
of non-life oompanies has beoome predominant (about 70 percent in 1985). 
The control law4 says that life insuranoe business and non-life 
business shall be subject to separate applioation and registration. 
Traditionally pure life offioes have been less oommon than oomposite 
off~oes, but under current provisions, most new oompanies specialise 
in non-life business (unally motor vehicle insurance) because of the 
lower capital requtrement.S The present position, therefore, is one 
where the number of companies which write life only business or which 
write both lite and non-life business is a diminishing proportion of 
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the total number of fims active on the rna~ket. However, an indica-
tion of the importance of the composite com~anies in the industry's 
structure is shown in table 3.2. Of the top ten companies operating 
on the ~igerian insurance market in 1982 eight are composite companies 
while the remaining two are ~on-life cOLpanies. 
Year 
. 1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
198C; 
Life Non-life Composite Total 
6(22) 13(48) 8 (30) 27 
7(16) 26( 80) 10(23) 43 
6(11) 38(72) 9(17) 53 
8(12) 43(66) 14(22) 65 
9(13) 44(63) 17(24) 70 
9(13) 41(59) 20(29) 70 
9(13) 43(62) 17(25) 69 
6(10) 37(62) 1~(27) 59 
6(10) 38(64) 15(25) 59 
.. 
6(9) 42(67) 15(24) 63 
3(4) 48(68) 20(28) 71 
3(4) 48(67) 21(29) 72 
3(4) 53(69) 21(27) 77 
3(4) 60(71) 21(25) 84 
3(4) 62(72) 21(24) 86 
3(3.4) 64(72.7) 21(23.9) 88 
4{4.71) 60(70.6) 21(24.7) 85_ 
Source: Insurance Dept •• Federal Ministry of Finance 
tigures in parenth~Bes show percentage distribution 
~ .-~ 
Table 3.1 
Distrtubtion of Insurance Companies by Type 
~or Business, 1969 - 1985 
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Ran~ Name of Cot:l''"'8..ll' Class of Business 
1. NICON Life and non-lif·:; 
2. mnc ~!on-life 
3. Royal Exchani;."e Life and non-life 
4. Great Nigeria Life and non-life 
5. Lion of Africa Life and non-life 
6. American International Life and non-life 
1. Guinea Insurance Life and non-life 
8. Sun Insurance Office Life and non-life 
9. NEM Insurance Lif e and non-life 
10. Phoenix Insurence Non-life 
*In terms. of gross premium income 
Source': Nigeria Re's Nigerian Insurance Year :Book (1984) 
Table 3.2 
Top Ten Companies by Size*, 1982 
The second basis for classification arising from authorisation is 
entity, that is, the type of 'person' authorised operate as insurer. 
All the fims are limited liability companies. National Co-operative 
Insurance Society of Nigeria and 'ltlorldwide Insurance Company t al thoue,il 
owned by co-operative societies, are operated like the other insurance 
companies. Only two of the firms, NICON and Nigeria Re, came into being 
by Acts of Parliament (chapter 8.1) and between them now (1985) control 
about one third of the premium income of the industry. 
There are other bases for classification. A distinction can be done 
between indigenous and foreign associated companies. Although the domina-
tion of the industry by expatriate companies was absolute up to 1949 
(Chapter 2.2), by the time of Nigeria.' s independence in 1960, this monopoly 
had been broken by the entry of in~i6enous companies. In 1969, the l~tter 
acco~~ted for 22 percent of the tot2l number of fi=~s (table 3.3). 3ver 
since, the percentage has been rising inexorably. In 1969, foreign o\med 
companies constituted 63 percent of the total number of the insure.nce 
offices. This virtual domination was completely removed in the 1970's 
by the indigenisation actions of the government leading to the elimination 
, , 
of exclusive ownership of insurance companies by foreigners (table 3.4). 
As well as the distinction between Nigerian owned and foreign owned 
companies, there are further differences between Nigerian owned companies • 
.. ~ . 
Of the 69 Nigerian owned companies operating on the market in 1985, two 
are owned by the Federal. Govemment, and 14 by the various -State Govern-
ments (table 3.5). There is a tendency for each government in the fede-
ration to own its own insurance company or bank, implying that the number 
of state owned companies will be on the increase. 
Year 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
,-
I 
Nigerian Joint Foreign Total 
5 (18.5) 5(18.5) 17(63) 27 
. 22 (51) 5(12) 16(37) 43 
33 (62) 5(9) 15(28) 53 
41(63) 13(20) 11(17) 65 
44 (63) 14(20) 12(17) 70 
47 (67) 16(23) 7( 10) 70 
46 (67)' 16(23) 7(10) 69 
40 (68) 15(25) 4(7) 59 
39 (66) 20(34) nil 59 
44 (70) 19(30) nil 63 
52 (73) 19(27) nil 71 
53 '(74) 19(26) nil 72 
S8 (75) 19(25) nil 77 
65 (77) 19(23) nil 84 
67 (18) 19(22) nil 86 
69 (78) 19(22) nil 88 
66 (77.65) 19(22.351 nil 85 
Source: Insurance Dept., Federal Minis try of Finance 
Figures in parenthesis show percentage distribution 
Table 3.3 
, ... • I ." 
~ Distribution 'Of Insurance Canpani:}s by Owers'hip (1969-1981 
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',,'hilst most of the indigenous companies are privately o~med, none 
of the firms operating on the market is publicly quoted on the LaJOs 
Stock Exchange with the result tb:.t insurance shares are not widely 
owned by the investing public. 
A final distinction to be noted is that between specialist reinsu-
rers and ceding offices. Of the 85 insurance companies authorised to 
operate on the market in 1985 only three wholly specialise in underNri ting 
reinsurance risk. The first is the Federal Government owned Nigeria Re 
which came into being in 1978 to receive the 20 percent compulsory cessions 
of all policies issued by all registered insurers on the market (chapter 
2.4). The second, the transnational Africa Ret Similarly established in 
1978 and owned b.r member countries of the OAU, accepts the 5 percent 
cessions of all treaties written by member companies (chapter 2.4). The 
third, the Universe Reinsurance Company, a private sector firm, which was 
licensed to transact non-life reinsuz'ance business on 12 December 1984. 
The existence of these specialist reinsurers ~es not however atop the ,:', 
'" 
ceding offices from exchanging facultative reinsurance between ~~elves and 
placing business above their retentions with specialist reinsurers on 
the reinsurance 'market of the world. 
3.3.2 Number-of-F1r.m Structure 
The number of firms is a clear iQdicator of the growth and development 
of the industry. It also provides evidence of a dynamic market structure. 
There is no doubting it that the number of firms has increased over the 
years and, in addition, some of the entrants have grown so rapidly in 
terms of premium income that many are little smaller than some of the 
major long-established firms. 
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~ 
~ 
rc of FOrei~ " .. Existing ~-t of Pri va te :..-- -
- .-
No of Participation Nigerian 
Directors I Participa tio] 
% No o£ 96 
( 
No of 
Name o£ Company Directors Inirectors 
rican International 7 4C 3 - -
tish American 7 4c 3 - -
sader Insurance 7 4( 3 - -
nes Insurance 12 4C 5 D4.18 3 
Union £& Rock 6 4c 2 9.90 1 
n of Africa 6 4C 2 45.00 3 
'cury Insurance 8 10 1 41.00 4 
.M. Insurance 7 40 3 -
. India Insurance 6 40 2 -
9,1 EJrcha.nge Assurance 9 40 4 2.00 
Unsurance Office 5 40 2 -
C 9 40 4 20 
UNL Ie 3 40 3 6.54 
w t African Provincial 6 40 2 5.60 
Sources Insurance Dept., Federal Ministry of Finance 
Table 3.4 
% of Federal Govel-
ment Participatiol 
e,/ 
Ii.' No of 
i)irectors 
49 3 
49 3 
49 3 
24.82 3 
39.10 2 
4.00 
-
49.00 3 
49.00 3 
49 3 
47 4 
49 2 
48.80 4 
42.46 3 
33.40 2 
Federal Government participation in Insurance Companies in 1985 
: 
, 
-
~.~ of state 
Government 
Participation 
% No of 
Directors 
11 1 
11 1 
11 1 
11 1 
11 1 
11 1 
- -
11 1 
11 1 
11 1 
11 1 
11 1 
11 1 
11 1 
---
Federal Government Companies Companies Owned by State 
Governments 
1. NICCN 1. Great Nigeria (Odua Group) 
2. Nigeria Re 2. Nigeria General (Odua Group) 
3. Bendel Insurance (Bendel state) 
4. Trans Insurance (Oyo) 
5. Lagos State Assurance (Lagos) 
6. Ga tew~ Insurance (Kwara) 
7. Universal Insurance (Imo & 
Anambra) 
8. }!an1lla Insurance (Cross River) 
9. Rivbank Insurance (Rivers) 
10. Xapital Insurance (Kano) 
11. Confidence Insurance (ondo) 
12. Nigerian Victory Assurance 
(Kano) 
13. Savanna. Insurance (Plateau) 
14. Yankari Insurance (Bauchi) 
Source: Nigerian Reinsurance Corporation: "Nigerian Insurance 
Year Book, 1984." 
Table 3.5 
Classification of Government Companies 
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t 
Year Number of :sn try /Bxi t Year Number of mtr.r/2xit 
Companies Companies 
1914-48 1 1973 71 2 
1949 4 3 1974 77 6 
1960 59 55 1975 77 0 
1961 35 (24) 1976 70 (7) 
1963 44 9 1977 59 (11) 
1966 49 5 1978 63 4 
1967 67 18 1979 71 8 
1968 88 21 1980 72 1 
1969 27 (61) 1981 77 5 
1970 43 16 1982 84 7 
1971 66 23 1983 86 2 
1972 69 3 1984 88 2 
1985 85 (3) 
Sources: 1. Conference Papers of the lIN 
2. c]N Economic & Financial Review, 
3. List of Registered Insurers, 
Federal Minis try of Finance 
Figures in parentheses represent exit from the industry_ 
Table 3.6 
The Number of Nigerian Insurers, 1914 to 1985 
Same evidence to support this view is given b,y table 3.6. The 
early period, 1914-48, witnesses the existence of only one company 
Royal. 
operating on the market. This is the· I Exchange operating as an 
68 
\ 
overseas branch. The period, 1349 to i 968, shows acce lera ted gro1:Tth of 
the number of offices. In 1949, tr~ee cOffipanies, the Legal and Gene=al, 
the Nor'tlich 'Lnion and the Tobacco, ':ie::e registe=ed to herald a sudden 
flood of companies establishing thenselves throughout the 1950's. 
Although the number of these comp~nies was 44 in 1963, by 1966 it rose 
to 49 and in 1968 it swelled to 88 (chapter 5.4). 
The flourishing of over 70 companies, unregulated, led to the 
proliferation of indigenous companies, a situation which prompted the 
promulgation of the Insurance Companies Regulations in 1968. This set 
the pace for government intervention in insurance. It was therefore no 
surprise that the number went down to a bare 21 in 1969 because a number 
of expatriate as well as indigenous companies woundup their operations owing 
to the increasingly effeotive enforcement of the control laws. It did 
not take a long time for the oompanies to recover from the Shock of 
government intervention. By 1910, the number had started picking up again 
reaching 11 in 1913. J5y 1915 it had climbed to 77. 
The domination of the industry by foreign oompanies oontinued despite 
the formation of NICON in 1969 (chapter 5.4). Government, in order to 
remove this anomaly, decided to indigenise the industry. This action, 
together with the promulgation of the Insuranoe Aot of 1976, led to the 
, 
reduction of the number of insurance companies to 59 in 1977 (chapter 9). 
Since 1976, the Insurance Department of the Federal Ministry of 
Finance has exercised stricter oontrol of the insurance industry. This ' 
is a result of the wide powers oonferred on it by the 1976 Insurance Aot. 
It issues authorisation in respeot of different classes of insurance 
business, and has publiShed annually a list of companies authorised to 
I 
write different classes of insurance. Using this information, 
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table 3.6 shows the number of comp~~ies authorised to write business tas 
shown a continued upward trend over the period 1977-85. Thus, whereas 
59 companies were authorised to write business in 1977 by 15G4 the 
number of authorisations had risen to 88 a percentage increase of 49 
percent. 
The reasons for the increasing number of companies are not far to 
seek. Firstly, the insurance industry has witnessed very rapid grO'.-rth in 
recent years: it has produced an annual growth rate of over 25 percent 
compared with the nation's gross domestic product expanding at an annual 
average rate of less than 15 percent (table 2.4). This means that the 
industry can absorb many more new entrants. Secondly, the restrictive 
capital requirements of W.300,OOO to ;;800,oooare no longer a disincentive 
to a rapidly growing capital owning class. Thirdly, the educational and 
other related barriers have been virtually broken by the opening of more 
insurance teaching schools in the country. 
).).) The Size Distribution of Firms 
One basic characteristic of the sizes of firms is their variation, 
ranging widely from the smallest to the largest. Firms with small shares 
are usually under competitive stress while those with large shares are 
likely to face less competitive pressures. Market share is the aim of 
the firm because the attainment of a significant share of the market is 
likely to be related to long term profitability. There is an hypothe-
sised relationShip between market share and the degree of profitability. 
Table ).7 shows the size distribution of companies in 1978 and 1982. 
\ 
An examination of table 3.7.1 shows that when size is measured in tems 
of gross premium income, there were in 1978 19 companies whose annual 
gross premium income was less than N1 million. These 19 co~anies 
between them earned a total of ~1o.8 million and accounted for about 
, 70 
, 
I 
, I 
2.9 percent of the total premi"..lm ir.COf:le in the industry. Companies in 
the size class of 1 million and 4.89 million (23 in number) tog9ther 
accounted for about ~59 million of the gross premium income which is 
approximately 16 percent of the total. There were only six companies 
in 1978 earning over 15 million in gross :f)remium income. These six 
companies altogether had a combined premium income of about ~176 million 
whioh represents 47.3 peroent of the total market. Companies earning 
between ;;5 million and ~15 million in premium income were 15 in number 
and together accounted for 34 percent (~126.4 million) of the gross premium 
income • 
.. 
In terms of total assets, table 3.7.1 shows that there were 11 
oompanies with assets over ~15 million. These 11 companies had between 
them about 74 percent (~314 million) of the total assets of the industry. 
Eighteen companies with assets less than ~~1 million had between them 2.2 
percent (~ million) of the industry's total assets. 
Premium Income 
Size of Firms in Terms Number of Amount 
of Premium Inoome Companies (~'m) 
(~;'m) 
Less than 1 million 19 10.8( 2.9) 
1 - 4.9 million 23 58.64(15.8 
5 - 1S million 1S 126.4(34) 
Over 15 million 6 115.1ill.Jl 
63 371.5(100) 
Source, Nigeria Re (1984) 
Figures in parentheses show percentage distribution 
Table 3.7.1 
, 
Size Distribution of ~a;e;ian Insurers, 1978 
Assets 
Number of Amount 
Companies (k'm) 
18 9.0(2.2) 
13 34.3(8) 
8 70.7(16.4) 
"11 313.5(13.4) 
50 427 (100) 
" ! 1 
: 
This analysis of tr:e size dist-..:ic".rtion of firms sho'lis t~e :lo:ninance 
and importance of la=-ge (:.;5 - 15m: and very large firms (above ~;15) in 
the insurance industry. 
Has there been any change in the size distribution of firms in the 
industry? An analysis of table 3.7.2 will clea=-ly enable us answer this 
question. VJhat has happened four years· later in-01982? The general 
pattern is clear. There is a tendency towards the greater importance of 
the very large firms. Firms earning ov~r ~15 million in premium income 
have increased their percentage share of the industry premium income to 
60 percent. These firms, 10 in number had a combined premium income of 
~364 million. The proportion of premium income accounted for by the same 
size-class of enterprises in 1978 and 1982 were 47.3 and 60 percent 
respectively. The percentage share of premium income by companies in the 
same size-class of less than ~1 million, has shown a downward trend from 
2.9 percent of the total premium in 1978 to 1., in 1982. A similar trend 
is observable for companies .in the other size-classes. 
A comparison of the distribution of market shares between 1978 and 
1982 shows that the largest sized fixm has increased its dominance of 
the market from 15 percent in 1978 to 20.5 percent in 1982. There is a 
gradation of market shares. The size distribution tapers down from the 
largest fim out to a fringe of small ones. The degree of asymmetry 
varies but there is a great preponderance of the smallest sizes. The 
skewed distribution is typical. 
The s~d size distributian shown in table 3.7 can be explained 
.... 
by a number of factors. The small number of large firms in the industry 
is explained by their longevity, most of the very largest companies 
having been in operation since the colonial period. BY comparison, the 
,72 
ve~J smallest firms are companies which only recently entered the indust=y. 
w'here an insurance company is owed. by the state or a group of commercial 
enterprises, it is bound to be large owing to the advantage of bulk-purchase. 
EXa.!Ilples of these companies (startL"1g as captives) are the Great ~;ioooeria and 
mac. The unusually large size of the leading company, :NICON, is explained 
by government's economic policy which is to control the commanding heights 
of the economy (chapter 5.5). It is for this reason that government set up 
this Corporation in 1969 to handle the bt:.lk of all insurances of the Federal 
Government and its projects. Since ~~e Federal Government is the biggest 
spender, the biggest employer and the largest buyer of goods and services 
(Okwor, 1981), it is not surprising that a quarter of the country's 
insurance business is concentrated in the hands of NICON. 
Apart from the use of the amount of annual premium income, there are 
other ways of measuring the size of insurance offices. These measures 
include aggregate sums insured in force, new business premiums, the size 
of t~e insurance funds, total assets, employment levels, etc. However, it 
does not really matter whiCh measure of size is used sinc~ all measures turn 
out to be highly correlated with one another. Relative .sizes based on 
sales will not differ markedly from relative sizes measured according to 
one of those variables. Thus, use of anyone variable in describing the 
d-.-.stribution of fim sizes will usually give about the same result as another 
variable. 
Perhaps a good indi~ation of the dominance of the latge firms is 
to examine the proportion of the industry' s outPut~ir sale~ or assets 
achieved by a small number of firms. This i~ a m~asure of concentration 
and is referred to as the concentration ratio, the commonly used 
measure of concentration. 
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Total premium Income ~~urnber of Companies Total ~remium (~'m) 
Category (~'m) 
1. N/A 10 (11.3) 0.0 (0.0) 
2. o - 9.99 59 (67.0) 129.3 (21.1) 
2.1 o - 0.99 21 (23.8) 8.3 (1.5) 
2.2 1 - 4.99 31 (35.2) 68.4 (11.2) 
2.3 5 - 9.99 7 (8.0) 52.5 (8.6) 
3. 10 -19.99 13 (14.7) 182.2 (29.8) 
3.1 10 -14.99 9 (10.2) 117.9 (19.3) 
3.2 15 -19.99 4 (4.5) 64.3 (10.5) 
4. 20 -29.99 2 (2.2) 50.2 (8.3) 
5. 30 -39.99 2 (2.2) 71.0 (11.6) 
6. 40 -49.99 o (0.0) o (0.0) 
7. 50 -59.99 1 (1.3) 53.4 (8.7) 
8. 60 -69.99 o (0.0) o (0.0) 
9. 70 -79.99 o (0.0) o (0.0) 
10. 80 -89.99 o (0.0) o (0.0) 
11. 90 -99.99 o (0.0) o (0.0) 
12. 100 -109.99 o (0.0) 0'(0.0) 
13. 110 -119.99 o (0.0) o (0.0) 
14. 120 -129.99 1 (1.3) 125.3 (20.5) 
Source: Nigerian Insurance Year :Book. 1984 
Figures in parentheses show percentage distribution 
Table 3.7.2 
Size Distribution of Nigerian Insurers, 1982 
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3.3.4 Concentration i.."'1 tl:e Insurance Industry 
Concentration refers to the combined market shares of ~he largest 
firms in the industry. More specifically it is the percentage share of 
sales, emplo~ent or capacity, acco~~ted for by the largest tr.ree or 
four fims in an industry. There are many factors determining concen-
tration and changes in concentration. These include econo~ies of scale, 
the desire to restrict competition and gain market power, ~otivations of 
management, advantages of large-scale sales promotion, 'countervailing 
power', government intervention in industxy and fiscal policy. 
Concentration is an important element of market structure. Its 
effect on market behaviour and performance may be significant. The 
higher the level of concentration the greater the likelihood of monopoly 
practices and outcomes. However, certain economic benefits are possible 
in concentrated industries. Greater concentration may lead to greater 
economies of scale and faster industrial development. The rate of 
pro~e,ssiveness, the propensity to innovate, and to adopt improvements 
-' .. '\ '" ' , 
in teChnology may be greater in industries with high degree of concentra-
tion. 
Market concentration is a directly observable dimension of industry 
• .c,I ... 
structure,. enabling the reader to grasp the degree of inequalit.1 in the 
distribution of firms by size. Market concentration ratiO, as commonly 
defined, is the percentage of total industry premium (or physical output, 
employment levels, value added, or assets) contributed b,y the largest few 
fims ranked in order of market shares. The easiest to calculate, the 
top 2, 4, 5, 10 or 20 firm concentration ratio, is most commonly used. 
In this section we consider the degree of concentration in the 
industry at three selected dates and the changing relative position of 
the leading companies. The simplest picture of the degree of concentra.-
tion in the industry is given by examining the cumulative percentage of 
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the total premiums ::,ec~ived by t::~e top company, the top t-,.,ro co:np2.nics, 
and so on. ~nis is done in table 3.8. 
Rank of Companies 1978 1980 1982 
\ 
-
Top Compa."lY 55.03 ( 14.82) 90.57 ( 19.81) 125.33( 20.50) 
Top 2 99.16 ( 26.71) 135.40 ( 29.61) 178.68( 29.23) 
Top 4 144.65 ( 38.96) 184.71 ( 40.40) 249.69( 40.84) 
I 
Top 5 160.17 ( 43.14) 203.73 ( 44.56) 277.00( 45.31) 
Top 10 226.88 ( 61.10) 281.00 ( 61.46) 364.22( 59.58) 
Top 20 296.68 ( 79.90) 37 3.28 ( 81.64) 492.01( 80.48) 
Total Premiums 371.31 (100.00) 457.22 (100.00) 611.36(100.00) 
Total No of Companies 63 70 78 
Sources: Nigerian Insurance Year Book, Nigeria Re. 
Figures in parentheses represent cumulative percentage of premium income. 
Ta.ble 3.8 
Distribution of Nigerian Insurance Among the Top 
Companies on the Basis of premium Income 
-.. (!-f.illion Naira) 
~ing 1976~2, there is a picture of a great degree of. inequality 
in the sizes 0.£ firms operating in the industry. The 20 largest companies 
controlled 80.61 percent of the total gross premium income while less than 
20 percent went to the remaining 50 companies. The top company has been 
the same throu8hout, namely NICCN,- whose preeminence is due Ito its 
monopoly of Federal Gover.nment insurance. The next two positions 
immediately following have been occupied the UNIC and Royal ExChange 
Assurance respectively. While there has been some jockeying among the 
companies for the remaining positions, there is no doubting it that 
the indigenised foreign subsidiaries dominate the top 5. the top 10 
and the top 20 companies =espectively. The explanation of this tenacity 
is the ir lor.gevi ty and their inte~2.. tional connections and ex?e:::ie~1ce. 
It should be observed t:'.;.t C!1 tLe basis of these fiGUres, life 
and non-life busllless is less concentrated than life insurance business 
(tables 3.8 and 3.8.1). ri furtl1er comparison Can be made between life 
insurance and non-life insurance. The tables (3.8.1 and 3.8.2) Show 
that there is more concentration of business in the hands of the top 
company as well as the 2 top companies in the case of non-life business. 
The situation is, however, reversed when the top 4,5,10 and 20 companies are 
considered. The clear cut feature is that the life business is more 
concentrated than the aggregate whereas non-life business is significatly 
less so. 
The results depicted in table 3.8 show an increase in concentration 
between 1978 and 1982. In the first half of this four year period the 
increase was high but this reduced considerably in the second half. 
For example, the top company increased its share of the market by 33.67 
percent in the first half. By the second half, this increase has been 
reduced to a mere 3.48 percent. 
Rank of Com anies 19 8 
Top Company 12.11 ( 18.56) 
Top 2 21.50 ( 32.95) 
Top 4 35.14 ( 53.85) 
Top 5 40.60 ( 62.22) 
Top 10 57.48 ( 88.09) 
Top 20 65.09 ( 99.75) 
Total Premium 65.25 (100.00) 
No. of Companies 
Souroes As in table 3.8 
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1 80 
16.86 ( 19.63) 
28.33 ( 29.55) 
47.66 ( 49.71) 
55.81 ( 58.21) 
84.15 ( 87.78) 
95.71 ( 99.83) 
95.87 (100.00) 
22 
1 82 
23.13 ( 18.89) 
36.97 ( 30•20) 
63.67 ( 52.01) 
14.88 ( 61.16) 
108.51 ( 88.63) 
122.26 ( 99.86) 
122.43 (100.00) 
23 
Figures in parentheses are oumulative peroentage of premium inoome 
Table 3.8.1 
Distribution of Life Insuranoe Among the TOEZ 
Com anies on the Basis of Premium Inoome 8 - 82 
Naira fr.Jrlion) 
,7.7 
Rank of Companies 
Top Company 
Top 2 
Top 4 
Top 5 
Top 10 
Top 20 
T""otal Premium 
No. of Companies 
1978 
r'" 86 I :)v. \. 
95.00 ( 31 •04) 
120.66 ( 39.42) 
151.96 ( 49. 65) 
201.23 ( 65.75) 
257.09 ( 84.00) 
306.06 (100.00) 
56 
1980 
83.81 (23.19) 115.29 ( 2;.59) 
128.64 (35.60) 168.55 ( 34.50) 
168.22 (46.56) 2'27.44 ( 46.55) 
184.42 (51.04) 244.28 ( 50.00) 
240.58 (66.58) 314.80 ( 64.43) 
302.03 (83.59) 392.61 ( 80.36) 
361.33 (100.00) 488.59 (100.00) 
65 75 
Source: As in table 3.8 
Figures in parentheses represent cumulative percentage of premium income. 
Table 3.8.2 
Distribution of Non-life Insurance 
Among the Top Companies on the Basis of Premium Income, 
1978 - 82 
(=, million) 
In seeking to explain this phenomenon, we should note that the 
insurance industry has been growing rapidly. The aggregate gross premium 
income of the companies was ~371.31 million in 1978, !~457 .22 million in 
1980 and 'N611.36 million in 1982, representing an annual grO'lith rate of 
23.14 percent in the first half and 11.84 percent in the second half of the 
period. Although the market expanded appreciably in the second half, yet 
increase in concentration slowed down more appreciably. In the first 
half only four new companies entered the market whereas in the se~ond half 
10 new companies gained entry. This provides prima facie evidence of the 
absence of insurmountable barriers to entry into the industry. The tact 
that so many companies entered the industry within a. short span of two 
years emphasizes that the concentration ratios prevailing were being 
tempered by the comparative absence ot serious entry barriers. Tbe 
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inference from all this is that the Greater the number of new entrants 
to the industry the lesser the tendency towards concentration. 
The analysis of the changes of concentration is given greater 
emphasis by examining the top ten companies in 1918, 1980 and 1982. 
In tables, 3.9, 3.9.1 and 3.9.2, the leading ten firms are ranked in 
order of industry aggregate premiUI!l income, life premium income and 
non-life premium income. 
Table 3.9 indicates at once that the undisputed leaders of the 
industry are NICON (the top company), muc (the second leading company), 
and Royal Exchange (the third leading company). The second feature 
is that the indigeDised foreign subsidiaries dominate the top ten compa-
Dies. Thirdly, there is~a low rate of turnover since only one company 
(British American) left the group in 1980. Fourthly, below the level of 
the three leaders, there has been some jockeying among the companies. 
For example, Unity Life moved from the fifth position in 1918 to the 
bottom in 1980 and disappeared from the group in 1982. The Nigerian 
General left the bottom position in 1918 for the sixth .in 1980, but had. 
left the group by 1982 also. 
Table ).9.1 presents a different picture. This is because it 
mirrors life insurance whiCh is subject to no other government control 
than fiduciary regulation. What immediately strikes one is that the 
three industry leaders on the basis of aggregate premium income lose 
their preeminent positions and are generally pushed down the ladder. 
Secondly, the foreign subsidiaries continue to maintain their domination 
of the group. Thirdly, no single company can claim to be the undisputed 
, . 
leader of the group. -~e chanqlngJof ·positions is evident. There is 
clearly no doubt that the companies in the group compete with each other. 
Table 3.9.2 depicts the top ten oompanies transaoting non-life 
business in respect of which government control is pronounoed. It is 
19 
therefore no surprise that the pattern revealed is once again in line 
with what table 3.9 portrays. 
Rank 1978 1930 1982 
1. NICON NICer,! NICCN" 
2. UNIC* m;IC* UNIC:t 
3. Royal Exchange* ~oyal Exchange Royal Exchange* 
4. phoenixlt' Great Nigeria Great lager ia 
5. Unity Life Lion of Afr~oa* Life of Afrioa* 
6. Lion of Afrioa* lagerian General Amerioan Inter-
na t ional':+ 
7. Amerioan International Phoenix'lt' Guinea;t 
8. Great Nigeria .~erioan International Sun* 
9. British American* Guinea* NEM* 
10. Nigerian General Unity Life Phoenix* 
Table ~.2 
TOE Ten Life and Non-life Com;2anies 
Rank 1978 1980 1982 
1. British Amerio~ Great Nigeria Great Nigeria 
2. Great Nigeria British Amerioan American International* 
3. American In ter-
national Orusader* African Alliance* 
4. Orusader* Amerioan Inter-
national British American'* 
5. UNCIC* African Allianoe Crusader* 
6. NICON NICON NIOON 
7. Afrioan Alliance The Niger* Bendel 
8. Royal Exchange* Nigerian General Royal Exohange*' 
9. United Nigeria Royal Exchange* The Niger* 
provident 
10. The Niger UNLIC* The Universal 
Ta.ble 3.9.1 
Top Ten Life Companies 
. 80 
;tank 1978 19S0 1982 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
KleON NICe::! :''ICCN 
~lc* mHC'} UN"',,",* . ~'" 
Royal :Sxchange* Royal Exchange*' Royal Exchange* 
Phoenix* Lion of Africa Lion of Africa+ 
Lion of Africa* ?hoeni.."'C'~ Guinea* 
Unity Life Nigerian General Sun 
Guinea* Guinea* Phoeni.x* 
Nigerian General Unity Life Law Uniorr» 
New India* Veritas Unity Life 
Law Union*' Law Union~~ Nigerian General 
Source: Nigerian Insurance year Book 
*Indicates the indigenised foreign subsidiaries 
Table 3.9.2 
Top Ten Non-life Companies 
3.4 poligY Implications 
The main lessons of the analysis are as fo110ws:-
First, the study gives us an insight into the nature and structure 
of the insurance industry in Nigeria. An industry in which firms of 
different categories operate freely must be regarded as healthy and 
dynamic. This has rich implications for the growth prospects of the 
industry. 
Seoond, if we oonsider the evidenoe oonoerning the number of 
firms in the industry, the rising number of firms might oause us to 
deduoe the industry to have beoome more competitive rather than less. 
Indeed, in so far as a large number of firms oompete in the industry, 
then, the industry approxiliiates (at least in terms of the number of firms) 
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more to the perfectly competitive ic:ed tha.n to monopoly. 
Third, in terms of the size distribution of firms, the findinJ; move 
in a different direction :rom the com~etitive model.7 The size distribu-
tion of the fires for 1982 shows considerable skewness. Although the 
perfectly competitive model makes no presumptions about the size dis~ribu-
tion of firms, one of the re~uirements of the model is that no firm should 
by its actions influence market price or have a significant sha=e of the 
market. In terms of the latter t.'1e insurance industry in !'~i~eria. clearly 
contravenes one of the requirements of perfect competition. 
Fourth, the industry (in teros of total premium income or assets) is 
being increasingly dominated by le~ger firms and there are many small firms 
existing on the fringe of the market. There is, thus, an increasing trend. 
towards high degree of concentrl:dion in the industry and the industry 
structure is that of Ci loose oligopoly. The oligopoly group are a\o(8.1'e of their 
.., , 
mutual interdependence but t.'1e interdependence is weak. In fact the 
existence of very small firms in t.~e industry is a manifestation of the 
'\ 
presence of oligopolistic conditions in the industry. This is because the 
established big firms have in most cases little to gain from the elimina-
tion of small firms whiCh account only for a small part of the total market. 
To the big established fi~s, the continued existence of many ~11 'fringe' 
firms offers conclusive proof that there is no 'monopoly' in the industry, 
and in any collective representation they will appear as so many 'independent 
representatives' to support the policy of the leading firm. 
Fifth, the turnover of firms, considered in te~s of the displacement 
of the leading fims by newcomers is very low, at least over the sample 
8 period. This is evidence of relative absence of competition in the 
~ - a industry inspi te of the ex1.atence 'of/ very large number of firms in the 
industry. But the picture of turnover rate within the leading-fims 
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group is that of modera"te shif"ts i.':. :l:.rlcet ~osi tions or ran..~s ,vh::'ch might 
be taken as evidence of some com~etition ~~ong the le~dL~g fi.-ms. The 
incessant back-and-fort~ c~anges in market position further confirms the 
loose oligopolistic structure o~ the industry. The cha::..ies in ma::-kat 
position might be an indication of t~e difficulty of forming any st~ble 
collusive understanding or agreement, since sOwe of the oligipolists 
could count on the behaviour either of himself or of his friendly rivals. 
Sixth, the analysis of the life results demonstrates that t:1is 
class of business, where government control is limited to figuciary 
regulation, shows positive response to competition. This is a 
particularly instructive revelation, showing that liberalisation of 
government control measures, such as the removal of entry barriers and 
other market restrictions, is needed to counter the concentration of 
the indus try • 
3.5 :~otes 
1. The analyses in this section (3.2.1) derive substantially from 
most of the standard works in the area of L~dustrial organisaticn. 
For eX2.'llple, J3ain (1968). Caves (1977), Sche:::er (19~C), 3hephe:::-d 
(1972 and 1979), Carter (1979 ~~d 1980), _L~intola-Eello (1983) 
and ~eedham (1978). 
2. See section 2 of the Insurance Act 1976. 
3. See section 3. 
4. See section 4. 
5. See section 8. 
6. Output is difficult to measure. Doherty (1976) defines output not as 
the premium received but in te:rms of claims payable, that is, price 
less management expenses and profit. 
7. See Nevin (1969), Colenutt (1977), Franklin and Woodhead (1980), 
Friendland (1957), and Silberston (1972) Richards & Colenutt (1975) 
among a host of industrial economists. 
8. Owing to the operation of the tariff, the competition is non-price. 
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PART T\fO 
BACKGROUND TO POLICY FORMULATION 
85 
Re€Ul~torJ Interventio~ 
4.1 Int~oduction 
The t~eoretic9.l framework of th::s study is presented in this cha]ter. 
It is arranged into three sections. The first ~~swers the question why 
regulation exists, the second explains how regulation is effected and the 
third identifies the benefits and costs of regulation. 
4.2 Rationale for ~egulation 
The focus of regulation is adequate protection for the consumers of 
insurance (Dunn. 1916) by supervising those who are allowed to conduct 
business as well as the manner in which they do so. There are three main 
reasons for this concern. 
First of all. the imbalance of information between buyers and sellers 
of financial services (inciuding. of course. insurance) is a well,known 
cause of market inefficiency. This asymmetry of information is the 
reason for the widespread use of insurance intermediaries because the 
latter, by the nature of their profession, have better information than . 
does the insuring public. 
The aSY!DlIletry of information between the buyer and sellers of insurance 
is mutual. Contrary to the general impression, in the formation of an 
insurance contract, the part,y who has a better advantage is the prospective 
insured. Taking life insurance as an example. it is the proposer alone who 
knows how sound his health is, and the type of illness which killed his 
parents and same of his close relations, Which ailment m2¥ also affect his 
own life. Usually, the proposer calls on the insurer to buy a risk the 
scope of which he (the insurer) does not know. The legal doctrine of 
utmost good faith 1 has always asserted the right of the insurer to know the 
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full details of the risk he is called upon to insure. 
Si~ce t~e subject - matter of insurance is under the centrol of t~e 
? 
insur~d, two problems arise whicl: !:l.:.ke insurance a ":narket for leoons."-
The first is moral hazard which arises from the fact that once the 
policyholder has paid his premium, he has no incentive to minimize his 
losses (Carter, 1980). The second is adverse selection where it is 
precisely those who perceive themselves to have a high riSk who will come 
forward for insuranoe. The two problems constitute a source of market 
inefficiency arising from the imbalance of information between buyers and 
sellers of financial services. 
Next, the market for insurance like other financial markets is 
vulnerable to the entry of incompetent and fraudulent suppliers on the one 
hand, and credulous consumers on the other (chapter 5.2). The early 
history of insurance in the United states and Eri tain shows many company 
failures resulting from the incompetence and dishonesty of insurers. In 
Britain, the need for supervision was recognised in the mid-nineteenth 
century follOwing the failure of a number of life insurance companies, 
wi th consequent loss to the policyholders (Dunn, 1976). Today increasing 
emphasis is placed on the qualifications, education, and overall competence 
of the operators of insurance business. 
The attraction of insurance business for those wishing to perpetrate 
dishonest or fraudulent practices emphasizes the fiduciary nature of the 
business. When an industry is entrusted with vast sums of other peoples 
money, public control seems appropriate in an effort to prevent insolven-
cies and to protect the public after an insolvency bas been establiShed. 
It is now acknowledged worldwide that an insolvent company laCks the 
financial resources needed to meet its liabilities. 
87 
The entrJ of dishonest supplis~s ~~d credulous consumers has often 
re3u'ted ~~ -t~uct"r~' p-obl~m- ~h.,e~_e_~ore th.,A state ha q ~=ec.uently reSl)onded 
-, .. ,.,... .... ,~",,,, _ . .,. _  - - - - - -
by using regula.tion to screen tl;.e 3up,.;:liers. This in"terve::tion I1as been 
done to se~e the following pur?oses: 
Insur~~ce control laws seek to prevent unfair competition among a 
insurers. Unless there is gove~ent supervision, the maverick L~surers 
are prepared too-lower their rates in order to attract the unsuspecting 
public, a situation which may compel the reputable companies to resort to 
combative measures leading to lowering the quality of their service 
(Athearn, 1969). 
State regulation protects the public against monopolistic features. 
The structure of an insurance indust=.y is propitious for competition when 
entry to the industry is easy, concentration is low, sellers are numerous, 
the product is largely undifferentiated, and total sales are expanding 
(steward, 1969). Therefore, an effective supervisory authority ensures 
that the structure of the industry is neither monopolistic nor oligopolistic 
and that the operation of the tariff system does not result in the co-opera-
tive exploitation of the consumer. 
The public welfare requires the continued existence of insurance compa-
nies in which members of the public have invested their funds. An individual 
buys insurance to protect himself against financial loss that may occur in 
future. It is essential that the insurance company promising to indemnify 
the insured for a future loss to remain in business so that it will be able 
to fulfil its promise. The public interest would not be served by insurers 
being forced out of the market because of the inevitable loses to policyhol-
ders, claimants and shareholders (Smmett, 1978) • 
. \ 
B8 
?inally, 3. :pa:::-ticular :;.s;ect O~: tr.s ll:arket :or insur~nce ...,l:::'ch :1::.S 
attracted public at~ention .; .......... "t, j • ...J UJ. __ ~rgu'2neSS of the d"'~::l.ils of the 
contract \'lhich are largely :nore i'Tlplici t thsn explicit. The vaE;uen'3ss 
of the terms of the contracts :or L~surance that are offered to t~e co~su-
mers is the basis of the poor b.3.f;e of the insur~ce indust!'y '.·/o:clc.-v:ide. 
i1arket researcn studies in the "t;'1{ 3hO\>/ that policyholders do not have a 
clear picture of the cover sold to ~~em.3 
This teChnical nature of insurar.ce makes it difficult for the public 
to understand its nature. The policyholder is presented with a complex 
contract which may contain terms, conditions, caveats, endorsements and 
warranties. ?ublic control is necessary to prevent some insurers from 
including unreasonable restrictions and exclusions in their contracts. 
The implicit presentation of the contract for insurance has caused 
the latter to be recognised as a business which is affected with a public 
interest (Eickelhaupt, 1974). The US case In German Alliance Insurance 
Company v. Lewis4 held that insurance was a bUSiness affected with a 
public interest, because it played such an important role in other 
businesses. This meant that it was in the public interest for most activi-
ties of insurance companies, including the rates they charged, to fall 
under the watchful eye of governmental regulatory authorities. 
Thus, it can be claimed that regulatory intervention relates to 
fundamental moral demands and its essence has been titled the "principle 
of aequum et bonum", the facets of which involve equity, morality, fai:rn.ess, 
equality and reasonableness. Equity, for example, implies that policyhol-
ders should be treated without unfair discrimination. Reasonableness , 
• 
ensures that the cost of insurance should correspond to its value, or 
more generally, that the insurer should treat the whole body of policyhol-
ders,. in a reasonable and fair manner (Kimball, 1969). 
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:n t!1e developing ~ount!'::.€::" :"'''1:u::::-:-.nce centro1 l"=Zi3L.ticr.. is 
by :::8 excessive domi.'1a tion of ::-:= ir:d.ustry by fo:reign i.;.te:::'Gst3 
This 1egisl3."t:'70 control is also looked upon :::;:::-i!1o=i1y 
as a ne~'1S of exercising ve=y close cont~ol over the invest~ent of insur~ce 
comp8ny funds, resulting in th8 curtailment of foreign exChrulge outgo on 
insurance and reinsurance trans~ctions. Such a measure may eventually 
lead to the establishment of a sO~'1d national insurance and rei.'1sur~ce ~~ 
market ~hich is an essential ch3X~cteristic of economic growth. 
4.3 Forms of ~egulation 
The constitution of each countrJ normally empowers the legislature to 
enact laws on all matters affecting insurance. The statutes, called ~cts 
or Decrees often define the scope of supervision which may embrace so~e, 
all or more of the following features - registration or licensing of all 
existing and new companies; minimum capital requirement; annual submission 
of accounts and returns; the po\rers of inspection and intervention by 
insurance superintendents; and the termination of a company's operation. 
These types of regulation are considered in same detail below. 
4.3.1 Entry Control Regulation 
It is now realised worldwide that an insurer needs financial soli-
dity which is the p:l'os,paet that the insurer will be able to meet its 
obligations (Kimball, 1969). For ~lis reason intending insurers must 
subscribe a prescribed minimum capital at the outset. Minimum capital 
requirements can vary according to the class of business undertaken, the 
highest amount being required for life. 
Apart from the capital requL-ement, the intending insurer must meet 
other legal and teChnical conditions to be able to obtain the grant of a 
licence. Hence in most countries insurers are required to submit evidence 
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of the co:npany's legal exi3"t2nce, sucr.. as copies 0: its :nemorandu:n and 
a::ticles of :1880<.::'<1 tionmd its certificate of incor!)ora tion; the 
basis adO:F,ted in c::W.cula ting p~smiUl:l ::2. tes; the calc'.lla tion of tGcr..!;.ical 
reserves with su!>porting stati::;tics.l data; and rei."'lsu!'3Ilce arrs.r.s'ements. 
4.3.2 Solvency ~ef-Ulation 
Theoretically solvency rc~lation is unnecessary under the 
close contro: regime. It is hOi'rever, necessarJ to specify solvency 
st~~dards where ~~e financial system of control is adopted so tr~t the 
overriding purpose of supervision is achieved. 
Solvency standards are usually imposed by means of a prescribed 
margin of solvency: that is, assets cust exceed liabilities by the 
specified amount. In Australia the margin is 15 percent whereas in the 
EEC it is the higher of two figures, one based on premium income and 
the other on claims (Dunn, 1976). 
Where solvency standards are specified it has often been found 
necessary to lay down regulations for the valuation and admissibility 
of assets. In the UK the Insurance Companies (Valuation of Assets) 
Regulations of 1976 specify the way in which assets should be valued for 
certain purposes including that of establishing the margin of solvency. 
4.3.3 Information Disclosure Regulation 
With the protection of the interest of the insuring public in mind, 
the state has required insurance companies to make available accounts and 
actuarial returns on which a view can be formed regarding the financial 
solidity of the insurer. The U.K. Government was content from 1870 to 
receive and publish insurers' accounts and returns.' Hence the slogan, 
"freedom with publicity", that is, the facts about the financial. posi-
tion of the insurers being made publicly available, it was left to 
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L"1d.;v~ciu':>'3 +'0 c""ooo::e "'mo"''''' t"'em (,..., ... · ... ~\.'p"ell 10RO) 
- - .~ "" .1,~ _ __ "'J.~ .1 .. .I~~ \ .Iv'w_ ..... _ _ , ",' ~ .. 
exa:-:lina ~ion of the ret~r::ls 'l;l-:ic~ r.:ust be 3ub:li tted to :he Sl.l;'l::::'"fi:30:r7 
2.'..:.t'::ori ty. T'.Clese returns ,~c:np::'is6 so:::e or 2.11 of the !'ollowing info::::!.:. ticn: 
ch~~~es L~ the constitution of the co~;any; the bal~nce s~eet, ~"1d otcer 
business res~lts; and the basis of r2.ting and the calculation of technical 
reserves. 
4.3.4 ~e~lation of Insurance Contract 
Terms and Conditions 
Insurance contract laws are aimed at unreasonable policy terms and 
conditions and therefore take the form of forbidding or prescribing, 
certain contract terms. 11any countries go as far as requiring Hordings 
to be subaitted to the insurance superintendents for prior approvnl. 
Contraot term regulations are frequently applied to private person's 
insurance, ,particularly life insurance. 
4.3.5 Price Regulation 
price regulation seeks to protect policyholders from both rates 
which are so low as to jeopardize the solvency of the insurer, and those 
which produce excessively high premiums. Price regulations are frequently 
met in the United states, Latin .America and Europe. In SCIlle countries, 
notably Western Germany, profit exceeding an agreed narrow margin is 
returned to policyholders through a compulsory reduction in renewal premiums. 
Not only are rates of commission often controlled but also a ltmit is 
frequently placed on the proportion of premiums that insurers may spend 
in commission and expenses (seotion 4.3.1). 
4.3.6 Investment Regulation 
The regulation of insuranoe company flmds seeks to ensure that there 
is adequate portfolio diversifioation and that there is moderation.of the 
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, 
., 
capi tal 2nd 1 i:~.uid.ity risks (Jic:.dnson t 1971). 
coun·t~J t tu t th~ "U8u:-:.1 
ones fre;uently :net ::.'..:::-e; :::-est::::iction::: of particul:ir d::..sses o~ ::..ssets 
that can be acqui~edj specific limits on the p:ropo:rtion of total 2.ssets 
that can be held in p2.:t'ticul3.r cl.:.sses of financial assets; or limits on 
the proportion of total assets tho..t can be held in a.."l inc.ividua,l financial 
asset (Di~~inson, 1980). 
4.3.7 ae~Jlation of Insurance Intermediaries 
The licensing of insurance intermediaries has been adopted i...'1 many 
countries, with requirements as to character, experience and technical 
education. The aim is to protect the insuring public from uniesir~ble 
salesmen. Sometimes rates of commission are prescribed by regulation and 
commission- sharing by the intermediary or premium rebatin<# by the 
insurer is forbidden (section 4.3.,). 
4.3.8 Protectionist Regulation 
Complaints about foreign domination of the insurance industry in the 
developing countries are based on six arguments aired as follows: First, 
social considerations are not taken into account by firms transaoting 
(1\ 
freely' 'on the insurance market. Seoond, purchase of foreign inauranoe 
and reinsurance entails an undue strain on the balance - of - payments 
of the developing countries. Third, foreign oompanies remit investible 
balances outside the country which are needed by the developing countries 
themselves. Fourth, foreign insurers make exoessively high profits in 
respeot of their business in developing oountries. Fifth, it is desirable 
for residents of developing oountries to acquire insuranoe teChniques 
n~).: 
and expertise and tha.t cannot happen if foreign insurers dominate the 
. 
market. Sixth, "they (that is, the governments of the developed oountries) 
do it too" (Hindley, 1982). 
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·ilhilst the above complaints :.rG made by :nest of the d.evelopi::lg 
cou::tries, the actual form of protectio::lisr:J. v:::.ries consi~~er3.bly. 
::owever, Carter and :;)ickinson (1979) classify tr.e restricticn,s inposed 
on insurance trade under the heacii.."l,:"s 0: establlsrune:lt and services 
.... 
business since an insurer may estacl~sh abroad local branches or 
subsidiarJ companies, or it may underi'1:::,ite at hOl:le the insurance of 
overseas risks placed by residents of foreign cou.~tries. It is evident 
that fewer restrictions are placed on reinsurance t::an on di=ect in!:;ura:ce 
because of the necessit,y of diversifying risks on a geographical basis. 
The most common restrictions imposed world - wide on insurance 
supplied on an establishment basis L~clude: nationalisaticn, domestication 
of foreign owened companies (chapter 8), discriminatory capital requirements, 
delayed remittances, discriminator"J taxation and i!m:ligration regulation 
and current market practices. ~he restrictions imposed on insurance 
a 
supplied on/services basis, on t~e other hand, are localisation of 
bUsiness, government pressure, exch~ge control regulations, the develop-
ment of state reinsurance, the localisation of reserves, and other restr-
ictions placed on non - admitted insurers. 
4.3.9 Self RePaUlation 
Although statutes are the m~in sources of insurance regulation, 
\ .. 
self-regulati.on or i~~a-industry regulation is an important feature of 
official supervision of insurance in some countries, notably the United 
Kingdom where Lloyd's of London provides a vivid illustration. The 
principle of self - regulation is based on the fact that government 
'same 
does not possess the(technical knowledge of insurance as the practiti-
oners do. And there is a vested interest in having a well run industry 
so that government intervention is undesirable (Gower, 1982). 
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~!J.ere ar~ two :nain me"::'lods of ;:;elf :::.-egulation. :'1;.e :i:::.-s"t is 'r~e:::.-e 
a IJrofessional org:mic:.:tion acts .::..s 8. self - rsS' ... l:1t:n·-J bO'~~r ovr;:::.- ~':;e 
activi ties of its members i-fhile -:::'e saco!1d is ':lhere 2.. profes31on~1 bod.y 
prorr:otes the establishmen"t 'l;:;y le,:;i3::,tior: cf an e.~ncy 'to :::'-3Ju:!.:::.te tr..e 
pra.ctice and cond'J.ct of its merr.cers. lloyd I s is an e:c::.:nple of the first 
method and the DIe Insur?..nce ::3roke::s Jegistra tion C!cuncil is an eX:.::lple 
of the second method. FollowinG the ;assage of the Lloyd's ~ct of 1982, 
tbe new C!o1.mcll of Lloyd's 'liould a;pear to be closer to the second method 
of self - regulation. It is fair to say that the whole historJ of Lloyd's 
is really a study of a 1.mique case of almost totally successful self -
regulation in an L~surance industry. 
4.4 The :Benefits and Costs of Regulation 
The various types of regulation identified in section 4.3 are available 
to the state which may adopt some or all of them. ithere all or most of them 
are adopted, then the close control system results. Financial control is, 
however, primarily concerned with solvency margins and the valuation of 
assets and liabilities. 
In what follows, the benefits and costs of the main types of regula-
tion are highlighted so as to brinG into focus the main areas of comparison 
between financial control and the close control systems of supervision. 
Entry control is commonly met with in the two systems. Since authori-
sation or licensing can have as preconditions a minimum capital requirement, 
acceptable credentials for promoters, structure of insurance contracts, 
...:.. set solvency margins, etc, entry control easily succeed~' in screening 
out the mavericks and undesirables and therefore fulfils the social 
objectives of protecting the consumers of insurance. It can, however, 
have the effect of constituting a barrier to entry for intending competi-
tors. The higher the figure selected for improving financial solidity 
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t~e more the deterrent for the e:::;r'::''0nces of new co:np2,nies. I."l cotmtries 
t::.e c.evelOfr.lent of tl:le local :n3:.:'~:st. 
Tte merit of solvency ::esu1:::ion is t:1at in t:'-~eor.l it )roviclGs a 
guarantee of sclvency. In add.i tic:":, it constitutes an early viarniI'.G syster::.. 
Given the complexity of e3tablis!1i:;~.; definite balance-sheet i::1s01 vellcy at 
any Zi ven point in time, and the f:.ct that an insura."lce co=:;:any :J.h/ays 1:2..5 
sufficient li:mid assets to mai."'1tz.in the a:ppearance of beil1g a going 
concern, company failures can 1:e e:::perienced. The history of insu:rance 
supervision in the DK shows that e:.o.'1 legislative reform was preceded by 
a series of insurance company insolvencies (Dunn, 1976). Hence the 
case for the establiShment of a gu~antee fund in states where the 
financial system of control operates so that each firm oontributes a 
6 fraction of its premium income to the fund. The guarantee fund spreads 
the costs of failure among the oonstituent members of the market and 
oreates the incentive for insurance company associations to monitor the 
solvency of their members (Finsinger and Pauly, 1986). 
The other costs of the solven~J regulation depend on how restrictive 
the rules imposed are. For example, where larger reserves must be held 
than are neoessary in an unregulated competitive market teen inefficienoy 
costs will become the result. 
Where there is no uniformity L~ the presentation of information, a 
, . 
" ..J 
oomparative study of the accounts of the companies becomes tediOU3, if 
not impossible. Disclosure of information to the insuring publio is not 
always useful since not many people have the skill, let alone the 
interest, to interpret .. finanoial statements. On the contrary information 
prOvided in a uniformly prescribed form will be very valuable to. the 
initiated. 
Contr3.ct regulation makes C08;G.~:.sons bet'wee!1 compa.Ilies ea.sy fc:: 
the consu.llers. It then becomes essy to obtain pre;nium quotations fer 
a set of standardised policies a!1~ tnis low search cost c~~ cont::ibute 
to the efficient ;erfo~ance of t~e n~ket. en the othe:: h~d, L~sur~ce 
co:npanies are faced with inflexibility "lith the result tha.t their ir.novc>.tive 
ability becomes blunted. Standardisation of policies Jlay also restrict 
the choices of customers who are not enabled to tailor coverage to their 
needs. 
i{bether price control is harmful depends on the precise form of 
control. If companies are forced to adhere to a standard t~riff governing 
rates and policy cover, then control will severely restrict competition 
from more efficient insurers. In suCh a situation, some insurers may 
withdraw from the market with consequent inconvenience to the insured 
(',Vitt, 1973). On the other hand, if controls are not effectively applied 
to the details of policy cover as well as rates, the insurers are likely to 
react to rate control by changing the q.uality and range of the products 
offered. 
Al though government control of the investment of reserves should 
ensure that there is ade~uate portfolio diversification and that the overall 
,., ' 
capital and liq.uidity risks are kept within acceptable limits, this forced 
approach _ has the effect of imposing some constraints 7 on the flow of funds 
which insurance companies have at their disposal. Since insurance compa-
nies' investment portfolio decisions are based on equating returns at the 
margin (with due allowance for risk), then a forced shift in the composi-
tion of their portfolios will effectively tax their policyholders. To be 
more specific, since it is unlikely that the insurance companies will 
permit their business to suffer, the tax will fall upon policyholders, 
particularly the purchasers .of life insurance. 
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T~e merit of r':?gula -ting ir.SU1,'·.::nce inter::nec.i2.:,ies 13 the protection 
of tn.e insuring publ:'c ~.;air.st u::f::~ir or incom~etent ad.,ice 0:'- sel:ing 
by inter.:ledie.ries. :Cut GiS GOYier (1 ;(2) observes it is in respect of the 
vas~ mnber of inte=:nediaries . consti tUti.l'lZ a ',iide s~(>ctru.'1l ~h2_t the 
most conspicuous weakness of control is to be found. 
Control of insurance co~is8ion has sought to avoid conflicts of 
interest on the part of intermediaries on the grounds, for example, that 
preferential commission level miGht be incl±ned to unduly influence an 
inter:nediary in favour of one pa=ticular insurer. Any regulation whiCh 
forbids commission - sharing or rebatinG is difficult to defend. A pros-
pective proposer who knows the insur~nce he wants and the insure:.- to 
approach ought not to be precluded from receiving the financial benefit 
of eliminating the intermediary. 
~ effective regulation of insurance intermediaries must seek to meet 
two different contingencies. The person selling insurance must be either: 
(a) a truly independent adviser · ..iho meets certain minimum standard.s of 
expertise, ethics and financial security; or (b) if not independent, is 
at least answerable to an identifiable insurance company for his acts and 
omissions in promoting and selling the poliCy.8 
Like the other types of regulation, protectionist regulation has its 
costs and benefits too. As observed by Dickinson (1981) its object is to 
minimize the foreign exchange costs associated with international insurance 
transactions. A major danger of this defensive regulation is that by 
restricting competition it oan reduce the range and quality and raise the 
price of products offered to domestic consumers, thus reducing a factor 
,.. 
input into the production of other goods and servioes in the rest of the 
economy (Dickins~n, 1981: 23 _ 26)9. 
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The a.dvantage of self - r8J'-.l1c:.tion is "that moral persuasion m<:.:.:," ·,·lork 
8.t its :nost power:ul and. it rna;/ ".J.} e::sier to enlist hi.:;h-pol,lered e::9c:,;,-';::, 'Ie: 
to pl:ly ~n active role 1.11 re~'Ulz.tion!' (Gower, 19E2). The :;:roolem, 
however, is tea.t it is dif~icul t :O'l.' 2.n:/ :;.:-ofessional body, est2..Jl!.::hed 
initially to protect the interests of the members, to convert into s body 
also protecting the interests of t1:e 1.'rls~ing public. It cm e3.sily be 
used a.s 2~ anti - competitive device to preserve the privil~6es of me~bers 
and constitute a barrier to entry into ~le market by intendL~3 competitors 
(Finsi..'"lger and ?a!lly, 1986). Si..'1ce the use of a government department to 
enforce the regulations often rasul ts in bureaucra tic bottlenecks, a.'1 
independent statutory authority, funded by a levy on all members of the 
industry, is preferable. 
4.5 Conclusion 
It is clear from the above analysis that the reasons for regulation 
in insurance follow from the needs of the consumers; its value to the 
insurers in limiting competition and securing profitability; and the 
interests of the state. The consumers of insurance need to be protected 
against insolvency and other maiket inefficiencies. The insurers for 
their part need the good name of 8.Il industry which is free from price-
dumping and other forms of preda.tory behaviour. It is obvious that the 
protection of the consumers is likely to be an important political issue 
for the state .10 
The argument against regulation is that market forces, 1f left to 
function freely, will ensure tha most efficient and innovative ways for 
meeting the needs of the consumer. Although it is conceded that the 
b~ers of personal insurances need protection against market failure, those 
seeking insurance against commercial and industrial risks are knowledgeable 
99. 
about their needs and therefore hardly need protection. 
\llere regulation discriminates against foreign insurers, con3mne~s 
are obliged to pay higher pr8miu,s since protected na=kets ~=e l~~ole to 
neglect consu.'ller needs and fs.il to i...'1..."'l.ovate. As a result, income that 
could be released for other fru~tful developments is locked ir.to less 
This is e::plained by the theory of cO:lr'}8..r.s. ti ve 
advantage (chapter 10.3.2). 
Fur~ermore, even where so~e de;.ree of regulation is accept2ble, 
the argument may be about whether it should be regulation by tllr:: state or 
self-regulation by those in the industry,; 'J,.,,~ .. I ~ .... 
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1. sections 19 an:! 20, :l,::~rir.e ::13ur:..nce 1 ')61 I,,' I. 
2. ,.lcerloof (1970). 
3. See Cockerell and ~icki~son (1930) :..r.~ ?ll:sL~Ger, ~a~~ond ~~d 
T::.?:.? (1985). 
4. (1914) 233 US. 380. 
5. 3ee the U. K. Life ~ssurance Companies Act 1870. 
6. -~ example of legislation establishing the guarantee fund is The 
Folicyholders Protection Act 1975 (UK). 
1. For details of these constraints see Akintola-Eello (forthcoming), 
Carter (1919), Dickinson (1919), Carter and Dickinson (1971 and 1919), 
Falegan (1983). Finsinger, Hammond end Tapp (1985) and Hindley (1981). 
8. 3ee Cockerall (1914 and 1980) and Gower (1984). See also Policy 
Holder Insurance News (25/3/83). 
9. See Carter and Dickinson (1979) and Hindley (1981). 
10. There are three main reasons for the interests of the state. 
(1) The state is very keen to encourage people to take out 
'!nsuxance as a way of limiting the cost of protection to the 
ste. te • (2) The importance of insurance companies as channels 
for saving and investment is well understood by the state. 
(3) Insurance has a special contribution to make to the balance 
of payments,on current account as a service and on capital account 
as insurance funds are invested locally. Therefore, the state 
has the obligation to minimise the foreign exchange costs 
associated with international insurance transactions. 
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5.1 Background to the Insurance Com~anies Act 
of 1961 and Its Subsidiaries 
Although the objectives of official supervision of insurance in 
Nigeria can be considered under tvTO broad headings __ _ consumer protec-
tion and the need to establish a viable market ___ the backgrounds 
leading to the promulgation of the ~.,o major controls laws 1 are different 
and for this reason will be examined in turn. 
5.2 The Laissez-faire Problem and Banking Crisis 
Except in relation to protection of third parties in respect of 
injuries suffered by them as a result of motor vehiole accidents,2 there 
was hardly any attempt made by the }Tigerian governments to regulate insu-
rance enterprises prior to 1961. Al though it may be argued that the 
. Companies 3 
Life Assuranoe/Act of 1870 is a statute of general application and therefore 
applicable to Nigeria as a first statute direoted at oontrolling insurance 
oompanies, as a matter of fact it .1s doubtful if anyone took notice of its 
applioation in the country (Akinkugbe, 1916). It was therefore not until 
1961 that the prinoiple of state regulation of insurance was introduoed. 
Many reasons account for the absenoe of legislation for such a long 
time. First, prior to Nigeria's independence on 1 october/~ 1960, most of 
the insurance companies in operation in the country were in the main, 
agency organisations or branch orfices of companies incorporated in the 
United Kingdom and, in so far as the parent companies satisfied the laws 
of the country in which theY' were inoorporated, the companies and agencies 
were deemed to have satisfied the requirements in this country (Akinkugbe, 
1916). It has therefore been correctlY' remarked that the colonial govern-
ments' attitude to insurance control was based on unbridled laissez-faire 
(Lijadu, 1972). SecondlY'. the few insurers operating ~ the market were 
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dominated by expatriates and thoroughly understood and practised, the ~('f\d\~~J 
ethics of insurance. Thirdly, reforms in the field of commarcial 1a.\·1 in 
general were seldom in the priority list of the then colonial po\o[er. 
It would probably have needed a major crisis, such as the bruL~ing c=isis 
of the early fifties, for the colonial government to introduce some form 
of direct control over the activities of insurance companies (Olawoyin, 
1971) • 
The free enterprise situation though prolonged was bound to be 
arrested because it was leading to tile proliferation of L~surance companies. 
"lith only one company the Royal Exchange_ dominating the market up 
to 1948 (Ogunshola, 1975) the number rose to four in 1949 (Barback, 1964). 
By 1960 it h~d risen to 59 (Ogunshola, 1973). When the Lagos stock Exchange 
was established in 1961 some of the insurance funds began to be invested 
in the Nigerian economy for the first time (Barba.ek, 1964). 
While these developments were taking place, the eyes of government 
were fo~ed . on the banking sector of the financial market. As it was 
with insurance buSiness, the colonialqovernment~s attitude to oommercial 
banking was also based on uncontrolled laissez-faire (Nigeria, 1970). In 
the early fifties, however, a number of indigenous banks, like the Trust 
Bank and the Nigerian Farmers Bank crashed and went into li~uidation causing 
ruin to the business of many Nigerians (Olawoyin, 1971). These failures 
spurred government to step in with a series of regulations to rationalise 
the procedure for the establiment of commercial banks, a situation whidh 
hitherto had been rather chaotic. Through a succession of legislation 
culmina.ting in the :Banking Act of 1969 the banking business in Nigeria has 
now been put on a better footing (Nigeria, 1970). 
One lesson of this intervention in commercial banking was not lost 
on government. The growth a.nd importance of insurance business as witness 
the developments mentioned above was gaining public attention. It was 
103 
obviously necessary to regulate it in order to avoid the disasters that 
took place in co~~ercial bankinS. _.s a matter of fact there were other 
reasons for state regulation of insu=~~ce in Nigeria. 
5.3 poor Insurance pr~~tice and Government's 
Development Objectives 
There were also other reasons for state regulation of the insurance 
industry. 
First, complaints about the performance of the insurance companies 
were brought to the attention of government. Within ten years of the 
enactment of the first legislation to regulate motor vehicle insurance 
business in Nigeria, there were widespread complaints of undue exploi-
tation of the masses by the insurance companies as well as undue delay 
before claims were settled in cases of accidents (Nigeria, 1960). The 
government set up a Committee in 1960 to investigate the complaints 
(Nigeria, 1960). One consequence of this outcry in respect of insurance 
business was the passing of the Insurance Canpanies Act of 1961 (Aje, 1978), 
the main objective of which was to protect the 1naur1ng public from the 
insolvency of insurance companies or their failure to provide an acceptable 
standard of service at a reasonable price. The insurance business like 
the banking business requires the confidence of the public. The system 
of licensing insurers to transact insurance business, whereby applicants 
have to satisfy the supervisory authorities as to their solvency, and 
was· 
financial and business integrity"aimed at ensuring the protection of 
the public from incompetent and fraudulent operations of insurance compa-
nies (Carter and Dickinson, 1919: 12 - 14). 
Secondly, in the absence of a na tiona! social welfare scheme, an 
increasing number of people were gradually appreCiating the value of 
life insurance in providing against the hazards of death and old age. 
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After the Second '';orld '.{ar, the insu::2-Dce industry received a considerable 
boost s..s it is usual with a pos~-'.JZ'.:: :pe::icd. 
The adva..YJ.ce in commerce and industr"J and the '.ddespread use of money 
had brought :nany cha."1ges and created nevl needs in the country. The desire 
for a better standard of living ~"1d provision of security for de?endsnts 
against the incres.sing risk to life Hb.ich accompanies ra:pid commercial and 
industrial developments was now more pronounced than ever before and the 
need to insure against risks better appreciated. The expectations of 
policyholders would be dashed if t:-.e premium income of insurance cor:rpmies 
which constitute the bulk of the guarantee fund held in trust for them 
and shareholders of companies were not administered on sound insur~ce 
principles. 
Thirdly, government wished to avoid unnecessary loss of foreign 
exchange (chapter 4.3.8). This v~s the reason behLYJ.d the Insurance 
(Miscellaneous provisions) Act of 1964, which was promulgated by parliament 
to regulate the investment of insurance funds and prevent the premium 
income generated in Nigeria from being invested by insurance companies in 
foreign countries (chapter 7.4). 
Fourth, there was the desire to build up a local insurance market by 
protecting indigenous insurers from foreign competition (Chapter 4.3.8). 
The domination of the Nigerian insur~~ce market by foreign companies at the 
time of independence was unacceptable on patriotic grounds. This was why 
in the vfuite paper published on the aeport of the Motor Vehicle Insurance 
Investigation Committee, the Federal Government in 1960 fully accepted the 
Panel's recommendation to give encouragement to the for.mation of more 
insurance companies (Nigeria, 1960). It was therefore no surprise that the 
Insurance Companies Act of 1961 provided inter alia, that for the future, 
only a company locally incorporated under the Companies Ordinance o£ 
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Nigeria and registered with the 2e~istrar of Insurance could carry on 
insurance business in the country (chapter 7.3.1). 
?ifth, there is the objective that funds generated by insuronce 
operations are channelled into the local capital market. If there was no 
government legislation or policy directly or indirectly influer.cing the 
direction of insurance company investment, in a situation where financial 
infrastructural facilities are inade~uate, insurance companies would be 
persuaded to invest their funds on the sophisticated capital market of 
the advanced countries where retu.-ns on investment may be higher 
(Dickinson, 1980). This was clearly the case in Nigeria in 1961 when 
insurance companies were accused of "investing their surplus capital 
- in such foreign places like England, Germany, Australia, New 
Zealand and so on" (~igeria, 1961). The control of the investment of 
insurance funds is therefore a means of retaining in the country a substa-
ntial source of funds for investment through the capital market in govern-
ment securities, equities, industrial and debenture stocks, mortgage 
loans and real property (Chapter 1.5 and 7.6.3.6). 
5.4 Insurance Act 1976: Reasons for Enactment 
5.4.1 The 1961 Insurance Com~anies Act: 
Deficiencies and Poor State Control 
The Insurance Act of 1916, repealed the Insurance Companies Act of 
1961 and the subsidiary legislation, the Insurance (Miscellaneous provisions) 
Act of 1964, for a number of reasons. 
First, the 1961 Act, as well as its subsidiary, was patterned on the 
:British model, which aimed at ensuring freedom and publicity to the 
bUsiness (Wiltshire, 1980) rather than providing the machinery for an 
effective control and supervision, implying that the British system was 
full of loopholes and inadequate provisions (Okwor, 1916). Generally, 
what the law required of a prospective insurer was evidence of compliance 
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wi th the capital requirements as well as a margin of solvency and that 
S'ollnd 
the business would be run m(insurance principles. The law certainly 
did not ensure that the promoters and directors of insurance companies 
were men of good Character to obviate the situation whereby fraudulent 
people operated an insurance company which the law openly licensed to go 
on defrauding the unwary public. As a result a good many incapable entre-
preneurs took advantage of the situation and formed insurance companies 
without financial stability which is an essential factor not only to the 
insurers but to their clients. 
Secondly, despite the inadequacy of the previous legislation, the 
machinery set up to enforce the laws was not effective (chapter 9.3.3). 
The supervisory agency was not equipped sufficiently to enable it to 
carry out its functions effectively, presumably because the ~uthorities 
did not realise the implications (Nigeria, 1970). The Presidential 
Speech to the 1973 Annual Conference of the Insurance Institute of 
~igeria complained that the Office of the Superintendent was so poorly 
staffed that it resulted in ineffectiveness (Akinkugbe, 1976). It was 
not surprising that a lot of letbargr was shown in the enforcement of 
the existing law. For instance, the prosecutio~of DabOh4 (chapter 
7.4) was not started until 1975 (Akinkugbe, 1976) some five years after 
the irregular registration of his company, the Nigerian States Assurance 
Corporation Limited, was effected. The charge was for offences against 
the criminal code. It never occurred to the supervisory authority to 
prosecute under the Insurance Companies Act of 1961. As a matter of 
fact it has now been established that Daboh would not have been prosecuted 
for any offence but for the fact that he ran foul of the then rulers of 
the country (Akinkugbe, 1976). 
Because of this complacency on the part of the supervisory authori-
ties other dishonest individuals did not even bother to attempt a 
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fraudulent registration. They just opened their offices displaying 
very conspicuously the names of their coopanies. They sent out their 
canvassers to the unwary members of the public who bought what they 
believed to be cheap policies but Hl'1J.ch were no policies at all. :naboh 
operated the Nigerian states Assurance between 1967 and August 1970 
without the company being registered as an insurer contrary to section 6 
(i) of the Insurance Companies Act of 1961 (Akinkugbe, 1976). 
Experience in ~igeria has demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt 
that the supervisory authorities not only lack officials with expertise 
and knowledge of insurance production and sale but are subject to red 
tape and are therefore slow in performing their functions (Reichel, 
1966-70). It is therefore true to say that where the supervisory autho-
rities are unable to carry out the tasks for which they are set up, the 
resulting distortions are likely to render the law inoperative (chapter 
I 
t" I~ j , 
7.7.3) and the --objects of the legislation are then frustrated (Lijadu, 
1972). 
Thirdly, the deficiencies of the 1961 Act (chapter 9.3.2) coupled 
with the inability of the supervisory authorities to enforce its provi-
-.!' sions (chapter 9.3.3) encouraged the proliferation of insurance companies, 
a process which received its impetus in the years ;1949/50~ As indicated 
above (chapter 2.2) the number of companies to which questionnaires were 
sent by the Federal Office of Statistics in 1960 was given at 59. By 
1963 the number had declined to 44 (Ogunshola, 1972) presumably, because 
of resentment generated b,y the domestication philosophy introduced b,y 
the 1961 Act. In 1966 it rose to 49 (Nigeria, 1962). and in 1968 the 
number had swollen to 88 (Nigerian, 1962). In 1973 the number went down 
again to 71 (Ogunshola, 1972) because a number of foreign owned as well 
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as indigenous companies wound up their operations because of the incre~­
si."'lgly effective enforcement of the control laws. In 1975 ~1.e number 
reached 75 (Ckigbo, 1979). 
The flourishing of over 70 insurcnce companies, unregulated, created 
proble~s. Some unscrupulous insurers still operated; claims were at best 
unduly delayed and at worst avoided; premium rates rose without regard to 
underwriting ethics; agents and brokers had. a field day; public disillus-
ionment was complete so much so that the insurance industry was vie\-red 
with suspicion and its practitioners classed into a fraternity of legally 
protected frauds. Increased government intervention was inevitable 
(chapter 9.5).· 
Fourth, the proliferation of insurance companies forced them to 
compete with one another. Although competition has beneficial effects in 
insurance markets (carter & Dickinson, 1979), the Nigerian insurers indu-
1ged in vicious competition by charging very low premiums in order to 
attract business at all cost. The result was that suCh companies did 
everything in their power to avoid the payment of any claims that were 
made by the insured who suffered loss in respect of the subject matter 
': of the insurance. A good case therefore existed for regulations 1:0; (a) 
increase the paid-up capital of insurers with a view to discouraging 
proliferation; (b) prohibit premium rate cutting by requiring insurers to 
keep to agreed minimum tariff rates, excluding external competition by 
prohibiting the placing of insurance abroad; and (c) seek to curtail the 
number of insurers in view of limited availability of skilled manpower 
resources. More reasons abound for more government legislative interven-
tion in the insurance industry. 
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5.4.2 Insurance Intermediexies: Foor Business Praotioe 
prior to the promulgation of the Insuranoe Aot of 1976 there was no 
state supervision of the insuranoe intermediaries. Although insurance 
brokers and agents render important services to the insured and insurer 
alike, these intermediaries,to a great extent,aocounted for muCh of the 
problems faced by the unsuspecting public in relation to their insurance 
business. By their shortcomings they did a lot of damage to the insurance 
industry. It was oommon knowledge tr..a.t many agents appended to their 
names "XYZ Insurance Agency" or "Insurance Brokers" (Ozomah, 1972). Some 
agents and "brokers" even held themselves out in certain quarters as 
insurers. Some dubious intermediaries defrauded the public by misappro-
rpiating the premiums collected from their clients (Okwor. 1978). Some 
of the indigenous brokers did not live up to expectation and this failure 
which could be attributable to many factors, tarnished their reputation 
wi thin and outside the insurance industry. It has been suggested in 
certain quarters that the failure of the brokers in this instance must have 
influenced the decision to cut off all intermediaries from government insu-
rances and place these risks direct with NICON (Cadmus, 1975). 
There is, therefore, a good case for consumer protection by the super-
vision of these brokers and agents. 
5.4.3 The Problem of Marine Insurance 
Lastly, there was the need to develop the marine and aviation business 
in Nigeria.. Prior to the promulgation of the 1976 Act, the marine and 
aviation business was poorly developed owing to a number of constraints 
suCh as laCk of manpower, expertise and reliable statistics, low underwriting 
capacity and a limited number of homogenous exposure units making it 
difficult to predict probable loss. ~lanr nations eZported their goods into 
the country wi tb banking and insurance services which were tailor-made to 
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ensure complete transfer of all desirable benefits to the exportine COllilt=ius 
regardless of whether alternatives \-ie::e available in :ageri~. It \-[8.S, 
therefore, necessary to begin to build up the local market by the i:1.c..igenisa.-
tion of insurance of imports with the aim of conserving the cou.."ltry's 
foreign exch~"lge on the one hand and providing a solid boost to the market 
on the other. Such a step has forced tile industry to develop the adequate 
manpower with proper expertise to cope with the tremendous volume of business 
that emerged (Okwor, 1916). 
5.4.4 The 1916 Insurance Act: Main Provisions 
Departing from the latas'gfafre philosophy of the Insurance Companies 
Act of 1961, the Insurance Act of 1916 adopted the extremes of the close 
control system of supervision. Whilst repealing the Insurance Companies 
Act of 1961 and its 1964 subsidiary, it re-enacts some of their provisions. 
It then goes on to introduce revolutionary measures like steeply increased 
share capital, the statutory deposit, etc (chapter 1.6). 
5.5 Development Problems and Economic Nationalism: 
Government's Economic POlieys 
In developing countries government policies towards.~private foreign 
investment are generally shaped by two principal factors, namely foreign 
domination of the economy and the resultant development of political and 
economic nationalism. These factors as they relate to Nigeria axe briefly 
examined. 
5.5.1 patterns of Entrepreneurial 
Activities during the Colonial Era 
. ' . .:' 
The colonial administration adopted a lab.'tfa1r~· policy towards 
the operations of multinational enterprises whose predatory and exploitative 
orientations, inherent tendency to resist and hamper local industrialisation 
and determination and deliberate efforts to retard the growth of indigenous 
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entrepreneurship (.L~eredole-ale, 1975), heavily shaped Nigeria's economic 
history for well over a century. Althoui.h these enternrises were to operate 
~ . 
within the framework of government regulations, in actual practice government 
regulation of business activities ",as virtually absent (Aje, 1978). 
3conomic power was concentrated in l~rge expatriate enterprises, the biggest 
of which was the United African Cocpany (UAC) itself a subsidia~J of the 
giant Unilever Company with headquarters in the United Kingdom. By late 
1930's the UAC controlled over 40 percent of Nigeria's import-export trade; 
and by 1949, it controlled 34 percent of merchandise imports into Nigeria 
and purchased on behalf of the Nigerian Marketing Boards 43 percent of all 
Nigerian non-mineral exports (Enuenwosu & Nemedia, 1980). Expatriate domin-
ance was also evident in the fields of banking, shipping, mining and insu-
rance (Nwankwo, 1980). 
This foreign domination of the economy was further accentuated in 1946 
by the publication of the "Ten-Year Frogramme of Development and Social 
Welfare for Nigeria", a programme which was intended to aid the growth of 
indigenous entrepreneurship directly through the granting of loans to 
Nigerian owned enterprises. For several reasons, foreign companies, especially 
those who had already established interests in Nigeria, responded more 
effectively to the new opportunities advertised through the publication of 
the Programme than did indigenous business-men. By 1949, they became domi-
nant in the commercial life of the country. According to ::sauer (1954) as 
much as 95 percent of the import trade in Nigeria was then in the hands on 
r 
non-Nigerian firms. This 18 because they bad virtually monopolized the 
lucrative war-time trade in controlled imports, thanks to the "principle 
of past performance" (Akeredole-a.le. 1976). by which the Colonial Government 
had chosen to distribute import licences. A Nigerian Association of 
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.. :~fric2n Impo~ters and ~x?orters U.je, 1 ~78), ,,.,i th members sc."t-+;~r.'ed9.ll 
over the countl7, was famed in 1942 2nd ~ad fou!ht unsuccessfully to 
obtai..'1 :Oor its members a share of the trs.de in scarce imports. SL':1iL~=ly 
the enor:nous tr3de surpluses derived f~om the im:nedic.te post-'.'Tar boom in tha 
export trade had gone largely to the licensed produce-buying foreiGn merchant 
firms and to the statuary Narketing :Boards, not to the L."1digenous businessmen. 
Much of the proceeds from farm exports were kept away from the Nigerian 
farmer by the Marketing Boards and retained in Britain in the form of British 
securities. These retained surpluses amounted to £120 million by 1954 and 
stood at £238 million by 19616 (rrelleiner, 1966). Since commercial banking 
in Nigeria was also controlled by foreign capital, the same foreign firms 
which had accumulated enormous surpluses in the boom also had the surer 
access to credit facilities not only with the banks and suppliers in 
Western Europe but also with banks in Nigeria. In these circumstances it 
was not possible for a large indigenous capi tal-owning class to emerge in 
lfigeria between 1949 and 1955, and so fore ian capital again already had an 
edge over indigenous capital in the exploitation of the even more extensive 
entrepreneurial opportunities of the period since 1955 •. 
Although many Nigerians did establish relatively successful firms, 
the consolidation of private foreign capital was assured by a number of 
factors. First, most educated Nigerians with considerable innovative 
capacity had stayed out of business, leaving indigenous confrontation 
with foreian capital to those who were less educated. Therefore, politi-
cally motivated nationalism found slight expression in business activity 
from the start. Second, Nigerians failed to marry political and economic 
5~ 
nationalism from the start 80 that the Nigerian nationalism that eventually 
emerged is essentially a bourgeoiS kind of economic nationalism. This means 
that state apparatus has been used to secure more and more material 
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concessions from private forei~n o3.:-i t~'.l for the :privileged few __ _ 
the bourgeois indigenous politicd elite and. te:p bureaucrats to 'lll"1.om 
power :passed at independence, plus ..:. small number of well-connected 
~igerian businessmen. This e:;cplams uny all efforts '..;e:=e rJade to ensure 
that the boat of the neo-colonial econorr~ was not =ocked too much. Third, 
the problem of diversionary internal :politics has lent unintended support 
to foreign monopoly capital over the period. The ~igerian political elite 
were ~~oeuvred by the colonial m~sters into a position in which constitu-
tional debates for sharing out political power and slender national economic 
facilities blinded them to the real issues of economic freedom. Political 
power was not understood to be a means of realizing that freedom. Fourth, 
the Nigerian Government did not understand that there are costs associated 
with private foreign investment. The open economy policy which such 
illusion inspired has contributed greatly to the entrenchment of foreign 
capital in the country. All along, but especially between 1957 and 1966, 
the Federal and Regional Governments continuously assured prospective 
foreign investors of a friendly business climate and of the security of 
their investments and extended over-generous incentives to various catego-
ries of innovating ventures (Nige=ia, 1958 & Asiodu 1967). Finally, opera-
tional advantages and strategies \,<,ere used by the private foreign investors 
to consolidate their position. Their superior management skills and 
experience, the "principle of past performance" which placed them at 
cumulative advantage over indigenous competitors for commercial contracts, 
their dominant position within and ability to manipulate the social world 
of business in the country. their fim control over the internal sources 
of commercial credit, their specially favourable relationships with 
external suppliers and other ex~er.na1 sources of credit and their status 
as parts of international business corporations; all contributed to the 
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rapid expansion of foreizn, comlJ2J1ies Hhile some of t:nem also made it 
possible for foreign monopoly c:::;i t~ __ l to suppress indi6encus3~1t:::,epre­
neurial activities and. stifle in(ac~~';.ous entrepreneurial a:nbition (::orris, 
1968). 
The stage was clearly set for sover~ent intervention. 
5.5.2 New Orientations to ~~ivate Foreign Capital 
As at 1958 industry was still regarded as being primarily the affair 
of private enterprise and few conditions if any were imposed upon foreign 
investors. The same philosophy of open private enterprise economy Has 
upheld in the 1962-68 Development Plan. The retention of the various 
incentive measures formulated during the colonial regime and the appreciable 
guarantees of protection to foreign investment indicate the continued 
belief in the important role foreign capital and skills could pl~ in 
furthering the course and pace of economic development of the country. 
On the other hand, statements and policies on nationalisation, Nigeriani-
sation, and several aspeots of the regulation of foreign businesses in the 
country indicate also that economic nationalism had assumed an important 
status among the socio-economic objeotives of the government. 
The Nigerian independence constitution provided for adequate compensa-
tion in oases of compulsory acquisition of private enterprises. But the 
early policy on nationalisation restricted such exercise to only public 
utilities (Proehl, 1965). The Nigerian National Shipping Line, the 
Nigerian External Communications and the Nigerian Airways were created 
after independence out of nationalised properties. There was a call 
from the more militant and radical national leaders for a more broadly 
based polioy on nationalisation. For instance, the Leader of Opposition 
in the Federal House of Representatives, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, urged 
Nigeria to follow the example of India, Burma, Ceylon, Thailand and 
Indonesia which had nationalised and yet found that foreign investors 
flocked to them(Nigeria, 1961). Jowever b,y 1961 the government affirmed 
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that it had no plans for the rl2.tio:::::.li.sation of industry beyond the J;)ublic 
utilities tr-..at were already nation:;.'..lised (Shippin~, Air.vays, ::laihr::.ys, 
Power, uti~ities and :·larketing Jo:..:r:is). The government iii not succumb to 
the pressures for a wider scale na~ionalisation because it was convinced 
that such a policy could not successfully be imple:nentad owing to overi·,hel-
ming constraints on human and mate~ial resources. Thus on the policy of 
nationalisation, the Federal YJnister of iinance, Chief Festus Okotie-Zboh 
moved, and the ~ouse of Representatives adopted in 1961 the following 
motion which, 
"resolves that the nationalisation of industries 
and commercial undert~~ings beyond the extent to 
which public utilities: Shipping, Airways, 
Rail ways, power, Gommunica tions and 11arketing 
Boards are already ~~tionalised is not in the 
best overall interest in Nigeria; welcomes the 
review of company and other legislation now being 
carried out by the Federal Government and other 
measures to ensure such undertakings are conducted 
in the best interest of Nigeria; welcomes the 
increasing participation by Nigerians in the 
ownership and direction of such undertakings; and 
deplores irresponsible statements on nationalisa-
tian which have recently been made in Nigeria 
and overseas" (Nigeria, 1964). 
The Federal Government policy then became Nigerianisation instead of 
nationalisation. The policy involves essentially the idea that, (a) 
Nigerians should displace as rapidly as possible expatriate employees and 
managers in Nigerian business enterprises and (b) the removal or dilution 
of foreign interest from the commanding position they occupied in the 
Nigerian economic life to be vigorously pursued. 
Owing to pressures, firstly from Nigerian traders (Aje, 1978) 
resentful of expatriate dominance in the distributive trade and transpor-
tation and secondly from opposition leaders clamouring for a more dynamic 
economic policy, the open economy policy of favouring industrial development 
b,y the private sector began to weaken and official interest in increasing 
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indigenous control of the economy GI:'l'2!:'ged. .~s a result, offici2,l :::8sula-
tion ar.d control of foreign business ~3sumed a new dL~ension. 
In ord'3r to establish a business in :'1igeria, the foreign inv:3tor 
requires the consent of the goverr~ent. The alien entrepreneur usually 
can obtain a visa for 28 days on thG first occasion and subse~uently a 
resident alien status. By 1961/62, permission was no longer to be granted 
to the foreigner to establish retail trade as such business activity 
became reserved for Nigerians and therefore closed to new foreign entrants 
(Proehl, 1965). The~xchange Control Act of 1962 subjected all foreign 
investments to the control of the Hinister of Finance. Under the Act, 
prior permission of the Minister is re~uired for (a) transfer of profits, 
(b) repatriation of capital, (c) ne\>! foreign borrowing, (d) transD.ctions 
in securities and (e) compensation deals (proehl, 1965). As a rule, 
however, permission was freely granted. As long as the alien investors 
satisfy the authorities that they h~ve settled their due tax liabilities, 
repatriation of profits is generally permitted. The Immigration Act of 
1963 requir:s the alien businessman to seek permission from the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs before setting up a business or practising a profession 
in the country. When the business is established, control is exercised 
through the regulation of the number of expatriate employees the foreign 
entrepreneur can bring in. The alien is generally not permitted to 
acquire an interest in land without government permission (chapter 8.6.6). 
As Proehl (1965) aptly put it, 
"the Federal Government can effectively channel, 
encourage, inhibit, or forestall the initiation 
and, to a lesser degree, the continuation of 
economic activity by the alien, through the 
control of the entry and stay of persormel, 
the repatriation of his money, the act of 
incorporation and the provision of tax 
";)eneli ts" (proehl, 1965). 
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:Tigeria had thus entered a phc:se Hhich witnessed 2. stronger o':ficial 
interest in increasing indieenous control of the economy. Therefore it 
was emphasized in the 1962-8 Development Plan that that objective was to 
be pursued by helping Nigerian businessmen to rise to the occasion 
(Nigeria, 1962). 
By 1968, beginning from the promulgation of the Companies. Act of 
tha t year (chapter 8 .~.) the government had started to adopt a less subser-
vient attitude towards the orthodox principle of the free-enterprise 
economy. For example, it was made clear (especially in the 1970-4 Plan) 
that the public sector would be required to enable the country to gain 
firm control over her economic destiny and to make planning more meaningful, 
and that the government would nationalise private enterprises in the future 
where that course of action became necessary in the national interest 
(Nigeria, 1970). The Indigenisation Act of 1972 which was completely 
modified in 1977 represents a summation of these policy changes. The 
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act of 1977 affects all businesses which 
~.I\r 1.\' .. '
':.,. ) 
are listed on one of the three schecb:iles. Those on schedule 1 must be 
wholly owned by Nigerians, while 60 percent or 40 respectively of those 
on schedules 2 and 3 must be in the hands of Nigerians. Sc."1edule 1 includes 
most service activities such as advertising, estate agencies or laundries 
and s.1mple industries such as bakeries or clothing manufacture. In parti-
cular it includes all retail trade (except large supermarket ch~ns), 
all distribution (except of motor vehicles, machinery and spare parts)and 
wholesale distribution of locally manufactured goods. Schedule 2 
includes banking, insurance, construction, distribution of technical 
goods, motor vehicles and imported goods and many manufacturing industries 
such as paints, rubber and plastics products and most industries based on 
local raw materials including petroleum and timber. Schedule 3 contains 
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the more sophistic3.ted :nanufacturins ind:ustries and all busi.'1.esses "not 
elsewhere specified. 1I7 
The intention of the 1972 2..ni the 1977 .icts is first to hei:hten the 
pace of indigenisation ~'1.d second to limit foreign invest~ent to those 
businesses where it is still necessary to import expertise. ~~ey ~lso 
represent the first serious attempt by government to deal with the ~roblem 
of foreign domination of the economy. This section of this chapter conc-
" , 
ludes by identifying the rationale for t~lis increasingly radical orientation 
to private foreign investment on the part of ~~e Nigerian Government. 
Two major reasons are identified. First, Nigeria's economic difficu-
Ities since the mid-1950's and the way they were explained and second, 
the lessons in self reliance forced upon ~igeria's political class by 
several national experiences and events, especially during the dec~de 
beginning :in 1962. 
The economic difficulties which inspired economic nationalism and a 
new orientation to private foreign investment had to do primarily with the 
country's balance of payments position after 1955 and with the efforts of 
the governments from 1955 to 1966 to boost indigenous business. 
The history of Nigeria's balance of payments problems dates back to 
1955, especially to the worsening terms of trade, caused by the cessation 
of the export boom induced by the Korean \far, and by the escalation of 
imports, explained in part by the 1955 - 1960/61 Development Programme. 
But the difficulties had also been attributed to the general rise in the 
cost of private foreign investment, eSl'ecially through the repatriation 
of profits, capital, and capital gains; to the decline in the inflow of 
private foreign capital; and to the dw.indling and the progressivetighte-
ning of conditions of official aid flows into Nigeria. One of the imme-
diate effects of these difficulties was, therefore, to focus the attention 
of articulate public opinion and of policy-makers on Nigeria's relations 
with the rest of the international community, with respect to the prices 
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of agTicultur2-l p!'od.uce, the :1:.:ure ~-'.:r .. d :::roblems of i:n:?ort de-perrde .. 1ce arcd, 
most particu13.!'ly, the orient?-tio:-:s :;::l~ activities of private foreign 
investors in ~~igeria ( . .',.l{eredola-'.:..le, 1973). 
Li2.{e ~~igeriat s bal3.Il;;e of ?::.~r::J.~nts ?roblems, deliberate gove~ent 
efforts to stimulate indigenous entrepreneurship also date back to the 
mid-1950's. As several studies8 h:cws s!:O'.m, such efforts achieved very 
little. And again, even thoush the fJ.ilure of these various measures \>,ras 
seen as resulting from capital shortace, inadequate man~l!rial skill, 
and negative socia-cultural and motivational cha!'acteristics of the world 
of private indigenous entrepreneurs, it was also attributed in large 
measure to the dominant presence and restrictive activities of private 
foreign investors in the economy. In particular, the foreign owned comm-
ercial b~~s which dominated the credit system had demonstrated a strong 
unwillingness to help indigenous 9usinesses to rise.9 The other foreign 
owned companies had utilised ~heir several other operational advantages to 
restrain the establishment and inhibit the growth of indigenous firms, 
first in the distributive trades and, subsequently. in other spheres as well. 
Many factors have combined to force the lessons in self-reliance on 
the Nigerian politic~~ class. Among these are the substantial shortfall in 
the expected foreign contribution in the 1962-8 Development Plan, the 
increasing cost to Nigeria (and to other underdeveloped countries) of her 
dependence on foreign capital, the escalation of restrictions on migration 
from the poor to the rich countries of the world, the anxiety to avoid the 
political embarrassments to Nigeria (and to Africa) whiCh are bound to 
arise from the crystallization of foreign economic dominance in the country', 
and, finally, the belt tightening experience which Nigeria bad undergone 
in the 1961-10 civil war. 
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The foregoing difficulties and lessons represented what pressures 
there were on the Nigerian Government to review the role of foreign 
capital and private foreign investment in the economy. But, for three 
possible reasons, the political class could have ignored these pressures 
(Akeredole-ale, 1978). First, there was the pressure on the part of the 
public upon the government to take action on indigenisation, t~~~:s to 
the promissory nature of the politics of independence, heightened by the 
more world-wide revolution of rising expectations. Secondly, enlightened 
public opinion capitalised on the country's economic difficulties and 
relentlessly pressured the government to tighten its control over the 
economy and curb the excesses of foreign monopoly capital in the country. 
Finally, the kind of intervention \,lhich such radical opinion demanded had 
become fashionable. The notions tl:s.,t ccntrol over the national economy 
must pass into the hands of the count....-y's own citizens and that, in the 
absence of a group of indigenous entrepreneurs, large and experienced 
enough to takeover, the government must take the initiative, had already 
gained gTound and had been put into practice by a large number of Third 
World countries, including many in ~frica.10 
Thus it can be said that the new orientations to private foreign 
investment in Nigeria have been produced by a concatenation of historical 
forces to which the country and its political leaderShip had to adjust. 
The private foreign investors themselves, the international community of 
foreign monopoly capital to which they belong, and the governments of 
their home countries have been the dominant actors in that history. It 
is they, through their prolonged exploitative orientations and activities, 
their lack of sensitivity to the new and legitimate aspirations of the 
Third World economies, who have defined the present international 
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relationship between :oreign c::.pitcl em:" the underdeveloped econoDY. 
At last, ~;ieeria. like ::lany othe::= ~hird ":icrld countries, seems to 
have concluded that the net short-term economic benefits of the 
relationships go to the home-base of foreign monopoly capital, and 
that even if such net short-term economic benefits went to her, it 
would still be imprudent in consideration of long-term economic 
freedom to continue to allow her economy to be dominated and controlled 
from outside. 11 
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5.6 Notes 
1. 7.hese are firstly the Insurance Companies Act 1961, the 
Insurance (Miscellaneous provisions) Act 1964, Insurance 
Companies Regulations 1969 and the National Insurance 
Corporation of Nigeria Act 1969 ~nd secondly, the 
Insurance Act 1976 and the Ni~eria Reinsurance Corporation 
~ct 1977. Their provisions are summarised by 
Ozomah (1972 and 1980). 
2. The Motor vehicles (third party insurance) Ordinance 
1945, Cap 139, makes it obligatory for vehicle operators 
to insure their legal liability for causing the death of 
or bodily injury to third parties. 
3. Interpretation Act, Cap 59, Laws of The Federation of 
Nigeria and Lagos 1958. 
4. See The State v. Daboh and Mordi (CCHCJ/11/7$, p. 1739). 
S. The analyses in this section (6.6) derive substantially from 
the existing literature." For example, Akeredole-ale (1975) and 
1978), Teriba and Kayode (1977). Enuenwosu and Nemedia (1980) 
and Aje (1978). 
6. Sessional Paper No. 24 of 1945. 
7. See the Nigerian Enterprises promotion Act 1977. 
8. See Schatz (1964), Kilby (1969). 
9. Nwankwo (1980) however debunks this view. 
10. Among them Chana. (lmder Nkrumah), Guinea, Mali,Somalia, Sudan, 
zambia, Uganda and Libya. 
1t. Nigeria's rejection of the IMF loan (Guardian, 13 December 1985) 
is a testimony to this determination. Ironically, however, the 
national debate which led to the decision to reject the loan has 
opened up the eyes of government to the opportunity costs of 
government participation in iridustry. (See Daily Times of 
28 November 1985). In an editorial comment, The Punch of 8 
January 1986 observed on "BUdget 86: Priva tis at ion and 
Commercialisation:" 
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" . For too long government parastatals have constituted 
a waste pipe to the whole economy. At the L~ception of 
this administration the Chief of General Staff came up 
with startling revelations of the extent of waste the 
economy had had to endure because of the inefficient 
management of the various parastatals. According to 
him ~23 billion had been sunk into these organisations 
in the past six years. This figure is made up of N11.4 
billion equity, N10.4 billion as loans and N1.3 billion 
guaranteed naira loans. In addition, .11.5 billion 
had been spent an these establishments as subventions 
within the same six-year period. Amazingly, the retums 
from these investments has been ab,ysmally low, averaging 
10 percent or less:' 
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Chapter 6 
policT RecOJIIIlendations of UNCTAD fez the 
:Ensurance Indus tr: 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter looka at the regulatory environment. It is important to 
examine the polier re=-eDdations of UBCTAD 'because of their major infiuence 
on the developaent of insurance regulation in the developing comtries. In 
addition, the broad. phUo.o~ as well as the critique of the recOIIIlendati0ll8 
is e88&yed. Finally, the insurance - related projects of the 'ONCTAD 
Secretariat are higbli8bted. 
6.2 The Qrigin of UNCTAD 
Recognising that miveraal peace and prosperity are closely linked, and 
that the econoaic growth of the developing countries will also contribute to 
the economic growth at the developed countries (UNCTAD,1983).the United 
Nations General Assembly in 1964 convened a conference on trade and development 
(tJlCTAD, 1983). The conference was a first attempt to develop a global 
strategy of interu.tional ecOIlO1llic relationa, and as it progressed the 
participants realiaed that a contiiluing effort would ha~e to be sustained 1£ 
8DJ aelDingful IUccess would be attainable. This resulted 111 a resolution 
calliDI for the ooaterenee to be convened periodicallJ (currentlJ at intervals 
of tour rears) t and for a Secretariat to be created to concentrate effort 01'1 
the problems at developaent in the developing comtries. 
UNCTADt I principal orgaDS 1 are the Conference i taelf, the Trade and 
])evele~nt Board. (TDJ) and the UNCTAD Secretariat. The first two orpna a.n 
2 
representative, reflecting the countries fomins ita aembership, whereas the 
third ia adainiatratift in character. The Conference, which meets ever.r four 
,.e&1'8, ia the aupre. body ot the organiaation and i8 responsible tor carr,ying 
out the Jl&in functions entrusted to it br the General !Isemblr of the l)kli ted. 
lations. Cont1nu1t, or work between Conference lessi0111 is aS8Ured by the 
Trade and Developaent !om, which has lix main coai tteea - CODIIIlOCii tiel, 
Manuracturea, Inviaible, and Financing related to Trade, Shipping, Transfer 
"12, 
of Technology and Economic Co-operation among developing Countries as well as 
a special committee on preferences. The Committee an Invisibles and Financing 
related to Trade (CIFT) is responsible for insurance and reinsurance issues 
among other areas. And within the UNCTAD Secretariat, the Special Progra.mme 
an Insurance (SPI) is answerable for the insurance - related requests of the 
CIP'l'. 
tmCTAD' 8 work in insurance in aimed at assisting developing countries to 
establish and strengthen their national insurance markets and tmprove the te~s 
and conditioaa of insurance and reinsurance which the7 will continue to 
purchase from the international cOJllllWlity (Huol, 1976). To accomplish these 
soals, the sovermaents of member countries of UNCTAD have adopted the lINm'AD 
resolutions in support of several types of state involvement (section 6.3). 
These include 1ndigenisation of insurance operations, state participation in 
insurance, expansion of regional cooperation, etc. 
6.3 UNCTAD Resolutions 
The WCTAn philosophy for state control of insurance is enunciated in the 
UHCTAD resolutions of 1964 and 1972 respectivelr. The 1964 resolution formalised 
the belief that "a sound national insurance and reinsurance market is {essential 
characteristic of ecOlloaic growth."3 This resolution (appendix 10) called upon 
developed c01Dltries to (a> give their full cooperation to the developing coun-
tries to encourap and strengthen their national insUTance and reinsUTance 
markets, and (b) give and increase the technical assistance and training facUi-
ties which ther provide. The resolution further stipQlates that technical 
resenes and guarantee deposits of insurance and reinsurance companies or 
·institutions should be invested in the countr, where the premium arises and 
called OIl developed countries to encourage such investment b7 removing all 
obstacles to the achievement of this aim. 
The 1972 resolution (appendix 10)was ~dressed more to the developing 
countries and invited them to take a series of measures geared to praaoting 
two objectives. The first vas the need to minimize, to the extent feasible, 
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the dependence of developing countries on international insurers and reinsurers. 
The second was the realisation that total independence of foreign insurance 
and reinsurance markets was not feasible and, therefore, efforts should be 
llade to secure the most appropriate terms and conditions at the lowest cost 
commensurate with the risks involved. 
The resolution specifically called for the following: FirstJ developing 
countries should take stepa to enable their domestic insurance maikets to cover 
insuranc. op.rations sene rated by their economic activities, including th.ir 
foreign trade. Secondly. these countries could achie~ these objectives by 
establish1ns and strength.ning their domestic insurance and reinsurance 
orp.nisationa. Thirdly. they should take steps to ensure that tecbnical 
reserve. accruing froll insuranc. and reinsurance operations carri.d out in 
their countries are invested locally. Fourthly. for.ign companies operating 
in the developing countries Should utilize the insurance a.rvies available 
locally. Fifthly. developing countries should establish closer co-operation 
betwe.n th.ir insuranc. and. reinsurance !nsti tut1011s on a regional or 
eub-regicmal. baais. Sixthly. the govermaents of the d.~loped oountri.s 
should increase the technical a8sistance and training facilities whiCh they 
provide to the d. ..... lopiDg countries in order to assist in d.veloping their 
domestic iDaeaDce and. reiDauranc. B1st8llls. 
M8D7 II1ac.llazl.oUIJ resoluti0D8 wer. passed. b7 the CIPr. As far back as 
14 April 1967, it oo-.ncled. the recolllll8ndations of the Expert Group on 
R.insuranc. to the attention of governments of memb.r state. of UNCTAD. on 
13 Jul7 1973 it invited d.veloping cOlmtries to cOll8id.r the adoption of the 
_aRr.. suggested in the stuc17 b7 the tJNCTAD S.cretaria t on r.insurance 
probl_s in developing countries. Other studies carri.d out by the UNCTAD 
S.cretaria t aD topical ilSU •• , such aa -.riD. cargo insuranc., insuranc. 
education, co-operative 1DIIurance, insurance of large risks. etc, were 
11a11arly comm.nd.d to •• mber ltat •• (appendix 10). 
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6.4 Apologia of UNOTAn Resolutions 
The apologists of UNCTAD are those personages who are connected with 
a 
the UNCTAD Secetarat in Geneva either on/consultancy basis or as full-tille 
starf. They are mostly ot European and Asian stock and seem to hold a liberal 
view in international relations. 
Malinowski (1971) traces the economic relationship between the developiDg 
countries and the metropolitan powers up to the Second World War (Chapter 2.2) 
when the former expressed the desire to advance on the economic front. ()128 
major CODsequence or this development has been a steady deterioration ot the 
balance - ot - payment. or these co'UDtries, causina them to appraise their 
foreisn exchange outtlon. Hence their adoption of the 1964 resolution to 
let up their national in.titutiona. 
The merit. of this approach are two fold. First, insurance ensures the 
mobilisation and channeling of domestic savings and the short-term 
accumulation of funds (chapter 4.3.8). Second, any savings tha.t can be 
realised in their forei&D excbanee outflow are vi tal for those suttering an 
adverse balance-ot-papent position (chapter 4.4). 
These objective. are expounded by' Ripoli (1976), who as Malinowski does, 
cited example. ot proteotionist polioies in the insurance sectors of developed 
c01U1trie. such as the United. States, Japan 8Z1d. ••• ber. of the IIC. 
6.5 Internal aDd External Criticism ot the RecaaaeDdations 
It i. tortuDate that the lJNCTAD Secretariat i. candid about the limit&-
tiona of their recOlllaencla tiona (chapter 1.2). No two insurance markets in 
deT8lopiDc cOUlltrie. are identical. This i. due to the great diversity :in 
the political, econa.ic and social. enviroluaent in which these new naticmal 
arket. haft evolved (UiCTAD, 1981). 'Ibis aeau that what is suitable for 
one arket IIq not be suitable for another. It 18 therefore no surprise that 
in .0118 caee. the application ot the 1'8solutiOlls has 1lIproved. the total 
retention capacity of the arket. whereas. :in others, all that haa been 
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achieved is the shifting of reinsurance from ane company to another 
(Habib-Makar, 1982) while the residual business going abroad. remains 
essentially the same (Malinowski, 1971). 
A priori, a market operated by fledgling indigenous companies usually 
needs a bigger international reinsurance supply than a market operated by 
direct multinational insurance concerns whose risk bearing potential is 
naturally substantial (Ripoli, 1974). The multinational insurance concer.ns, 
because of their huge risk bearing capabilities, are better able to provide 
cover tor the increaSingly large industrial projects that are springing up 
in developing countries (Carter and Dickinson, 1979). 
Emerging competitive markets (SUCh as Mexico and Singapore) which have 
shunned the UNCTAD recommendations have reaped the rewards of healthy compe-
tition. Not only have their policyholders been left with a free choice of 
their insurers but the markets have been sps-~d disruptive upheavals and a 
heavy overseas reinsurance drain of currency (Wilmot, et aI, 1976). 
The lesson of the limitations of the UNOTAD recommendations is that 
foreign technology imported into a traditional culture is only subject to 
government regulation at an opportunity cost, leading to unintended results 
(chapter 1.1). 
In the li8h t of the above UNCTAD is changing its views and modif'y'ing the 
recommendatians. This is inevitable owing to the problems of implementation 
experienced frOll countr, to country and the results of the academic studies 
which have been assessing the recommendations. 
tmOTAD's --·concer.ns with the localisation of business however remain 
unchanged. This means that there are cCl'ltinuing weaknesses in their 
modified recClllDleodatians since they underplay a concern tor consumer protec-
tion whiCh is the focus or regulation. 
6.6 The Activities or the SPI 
To assist the developing countries in achieving its objectives, the 
SPI undertakes studies, provides technical assistance and participates in 
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and organises training and educational. activities. Furthermore, the SPI 
regularly follows current insurance issues that may be of importance to the 
developing countries. Some of the major undertakings are discussed below. 
6.6.1 SFI Research Studies 
At the request of the CIFr, the SPI has prepared and published a 
growing list of stUdies which has been made available to member governments 
and which can be purchased frOll the Ullited Nations in New York. "Establish-
ment of a Ull1fied International system of Insurance Statistics" provides a 
model for setting out a statistical fODmat and reporting ~stem in 
insurance. "Insurance Legislation and SUpervision in Developing Countries" 
explains the effects which legislative action may have on the development of 
the insurance industry. "Reinsurance Problems in Developing Countries It 
examines the problems found in most developing countries, and in particular 
the inadequate reinsurance planning resulting in a strong dependency on 
foreign reinsurers. "Marine cargo Insurance" suggests a number of measures 
to reconcile the international nature of marine insurance with the interest 
of developing cOlmtries. "Insurance Education for Developing Countries" 
determines the need for education in developing countries and suggests aD 
approach to meet this need. The purpose of "Insurance of tare Risks in 
Developing Countries" is to h18b1iSht the considerable difficulties connected 
with 1DsuriDg large risks and. propose different wap in which the available 
experience and capacities of the entire national markets could be mobilised, 
among which the strengthening of the local technical and financial resources 
of the local cOilpanies md the avaUabUi V of sufficient reinsurance facili tie. 
an a stable bub are of importance. 
Two stUdies vere prepared on the subject of motor insurance, namel,. 
"Problems of Motor Insurance in Developing Countries" and "Probl.u of 
Developing in the Field of Motor Insurance." The first atudr hi8hlights the 
conapicuou place of IIOtor insurance in the insurance .mets ot the majori tJ' 
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ot developing countries and then suggests ways ot ma.n.agiDa this cla.ss ot 
insurance. The second stud7 analyses the socio-economic problems caused by 
.otor accidents and discusses the commonly tound elements in national paCkages 
aDd indicates where they are tound or not tound and the merits and demerits 
ot including or excluding thea. For its part, the study on "The Promotion 
ot Lite lDBu:rance in Develop1Dc Countries" analyses the social and econaaio 
role ot lite insurance in developing countries and hisblishts the numerous 
val's in which l1£e 1Daur81'1ce could aid devel.opment by oontributing to social 
ltability, by reducing the fiDazlcial burden 011 the state, of caring for the 
&pel and those made tiDanc1ally destitute because ot death ot the bread -
wiDner and by aobUiziB! do.stic savings. 
under the title, "Review on Developnents of Insurance in Developing 
Countries", there is a biennial review of insurance and reinsurance develop-
in 
men~develop1ng countries with particular emphasis on the evolution ot 
their national markets. 
As requested by CllT at the various seSSions, the SFI is purSuing research 
111 various areas such as insurance schemes through which developing countries 
could cover losses arising troa natural catastrophes, the impact of "captive" 
iDaurers on the inaurance markets ot developing c01mtriea; case reports; 
alternative legal syste .. tor the compensation ot .otor accident victtma; 
posaible tiscal .. &auras applicable to insurers and poliQ1holdera that develop-
ing co_tries could adopt. to render lite insurance policies aore cOllpet1t1ve 
and flexible; poaaible new in ... staent approaches tor lite insurers; a model 
tor the cOlIpilation ot IIOtor insurance statiatica; etc, etc (UNCTAD, 1983). 
6.6.2 %!chnical AssistaDce 
ID addition to the conduct ot research work, the SPI &ssists governments 
ot developing countries individually or collectively in their development 
etforta throqh technical &Bsistance. A request tor assistance alwlQ'B emanates 
fra. the governaent itseU. This assistance at the individual government 
leTe1 baa included advising 1Oft1'DJll8nta on the reaaibili tr or establishing 
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and strengthen1iag national. insurance and reinsurance organisations. The SPI 
has also been requested at various times to draw up or revise existing insur-
8Zlce legislation appropriate to the needs of the country. Some of these 
technical assistance operations are underway, while others are under prepara-
tion (UNCTAD, 1983). 
Regional assistance has been rendered in suCh activities as drawins-up 
the agreement establishing both the Africa Re and Asian Re. The structure 
and mode of operation of these two regional reinsurance institutions are 
therefore similar. Both were established after ma.tl7 years of negotiations 
among go"lermaents and also between governments and insurers. The headquarters 
of Africa Re is in Lagos and that ot the Asian Re is in Bangkok. The corpora-
tions began operations in 1978 and 1980 respectively. The govemments ot the 
countries whiCh are members ot either the A!rica Re or Asian Re undertake to 
give them at least 5 percent of the reinBU~anoe business oeded abroad in the 
form of reinsurance treaties (chapter 9.3.3). 
The SPI has also sponsored meetings of insurers and insurance controllers 
in Asia and the Pacific, A!rica, the Arab region and Latin America. Also, it 
participatea in sympoaiums organised by regional institutes. For example, 
the SPI assisted the Economic CCIIJJlW1ity of Weat African states (ECOWAS) 
in drawiDg-up a Protocol establishing aD inter - African insurance card 
covering motor "Iehicles third part,y liability when the insured vehicle is 
passing through the territories of the parties to the Protocol, such cover 
to provide at least the same gaarantees as those required br the lava in 
torce in the territory' of each of the parties (ozomab, 1979). 
In partnership with the United Nationa' regional economic cODlDiasiona, 
the SPI haa held a aeries of .eetings ot insurance commissioners (or other 
government agenciea in cbarp or insurance supenis1on) tor countriea in 
Alia and the Pacific, Africa and La tin America. Theae were the first 
re8ional meetings ever held for insurance aupervisor;y officials. Although 
the purpole was merely to provide a fortlll through which they oould become 
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acquainted, exchange views and experiences, and generally improve their 
knowledge of the supervisory function, in every case the results went much 
further. In all three regions the participants adopted resolutions to form 
regional associations, and the objectives expressed in the resolutions were 
remarkably similar. In the first place, it vas expected that the association 
would provide a continuous forum for sounding out ideas, as well as a clearins-
house for information on important developments. In the second, it was felt 
that they would serve as a natural f'ramework for harmonizing .,.n- of 
insurance statistics, legislation and regulation (BUol, 1976). 
These technical assistance projects tJpically are funded through the 
Uni ted Nations Developaent Programme (mmp) or the international aid agencl 
of a developed countr1. Through the funds provided by such grants the SPI 
has established programmes of insurance and actuarial science in two Af'rican 
Universi ties. It has also provided expert assis tance for the writing of insu-
rance legislation in over a dozen countries (Buol, 1976). 
6.6.3 Education and TrainiBg 
The SPI is involved in insurance training and education activities. 
For example, the SPI, with the cooperation from the Economic and Social 
COIIIIIlilsion for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) and 'ONDP. has offered a general 
insurance course in Manila. This course, now of three months' duration, 
is intended for middle-level insurance managers of insurerl from developing 
countries of Asia and the Pacific region. The course is conducted under 
the auspices of the Insurance Institute for Asia and the Pacific (IIAP) 
and val offered in 1982 8Dd 1983 (WCTAD. 1983). 
The SPI also conducts specialised seminara of one or two week's duration. 
These seminars deal with specialised topics of direct interest to insurers 
or insurance regulators of developing countries. For example in 1983 a 
.eminar on the GoTemment Interest in the SUpervision of Reinsurance was held 
in Singapore. 
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In addition to the above activities, the SPI provides assistance to 
na.tional or :regional insurance training institutions. A t the regional level 
the SPI provided assistance in establishing the West African Insurance 
Institute (ChapEn, 1983). The Institute was established in 1978, with 
tJNl)P financing, at Monrovia (Liberia) by the five English speaking countries 
ot West Africa (Ghana, Gambia, Nigeria, Liberia and Sierra Leone). The aims 
ot the Institute are to provide vocational training to the statts of insurers 
and 
and. 80vernment insurance superviSOry' agenCielf)to act as a centre tor the 
compUation of technical and statistical insurance data and to render teclmical 
assistance to member states (Chapter 9). 
6.6.4 ID!J)8Ct ot UNCTAD OD the Insurance Markets 
of Developing Countries 
The factthi+' the domestio insurance sector had emersed ver:r rapidly 
trom the colonial era to the transitional and take-off stages all within 
a period of a quarter of a century is a testimony to the vigorous 
activities of the SPI. 
In the colODial period the typical market cODsisted of locally 
licensed aeencies or branch~s ot foreign insurance companies (Chapter 2.2). 
These foreign agencies and branCh offices handled most of the domestic 
riake emanating frca these arkets, except that larp and complex lines of 
business cover were obtaiDed directly from abroad. Owing to the absence of 
a geDuine dOlle.tic industry 8I1d of insurance legislation, foreign insurers 
and reinsurers operated relatively unfettered 'bJ local rel'11atiOD or compe-
tition. This resulted in _jar outrlows of CurreDGJ, with the result that 
relati ... ll .... 11 iDSurano8 tuds were available tor local investment and, 
hence, deve10pmeDt. Itm1 ot the foreip apncie., branches and. cOlllplllie. 
placed little emphasis CD developing 8Zl1 technical. and unagerial inaarance 
Skills amODg the local population (Chapter 4.).8). 
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That the situation began to change as the developing countries began 
to realise the importance of insurance operations to their national economics 
and. to their developaent ,fforts is no coincidence. The politicisation of 
the resolutions of UNCTAD and CIJ'r as well as the impact of the studies and 
activi ties of the SPI formed the basis for change, which was verr rapid. 
The resolutions concerning the control of the insurance industry' were 
translated into action first through enactment and enforcement of stricter 
insurance regulation and control. A more order17 market then ensued. 
Insurers were required to be licensed prior to conducting the business of 
insurance. Direct insurance abroad was often prohibi ted, if local insurers 
could accommodate the riak. Insurers were required to maintain technical 
reserves on local businesl in the coun'tr7. Rext, the control of insurance b7 
nationals took place through the establishment of domestic insurance companies. 
Foreign insurers ceased to operate as agencies and branches, instead, 
acquiring shares in domestic companies through major! ty or minority 
participation. 
Measures were also taken to seoure a larp volume of busin.IS for the 
Dational market b7 requiring local cover of certain risks, for example, on 
transport insurance of iaports. It ~ be recalled .in this cOlUlection that 
OCTAD relolution 42( 111) urpd that "doaestic insuraDc. markets of developing 
countries should cover the risks generated 'bJ' the economic activities of 
the countries concerned, including their foreip trade" (section 6.3). 
III accordance with this atrategr ~ developing countries have enacted 
la .. making it obllgato17 tor all imported goods to be insured 10cal17. 
Govermaents ot developing countries have also taken action in the field 
of reinsurance. Tvo llajor SPI studies on reinsurance (seotion 6.6.1) 
established guidelines tor action at the COJDpaIlJ t lI&l'ket and regional levels 
for maximizing retention and for national reinsurance planning. As a result 
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of UNCTAD's ini t!atives and enoouragement two important regional 
reinsuranoe institutions exist and several regional and sub-regional pools 
have been established. 
In the area of insurance eduoation and training, a number of 
developing oountries have established national training institutes, as 
well as regional institutes. In addition to the above tangible resul tSt 
same intangible benefits have accrued, namel~ that the various meetings 
or the elF!' have served as forums for discussion. The om has also been 
the catalyst that enoourapd developing oountries to oooperate with 
each other and also to seek oommon grounds for aotion. Furthermore, 
the result of this in ~rohange was to inorease awarene ss and oonf idenoe 
or insuranoe personnel in developing oountries themselves. This in turn, 
resulted in a better negotiating balanoe between insurers of developed 
countries and those in developing oountries. 
UNCTAD is obviousl~ the basis or these historic ohanges. 
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6.7 Notes 
1. For detailed information see United Nations, 1980 and 
Hagnani, 1978. 
2. Currently there are 166 members, including some countries 
that are not members or the united Nations itself, but which 
are interested in the well-being or the developing oountries. 
3. See UlOTA» Resolution A.I.V. 23. 
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PART THREE 
POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND IMPLEMENTATION 
CIUP1'ER 1 
J'Il)UCURY lU!nULATION Dr NIGERIA 
7.1 Introduction 
'lhe purpose of fiduciary regulation is to protect policyholders 
against the dishonest" and incompetence of insurance operators. 
It is therefore universally accepted that the speoial features which 
distinguish insurance from other goods and services make government 
regulation of insurance transactions desirable (Chapter 4.2). 
1.2 Historical Background 
In Nipria there were no insurance control laws until 1961. 
Until this date, the only laws in operation were aeneral companl' 
1 laws and the law requiring third-party- motor insurance. From 
1961 onwards a number of insurance laws have appeared as !ollova t 
7.2.1 Insurance COmpanies Act 1961 
The aiJIl of this Act was to provide fiduciary relUlation of 
the companies in operation. It made proviSions for registration 
as distinct fram incorporation and demanded certain standards of 
solvency and disolosure of information. 
1.2.2 Insurance (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act 1964 
The control Act of 1961 made no provisions for the control 
of ~ investaenta. This anomalous situation was corrected 
by this Act, which provided that everr insurer should invest at 
least -, two-fifths of its preTious l'Sart s premium in NipriaD 
securities. 
7.2.3 Insurance Act 1976 
The aima of the 1976 Act an to regulate the operations of 
insurance ccmpanies, brokers and agents and to make it compulsory 
tor the insurance of import a to be placed with local insurers. 
It repeal a the 1961 control Act as well as ita 1964 cOIIlpl_ent 
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In addition to tne above laws, there is a miscellaneous 
category that are worthy of mention. The Marine Insurance Act 
providing a basic legal framework for marine insurance was passed 
in 1961. The Companies Act of 1968 compelled all existing foreign 
cClllpanies to incorporate locally. The Insurance companies ,R89'll.ations 
ot the same year required. existing insurance companies to apply 
for registration in the Register and sulDi t retums on their 
f1naDc1al. position to the lieg1strar of insurance (chapter 9.3.2.1). 
7.3 Insurance Companies Act 1961 
, 7.).1 Re,istration 
The Insurance Companies Act ot 1961 introduced the necessit" 
tor registration as distinct from incorporation by providing that 
"no insurer shall comtllence or Carr:! on insurance business in the 
Federation unless the insurer is re,istered tor the purpose of 
2 this Act." Xovever t where a company was already carrying on 
insurance business, it should apply wi thin three months tor 
registration as III insurer.) 
Application tor registration Should be made in the presoribed tor.. 
and accompanied b7 such other documents &8 the Registrar required.4 
Betore reg1ster1Dc an applicant as all lnBurer the Registrar IIlWIt 
be satistied. 
(a) "that the c1us ot business is er vill 
be conducted. in acco~e with sound 
insurance principles , and 
(b) that the Jll8.rgin of solvency is 
adequate, and 
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I 
(c) that the applicant being a bo~ corporate 
operating outside of the Federation is duly 
constituted under the laws of the countr.y in 
which the head. office of the applicant is 
situated. and that the paid up capital is 
not less than £50.000 or that the applicant 
being a body corporate. constituting and 
operating sole11 in the Federation, has a 
paid-up capital of not less than £25,000, and 
(d) that in the case of the applicant being 
an association of underwriters. the 
requirements of this Act as to association 
of underwriters are provided for in the 
regulations of the assoCiatiOD, and that 
if constituted outside of the Jederation, 
the association was duly constituted not 
lesa than five years before the date of 
application for registration under this 
Act and is lawful. in the COlmtry' of 
origin, he shall register the applicant 
a. an insurer and notifY' the insurer 
in writing accordingly. Notice of the 
registration shall be published in the 
Gazette ."6 
The would-be insurer must submit a formal application to 
the Registra.r.7 If the latter waa not satisfied that the 
applicant bad met the above conditions, he could reject the 
applicant for registration and give notice in writing of 
his intentioD to reject the applicant.8 (An aggrieved 
person waa given a risnt ~f appeal).9 
7.).2 Margin of Solvency 
A solvencY' standard for the companies operating on the 
market was imposed. FirstlY', the assets of a local non-life 
company IIlUst exceed its 11a.bUities by at least W,O,OOO or 
10 pareent of its premium income for the preceding financial 
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yea:r (whichever was qreater). Secondly, the assets ot a local 
composite insurer must exceed its liabilities by at least 
~100,OOO or 10 percent of total premiums. In addition to this, 
the liabilities ot such a company under its unmatured lite, 
industrial and sinking- tund policies must not exceed the amount 
ot its lite insurance fund. Th1rdl.y, the margin ot BolvenOT 
imposed on a local insurer carrying on insurance business within 
and outside the Jederation, or aaly outside the Federation is 
exactly double the above tigures.10 
7.3.3. Principal Ottice and Principal otticer 
There is provision that an insurer should maintain a principal 
ott ice in the Federation, appoint a principal officer and notify this 
information to the Registrar in writing.11 If the insurer changed 
the location of its principal office or appointed a new prinCipal 
officer, the insurer should, wi thin 21 daY'S of the change of 
location 0% of the apJointment as the case may be, give notice 
thereof to the Registrar in writing ,12 (~ee ~ection~3 7.6.3.1). 
7.3.4 Accounts 
The .let proTided the. t an 1nsurer should, wi thin six months 
after the end of each financial year of the insurance business of 
the insurer, llotif7 the Registrar 111 writing of any chanp during 
that year aQJ matter prescribed for the purpose of the Act. 1) 
It is similarly provided, lDteraJ1a, that an inBurer should, 
within such six months alao prepare and furnish to the Registrar, 
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in the preseribed fOrlDs, a certificate &8 to the solvency of the 
insurer, signed in the case of a life insurer, by an .ctuary; a 
balance Sheet duly audited showing the financial position of 
the insurer at the close of that yeu together with a coW of 
the relevant profit and loss account. The insurer must also 
furnish a certified. copy of the revenue account in respect of 
Ufe insurance business, 1£ 8n7, oarried 011 by the insurer in 
that year and such other documents and information relating to 
the relevant accounts and balance sheet (including copies of 
reports on the affairs of the insurer for the financial year 
as submitted to the policyholders or shareholders of the 
insurer) as the Regis trar from time to time 
The Registrar was given powrs to direct that the 
account. or balance sheet su1:Ditted under section 12 of the 
Act be amended. The Registrar could himself effect the 
amendment and infora the insurer of the particulars of the 
amendment. lIe could reitect the account or the balanee sheet 
as not having been prepared as prescribed.1S There was a 
right of appeal by an insurer ap.inst the Registrar's 
amendment of aD account or balance sheet. 
The accounts of an insurer could be audited. on17 b:1 an 
-
Auditor approved b7 the Registrar. An audit must be carried 
16 ' 
out annually.. (See sections 1.6, •. ]. 4/11.8). 
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Any statement issued by an insurer containiDc its authorised 
capi tal must be followed by its paid-up capital and a:tJY statement 
about its subsoribed oapital must be followed by its paid-up 
oapital.17 
There was pro:vision that an insuranoe oomp8n7 oould be wound. 
up by the !igh Court for inabUi ty to pay its debts. In this 
18 
regard, the provisions of seotion 134 and 136 of the Companies Aot 
had effeot as if the petition vas ane presented under the 
Companies Aot19 whioh provide for winding up in cases, inter alia, 
of default in delivering statutory reports to the Registrar, 
inability to pay debts, failure in oertain oases to meet a 
oreditor's demand note, or to satisfy exeoution or other process, 
or the oourt after a oonsideration of any contingent or prospeotive 
liability of the company is satisfied that the company is unable to 
pay its debts. If the value of the assets of an insuranoe oompany 
did not exceed the margin of solvency as defined in section 4 of 
the Aot the company would be deemed to be unable to pay its 
20 debts. (~ee seotion 7.6.9). 
1.3.6 Canoellation of the Certifioate 
of Registration 
The Act empowered tQe Registrar to cancel the registration ot 
a registered insurer if the Registrar was satisfied that the 
olass of insurance businesa of the insurer val not being carried 
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on in accordance with sound insurance principles; or that the 
insurer's margin of solvency was inadequate; or that the insurer 
bad ceased to carry on the insurance business in the Federation; 
or that the insurer, in writing, requested the cancellation of 
registration or that a judgement obtained in any court in, 
21 Nigeria against the insurer remained UIlSatif'ied for thirty days. 
The Registrar, in exercise of his functions under section 9, 
was obliged to notify- in writing the insurer of his intention to 
cancel suCh insurer's registration. The insurer had a right of 
appeal within 60 dars of the date of suCh notice.22 An insurer 
whose registration had been cancelled was normally given 12 months 
of grace within which such business must be wound up.23 The period 
could in special cases be extended by the Federal Commissioner for 
Trade. (S~e section 7.6.4). 
7.).7 Amalgamations and Transfers 
The Act precluded anr local insurer from amalgamating with 
any other, insurer c&rry'ing on long term business or workmen's 
compensation ia.urance bustness and also from transferring to or 
acquiring from Ill7 other iDsurer Bn7 such insurance bu.atness or 
&rrf part of ~ such insurance business unless the transaction vas 
88Zlctioned 'b7 the 1Iigb. Court,24 which for ~at purpose baa the .... 
jurisdiction as those it possesses under the companies Act of 
1968.25 (Soe section 7.6.8). 
7.4 Evaluation 
The Act was patterned on the British model which was designed 
to ensure freedom and publicity to the business rather than provide 
the machine%'7 tor control and supervision as it is the case in most 
ot the E. E. C. meaber countries, India, Japan, ]Sra.sU and Mexic9,' to 
name a tew examples. In this laisses-tatr. situation, it was not 
surprising that the low capital requirement ot .$0,000 tor regis-
tration coupled with the relatively lax pre-registration conditions 
was responsible tor the muahroan growth in the number ot insurance 
companies. 
Thus, it was possible tor an applicant, with one or two 
experie~ced insurance men and .50,000 deposited with a commercial 
bank, to apply tor and be registered as an insurer. Experience has 
shown that by .. angement with the commercial banks such deposit. 
could be withdrawn after obtaining the certificate of recistration. 
In the event of cancellation of the insurer's certificate ot 
reg1.stmtion, there was usually no financial backing ap.1nst 
financial liabilities. 
This lax pre-registration condition is demonstrated by 
The State v. Daboh and Mordi (Ak1nkugbe, 1976). The accused persons 
conspired topther to obtain registration as an insurer of the 
NipriaD states Assurance CClllp~ by falael;, pretending that the 
cOmp&QJ had a credit balance of .$0,000 in ita account with the 
!ant of the North. Daboh was the Executive Director of the 
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· insurance comp&.ny' whUe Mordi was the Manager of the bank. 
Tbis case illustrates how Nigeriana either blatantly 
disregarded the control law or operated on its fringe. 
(Tbe other inadequacies of the Act are reported in 
chapter 9.3.2). 
7.5 Insurance (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act 1964 
The Insurance Ccmpanies Act of 1961 made no provisions to 
control the investments of insuranoe companies,26 even in a situation 
, \, 
where the latter' were harily investing their funds locally 
(chapter 5.3). This deficiency was remedied by the Insurance (Miscel-
laneous provisions) Ac~ of 1964. the sole purpose of which was to 
provide for the investment of insurance funds in specified Nigerian 
investments. 
The Act prohibited the pqment of compensation under an 
insurance contract' in respect of local risks. unless the person 
paying the compensation was a Nigerian canpa.tl7.27 This provision 
would appear to restrict the insurance of local risks to Nigerian 
insurers (section 7.6.2.1). 
It was stipulated that eve17 insurance comp&ll7 transacting 
non-life insurance business should invest at least 40 percent 
of its premium income during the immediately following financial 
year in Nigerian investments.28 These investments could be 
realised to meet abnomallylarge claims. but should be made 
good within a period of )0 daJs.29 
There was proviSion that life contracts OD Nigerian citizens 
should be issued 'oJ Nigerian companies in Nigerian currency 30 
(chapter 8.1.1). 
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This was intended to limit the amount of foreign exchange that 
would have been expended in paJing life premiums abroad. However 
the remittance of reinsurance premiums on life contracts to 
reinsurers abread was allowed. The entire life fund IIlUst be 
held in Nigerian investments. 
"Nigerian investments" was defined as 
(a) stocks, notes, bonds and other securities issued 
by the government of the Federation or a Region; 
(b) stocks, share. and debentures issued by a body corporate 
established directly by a law in force in Bigeria, 
or issued by a Nigerian company; 
(c) rights to receive payments by way of interest 
or dividend which have accrued due in respect 
of any such securities ••• ; 
(d) moneys standing to the credit of any current 
or deposit account maintained with a branch 
situated in Nigeria of a licensed bank within 
the meaning of the Bazlking Act; 
( e) moneys atanding to the credit of any deposit 
account maintained with a person who is 
carrying on business in Nigeria as a 
building society ••• 1 
(f) an estate in tee simple absolute in possession 
in land in Niseria ••• ; 
(g) rights to be paid a loan ¥.bich is absolutely 
secured by a first mortgage of such an estate ••• 1 
(h) rights to receive payments by' wq of premium 
which bave accrued due under contrancts of 
insurance made in Nipria; 
(i) right to b. repaid a loan made in Nigeria to 
~ person in cOlllequeuce of his being a 
person who has undertaken to make payments 
by way of premiUJI under a contract of 
endowment insurance ••• 1 
(j) property of such other desc~tptionst 1! 
~, aa .,.. 'be preaC1'lbed." J 
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These investments were to be distributed aa follows: For a 
general company, 10 percent of the investment must be in government 
stocks and/or securities and not more than 4 percent in real property. 
As for life companies, 2$ percent of the investments must be in 
gover.nment stocks, notes, bands and other securities and not more 
than 10 percent in real property.32 (See ch3.~ter 7 .6.3~6). 
The 1964 Act has set the pace for gover.nment direction of 
insurance company investment by' imposing restrictions on particular 
classes ef assets that could be acquired and specific limits on the 
proportion of total assets that could be held in particular classes 
of financial assets. Since many of the securities were not available 
in the capital market, the companies were not able to find avenues 
for much of the funds generated from insurance. No wonder the 
investment of the funds was not optimal as table 7.1 shows. The 
rigid policy of restrictions has the effect of prolonging itself 
( D~kinson, 1980) and still lingers on today. (For more 
evaluation see Chapter 9.3.2). 
Financial Asseta 
Govermaent. aecuri tie. 17.23 17.70 
Stocks, shares and 
bonds 24.65 19.21 20.46 15.08 13.36 
Mortgages & policy 
loans 11.21 16.51 16.31 12.09 13.73 
cash & billa receiv-
able 47.75 44.41 43.96 49.11 40.95 
Other assets 2.80 2.64 4.75 6.02 11.33 
Total assets 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source I Insurance Dept •• 'ederal MiDistr,y of Finance 
Table 1.1 
percentage Distribution or Investment by Insurance 
Companies in Nigeria (1968 to 1973) 
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1 
21.26 
12.57 
11.88 
41.55 
12.74 
100.00 
1.6 Insurance Act 1916 
Now we turn to a discussion of the 1916 Insurance Act. 
There are two periods covered by this thesisl (1) the 
period before the 1916 Insurance Act, and (2) the period 
immediately atter the 1916 Act, at least so far as the available 
data permits. The 1916 Act has been used as the dividing line 
simply because the Act, it is generally agreed, marks an important 
milestone in the historical development of the insurance industry 
in Nigerian. It was not until the promulgation of the 1916 Act 
that what is now known as the insuranoe industry in Nigeria emerged. 
Adopting the close control system of regulation (chapter 4.4) the 
Act contains wide ranging provisions dealing with ownership 
structure, minimum entry requirements, regulations concerning 
reserve requirements, the management of insurance funds, the filing 
of returns and the supervisory rolls of the Insurance Department 
of the Federal Ministry of Finance and Economic Plsnning and such 
other provisions as m&1 affect the structure, the behaviour 
and overall performance of insurance business in Nigeria. 
7.6.1 Scope of Supervision 
The provisions of the Insurance Act of 1976 apply to all 
insurance business and insurers excepts 
(a) a friendly society with no share capital and 
provided the SOCiety does not employ &n1 agent 
to sell insurance policies to nan-members; 
(b) a pension fund; and 
(c) any other insurer baaed outside Nigeria who is 
engaged solely in reinsurance business with an 
insurer licensed under the Act.33 
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Under the Act, insurance business is classified into life 
insurance and non-life insurance business. The latter is further 
sub-divided into. 
(a) fire insurance; 
(b) accident insurance; 
(c) motor vehicle insurance; 
(d) workmen's compensation insurance; 
(e) marine, aviation and transport insurance; 
(f) miscellaneons business not falling under any or 34 
the above-mentioned classes of insurance business. 
The above classification notwithstanding, any part of an 
insurance business may be treated as belonging to a particular 
class of insurance business and the rei."1surBr.ce of liabilities 
under an insurance policy is treated as an insurance business or 
the class to which the insurance policy would have belonged ir it 
had been issued by the re1nsurer. 3S 
1.6.2. Conditions for Commencing !USines8 
7.6.2.1 Establishment 
In all countries aQ1 conce~ proposing to c&rr7 an aD1 
supervised class of direct business Whatsoever is required 
under the insurance laws to haft an establishment in the count1'1 
concerned (section 7.4). Hence the Insurance Act or 1976 
provides that no person Shall carry on ~ class of insurance 
buSiness in liseria excepts 
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(a) a company duly incorporated as a limited liability 
company under the Companies Act of 1968; 
(b) a co-operative insurance society registered under 
the law relating to co-operative societies; and 
(c) a mutual insurance company. 36 
HoweTer, an establishment is not required in order to undertake 
reinsurance business in excess of the 20 percent compulsory cession 
to the Nigeria ~einsurance Corporation of Nigeria.37 
1.6.2.2 Licensing 
The grant of a licence is subject to a number of conditions. 
These are legal, financial and professional conditions. 
The Act provides that no insurer shall commence or carry on 
insurance business in Nigeria unless the insurer is registered in 
accordance with the provisions of the Act. 38 All the insurers 
carrying on insuraftce business at the time the Act comes into 
effect are expected to apply within three months for registration. 
Otherwise they are obliged to cease operations after the expiration 
of six months from the comingmto ~peration of the Act, unless 
they are duly registered to continue the particular class or 
classes of insurance business in respect of which application haa 
been made by the insurer. 39 It also gives seven or more persons, 
who have subscribed to a memorandum of association and otherwise 
complied with the requirements of the Act, the ' ... -' permission to form 
and register a mutual insurance compSllY' , the aim of which is to use 
the profit derived from their operations to reduce the cost of 
insurance undertaken by i tl members. 40 
.~ ~ie),~:!:"te :'egistr'''.tion :Jut 20 r;b-'c::.ined for li':e ~UlC. non-life 
dPplic~tic~ fo~ registr~tion mU3~ be ~ade to 
.L'1- '. "ct f I ". r1 f 41 ~"t.:; -lre or 0 nsurance on 3. p:'Gscr~ce~ om. The ap~lican t 
~.,.-+ 'ot.L~c"" tr'l tb I" "'" ~ .1 t 
•• I~.;'" u ~ ",c:,.. .. .e app ~c::. ,,::';):1 L o:::n SOlle: ~O cu.7.en s includ.ing the 
t2.bl,:;- for pre41i;.:::;.'::, :h., mer~o:.'andurn :o.nc. articles of associ:. tion, a 
certified copy of the certi:ic~te of L~corporation snd the names 
.1'2 ~d 2.ddresses of the directors, etc.-
A minimum paid-up capital of ~3CO,000 in respect of companies 
\"i~hing to transact non-life i.'l3UI',:-.l1Ce business, ~;500,ooo in =espect 
of life business, and amounts not less t:- "~J. tGn times the above amounts 
in respect of reinsurance business.43~$. means that a composite 
comp211y requires a mini."llum of a80o, 000 issued and paid-up capital. 
The ]ederal Commissioner for FL~~ce may, by order publiskad in the 
Pedersl Gazette, increase the amount of the share capit~1.44 
The share capital otherwise knQ1:1l1 as "statuto:y deposit", ::lust 
be deposited with the Central ]aru{ of Nigeria and kept deposited 
thQ~ein until after registration when the Director of Ir~urance may 
pe~it the release of 50 percent of the amount so deposited, as 
ltlo::!d.'1g capital. The balance re.112.ins de;osi ted as lonG' ::s the 
com?2IlY continues in insurance bV,siness. 1;/here, however, the 
a??lication for registration is not successful, the full amount of 
the deposit is notwithstanding refundable.45 A further relief is 
guaranteed by the Act to permit the withdrawal of up to a further 
25 percent of the deposit on application to meet a substantial loss 
which the company would not othe~1Ie be able to meet. However, 
the amo-gnt so withdrawn must be replaced wi thin 30 days. The 
statutory deposit is not regarded as assets held by the insurer 
but is available in the event of the cancellation of its oertificate 
of registration or of the winding up of the insurer for 
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the disCharge of the liabilities arising out of the policies of 
the insurance business transacted by the insurer and remaining 
undischarged at the time of the winding up. 46 
In addition to the above financial conditions, the applicant 
for registration as an insurer must satisfy the following additional 
oonditionsl 
(a) that the class of insuranoe business will be conduoted 
in accordanoe with sound insurance prinoiples; 
(b) that the applicant is duly established under the 
applicable law; 
(0) that the statutory deposit has been paid to the 
Central Bank; 
(d) that the arrangements relating to reinsuranoe 
treaties in respeot of the classes of insurance 
business to be transacted are adequate and valid; 
(e) that the proposal forms, term and conditions of 
insurance policies are in order-nd. ::1ccept:::.:.ble; 
(r) that there is at least one competent and profe-
ssionally qualified person to man each department 
of insurance business; 
(g) that the directors and shareholders have not been 
involved in or been found guilty of fraud; and 
(h) that the name of the applicant is not likely to 
be lIistaken for the name of 8Zl7 other insurer. 
If the Director of insurance is satisfied that the above conditions 
have been met by the applicant, be is obliSed to register the 
applicant as aD insurer by' issuing a oertificate of registration and 
. 
notl!ying the insurer in writing accordingly. A notice of the 
registration must be published in the Federal Gazette. If however 
the Director is not satisfied that the registration conditions have 
been met he shall give notice in writing to th~ applicant to reject 
the application.47 
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ifuere an applicant is denied registration, he must be notified 
in writing and he may appeal to the Federal Commissioner against 
the rejection. It the appeal fails, the fact of failure must also 
be published in the Federal Gazette and in such other manner a8 to 
ensure publicity.48 
7.6.3 Supervision of Registered Insurers 
It is, of course, the function of the supervisory authorities 
to verify that the concern remains solvent and conducts its business 
in accordance with the laws and regulations. This implies consider-
ation of legal, accounting, technical, equitable and economic 
matters. The supervision of the business of a registered insuzance 
concern therefore involves first the inspection at the place of 
business, either merely to verity the information given in the 
returns or to inspect the whole of the ceDcem.s business affairs 
and, second, examination of the returns which must be submitted to 
the supervisory authorities. 
7.6.3.1 Registration Office 
Every insurer must have a principal office to which all cODlllUl1i-
cations and. claims may be addressed. The 8i tuation of the prinCipal 
office and ~ change thereof must be notified to the Director ot 
Insurance within 21 days. Where the insurer is incorporated under 
the Companies Act ot 1968. its registered office under that Act must 
be the same as its principal ott ice under the Insurance Act. It is 
an offence to function as an insurer Without a principal ottice .. 49 , 
(section 7.3.3). 7.6.).2 ApPOintment and Vacation ot 
Ottice ot Chiet Executive 
The Director must be notitied in writing or an intention to 
appoint a particular candidate as the chief executive ot the 
insurance CODlpID1. The notice ot intention is to be counter-Biped 
by the prospective appointee. It must contain his academic. 
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professional administrative qualifications and the detailed career 
50 history. No appointment can be made until the Director contims 
in writing that there is no objection. If he objects to the 
appointment, the insurer and the prospective appointee can appeal 
to the Commissioner.51 Any appointment in contravention of the 
Act renders the insurer and the Chief exective so appointed 
liable to a ftae of .10 for each day of contravention. 
If the Chief executive is relieved of his post, the insurer 
must give the reasons, and if he resigns, he must state the 
reasons for his reSignation. In either:..~ event, he must prepare 
a report on the state of the business. The insurer must then 
inform the Director of the vacation of office and send a cop,y of 
the out-going chief executive's report to the Director within 
52 21 days. Non-compliance carries ~ fine of N500 upon conviction. 
7.6.3.3 Ins~ance Policies 
All insurance policies and subsequent changes in them must be 
apPJJOved by the Director of Insurance. This means that where 
standard form insurance contracts are not used ~ an insurer, 
then every policy, certificate, contract, rider, clause, warranty 
or endorsement or deletion therefrom must be individually submitted 
for the approval of the Director. iolhere, however, standard form 
insurance contracts are used, then, only six copies need be 
submitted - the six standard printed forms will serve &s prototypes 
while their facsimUe copies ~ subsequently be validly 
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disseminated to the public by the insurer as if they also have been 
individually approved by the Director. Further-more , it would appear 
that where an insurance company has secured the requisite approval 
and it does not intend to vary ~ of the terms in the insurance 
documents later, it may not seek the Director's approval again 
until it may became necessary owing to the introduction of new terms. 
policies issued in contravention of the Act are voidable at the 
instance of the insured and the insurer is liable on conviction to 
a fiDe of :2,000.53 
1.6.).4 Records 
The insurer must keep at its principal office the memorandum 
and articles of association, the names and addresses of shareholders, 
the names and addresses of policyholders and a register of claims, 
indicating the date of claim, the names and addresses of the 
claimants and date of rejection of claims. In cases of rejection, 
the register must show the reasons tor the rejection and where 
there is litigation the decision of the court thereof. There must 
be a register ot investments, assets and reinsurances ceded. Other 
records are the cash books, current account books and a register 
of open policies in marine insurance. In respect of life insurance 
the insurer must keep a register of the insured under group policies, 
loans on policies, cash surrender values and of lapsed or expired 
policies. Non-compliance would on conviction attract a fine of 
54 . ~500.. (Se,e section 1. 3.4 ~ • , 
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FUrthermore, every insurer must keep separate account books for 
each of life and non-life insurances. The fund for one type of 
business cannot be applied to discharge the liabilities arising from 
the other type of business. On the one hand the life fund shall 
consist of a sum which is not less than the mathematical reserves 
while, on the other, general funds consist of the reserve for 
unexpired risks and reserves for outstanding claims.55 (:Ge secti~n 7.c.3.3). 
1.6.3.5 Reserves 
Every insurer is expected to set up and maintain the following 
technical reserves in respect of life and non-life business: 
(a) reserves for unexpired risks; 
(b) reserves for outstanding claims; and 
(c) contingency reserves to cover fluctuations in 
securities and variations L~ statistical estimates. 
The reserves for un-expired risks in general business other than 
marine insurance shall not be less than 45 percent of the total 
net premiums; however, this figure is increased to 15 percent in 
the case of marine business. The reserves for outstanding claims 
represent the amount of all outstanding claims in addition to 20 
percent of the est1mated figure for outstanding claims incurred bpt 
not reported at the end of the previous preceding year. The contin-
gency reserves are not expected to be less than :3 percent of total 
premiums or 20 percent of net profits (which ever is greater) 
provided they are allowed to accumulate untU they reach the 
minimum paid up capital or 50 percent of the net premiums 
(whichever is greater). In life insurance the insurer is expected 
to maintain a general reserve fund 1ihich is made up of the sum of 
the net liabilities on policies in force at the time of theactua-
rial valuation and a contingency reserve which equals one percent 
of premiums or 10 percent of profits (whichever is greater) and 
which shall be allowed to accumulate until it reaches the amount 
of the minimum paid-up capital. S6 
7.6.3.6 Investments 
The current law, which has repealed the previous enactment on 
investments, S7 requires all assets in respect of insurance business 
, I 58 
transacted in Nigeria to be invested in Nigeria. Under the 
Insurance Companies Regulations of 1968 and the Insurance Act of 
1976, suCh assets are to be invested in the stocks of the Federal 
and State Governments and semi-sovernment bodies, equities, 
mbrtgaee loans on real estate, industrial debenturel IDd UDsecured 
loans, Treasury :Bllls and TreaaU17 CertUicates and cash on deposit 
account. In addition, the cODlp8Dies are required to invest at least 
2S percent of their funds in IOvernment aecuri ties and not more than 
'- 10 percent of the funds in real property. (Se'echapter 7.5). 
\ 
7.6.3.7 Annual Returns 
Not later than 31 May, each insurer IIlUst 8ubmit ita annual 
returns, namely audited balance sheet, profit and loss account and 
revenue account for each olass of insuranoe bulineaa. The life 
insurer DlUst in addition sulDi t an abstract of the report of the 
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actuary, the ~uation report and a table of premiums, policy 
reserve values and guaranteed surrender values. 
On receip~, the Director may call for additional information 
and ma¥ require the insurer to correct or rectitr any deficiencies. 
Failure to produce any required document or to give additional 
information is punishable by a fine of ~2,OOO.59 Failure to 
submi t the amlual retums is also ptmishable by the imposition 
on conviotion of a fine of g1,OQO.60 No insurer is allowed to 
deolare and pay any dividend until the Direotor has expressly 
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confirmed in writing that its annual returns are in order. 
After reoeiving the Direotor's notification that the returns are 
in order, the aooounts must be published in at least one 
ne\o{spaper with wide Circulation. 62 (..;;e :;':cticn 7.:;.4). 
7.6.3.8 ~udit 
The balance sheet, the profit ~~d loss account and the 
revenue aocount of every insurer shall be audited annually by an 
auditor approved by the Direotor and no auditor shall be approved 
if he is an employee, manager or director of the insurer. At the 
end of the audit, the auditor Shall certify whether or not he has 
obtained adequate information from the books and records: the 
books of the insurers have been properly kept and the affairs 
and transactions o! the insurer have been oorreotly reoorded; 
the acoounts and balance sheet are in accordance with the 
information given to him for the purpose of his audit; the 
aooounts and balance sheet are in acoordance with the 
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applicable provisions of the Act and the balance sheet and the 
profit and loss account, respectively, give a true and fair view 
of the financial position of the insurer.63 (See section 7.3.5.) 
7.6.4 Cancellation of the Certificate of Registration 
The Director of Insurance can cancel the certificate of an 
insurer if he is satisfied: 
(a) that the class of insurance business iS,not being 
conducted in accordance with sound insurance 
principles; or 
(b) that the technical reserves in respect of unexpired 
risks and outstanding claims are inadequate; or 
(c) that the insurer has ceased to carry on business for 
at least one year; or 
(d) that the insurer has applied in writing for the 
cancellation of its certificate of registration; or 
(e) that a judgement debt obtained in court of competent 
jurisdiction against the insurer remains unsatisfied 
for 30 days; or 
" (f) that the insurer is carrying on simultaneously with 
insurance business any other business which is 
detrimental to the insurance business of the 
msurer; or 
(g) that the business of the insurer haa been transferred 
to or amalgamated with the business of any other 
insurer; or 
(h) that the insurer haa refused to submit to an 
examination of its books; or 
(1) that the insurer has failed to comply with the 
provisions of section 19(4) of the Act; or 
(j) that the insurer haa failed to maintain adequate 
and valid reinsurance treaties; or 
(k) that the insurer lacks expertise; or 
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(i) that the insurer has persistently failed to 
comply with any enactment relating to reinsurance 
in Nigeria; or 
(m) that the net assets of the insurer are below the 
minimum paid-up capital and the capital has not 
been made good wi thin the time stipulated by the 
Director; or 
(n) that the insurer persistently fails to pay claims 
promptly; or 
(0) that the insurer has failed to set up the special 
reserves prescribed in section 17~1) of the Act; or 
(p) that the insurer haa established a branch office 
or branch otfices without the approval ot the 
Director; or 
(q) that the insurer acts in any manner without the 
approval of the Director in cases where the .:.ct 
requires such approval; or 
(r) that the insure~ has been wound up or 
otherwise dissolved. or has gone into liquidation. 
Betore exercising his power of cancellation, the Director 
shall notify the insurer ot his intention and the insurer may 
appeal to the Commissioner. Where no appeal is lodged, the 
Director shall cancel the certificate and publish -H-,CL tact in 
the Federal Gazette.64 On cancellation, the insurer must 
apply to the court tor a winding up order under the Companies 
Act ot 1968.65 (s~e section 7.:3.\. 
1.6.5 Insurance Intermediaries 
The Insurance Act ot 1916 draws a distinction between the 
insurance intermediary who acts as an agent representing the 
insurance company or companies and the insurance broker who holds 
out himself as giving independent advice to his client and an the 
cover most suited to his needs. 
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7.6.5.' Insurance Agents 
Insurance agents are salesmen employed to sell insurance 
policies and are not normally required to possess sound knowledge 
of insurance. Hence they are required to be licensed before they 
can transact business. APplication66 for licence must be made 
to the Director of Insurance and be accompanied by a letter of 
appointmen t as an agent from each insurer 67 and a licence fee 
of ~100.68 If the Director issues a licence, he must publish the 
same in the Federal Gazette. The licence entitles the holder to 
act as an agent for the insurer or insurers named therein. The 
Director cannot licence as an agent a minor, a person of unsound 
mind or a person who had, prior to th9 date of his application, 
been convicted by a court of any offence involving criminal 
misappropriation of funds or breach of trust or cheating.69 
The licence is renewable every year on the p~ent of ~2570 and 
presentation of a certificate from each insurer concerned that 
71 the accounts of the preceding year had been settled. 
The insurer must maintain a register of agents indicating 
the date of commencement and termination of 888nc1. An agent must 
pq or transfer to the insurer premiums collected by him within 
15 days of receipt thereof. Any contravention is punishable by 
~100, =200, and =500 tor a first, second and third offence 
respectively. On the third conviction of the agent, however, the 
Director of Insurance must revoke his licence and thereafter he 
cannot be licensed as an agent again. ,An agent without a valid 
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licence is liable on copviction to N·SOO fine or imprisonment for 
two years or both, and in addition, he must refund to their 
rightful owners all moneys collected by him while so acting. 
An insltrer who recklessly or knowingly t~sacts business with 
an unlicensed agent is liable on conviction to a fine of ~1,OOO 
and the court may order the insurer to ~efund all moneys collected 
by the agent.72 
7.6.5.2 Insurance Brokers 
Insurance brokers accept no share of a risk but are responsible 
solely for the placing of insurance and the subsequent servicing 
of it. In addition, their help may be needed at the time of a claim. 
In la\-l, an insurance broker is primarily the agent of his principal, 
the policyholder, although at certain times, as with the collection 
of premiums, he also acts for the insurers. Like the insurance 
agents, they' too are licensed b7 the Director of Insurance. The 
latter can only approve an application it he is satisfied that. 
(a) the applicant has the prescribed qualifications;7) 
(b) the applicant haa unlimited liability; and 
(c) the applicant haa deposited on a fixed deposit 
basis 32$ ,000 with the Central !ank of Nigeria. 
If the Director i8 not satisfied with any of the matters 
mentioned above he !DUst notify the applicant in writing of his 
intention to reject the application. The applioant may appeal 
to the Commissioner against the decision.74 The tact ot 
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registration75 must be published in the Federal Gazette and the 
certificate is valid for one year but is renewable on the payment 
of~10076 and presentation of a certificate from each insurer 
conce~ed that the accounts of the preceding year have been 
settled. This certificate is an inducement to the prompt and 
faithful discharge of the obligations under the Act. 
The certificate may be cancelled or renewal refused if 
the broker haas 
(a) knowingly or recklessly contravened the provisions 
of the Act; 
(b) made any material false statement for the .~14;,.' .. ;,~'; 
of obtaining a licence; 
(c) been found guilty by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion of fraudulent or dishonest practices 
including misappropriation of clients' money; or 
(d) materially misrepresented the terms and conditions 
of any policy or contract of insurance which he 
has sold to clients or. seeks to sell to prospective 
clients. 
:sefore cancelling or refusing renewal, the Director must 
notify the broker or his intention in writing and the broker may 
appeal to the Commissioner against the cancellation or the 
refusal to renew.77 
.. 
Every licensed broker is required to maintain, at all times, 
a professional indemnity insurance of not less thaD =SO,ooo or 2$ 
percent of his annual brokerage income during the preceding ;yea:r, 
whichever is the greater. He must pay or transfer to the insurer 
every premium collected 'b1 him within .30 days of receipt thereof. 
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Any contravention is punishable on conviction b.1 a fine of .,00, 
~1,OOO and :2,000 tor the first, second and third offence respectively. 
In addition, the licence must be revoked and the broker or persons 
consti tuting the fim cannot by' himself or themselves or in conjunc-
tion with any other person or bo¢1 be licensed again as a broker 
under the Act. It is an ottence punishable with .$,000 to 
function as a broker without a licence. A:1ly insurer ..mo lmowingly 
or recklessly transacts business with an unlicensed broker is 
lia.ble on conviction to a fine ot .$,000. The court mq in either 
case order the broker or the insurer to retund the moneys involved 
to their rightful owners.78 
A broker must k.ep separate recorda of all hi. busines. 
transactions with insurers registered under the Act and those 
outside Nigeria. He cannot, however, enter into IIl7 insurance 
contract with a:t17 person outside Nipria without the prior 
approval ot the ])1:ector of IJlaurance. Azq contract entered into 
in violation of the .lct i. void.79 In order to ensure compl1azx:e 
with the Act, the ])irector, UJ', at arq t~, authorise an inves-
tigator to conduct aD7 examination ot an apnt or a broker and, 
he DUll' 'b7 notice in writing request him to produoe IZ17 document 
or ~matiOD reIat1nc to Il13 insurance buainesl nelOtia ted or 
solicitel ~ b1a.80 
7.6.$.) CommiSSion 
The Insurance Act of 1976 regulates the rates of commission 
paJable to insurance agents and brokers respectivelr. The 
maximum rate PaJabIe tor motor vehicle, workmen'. compensation, 
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contractors' "all risks" and engmeering insurance is 10 percent 
while the maximum commission p~~ble for o~~er non-life insurance 
business is 1$ percent. The rate of commission can only be 
altered with the approval of the Director. It is an offence to 
payor receive any commission iB excess of the stipulated rate. 
The penal V for contravention is :1,000 fhe plus an amount equal 
to such excess Cammiasion.81 No part of the commission m8¥ be 
offered as a rebate for the purpose of indu~ aD1 insured to 
renew or take a policy of insurance.82 
7.6.5.4 Adjustera 
According to the provisiona of the A.ct brokers include 
adjustera. All references to brokers in the Act Ihall be construed 
to include ad.juaters.. An adjuster meana a:trI person or boci1 WlO 
for lIlODey or other valuable caaaideration act. tor or on behalt ot 
~. :lnaUftr in adjuat1q claW ari.ing from iDaurance contract. 
or policies or in nelOtiattDc for or effecting aettlement of cl&~. 
in cozmection with &DJ .uch tranaaction.8 3 
7.6.6 Machine;r tor Control 
: .. ,;.~.".Mt: pzovide. for the appointment ot a direotor of 
~. a clepaV '!rector of 1nsuru1ce mel auch other officera 
... are uce.Rr7 t= the .Sn1atration aDd eDto:ro_nt ot it. 
proTiaicma. _ power ft8ted. 1n the Dinctor ..., be eure1aecl 
bJ the Depuv Du-otor aDd. 8D7 other public offioer clul7 
authori.ed. bJ the Director or ])ePUV Direotor. 84 'l.'he lot alao 
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• 
provides for the appointment of a chief actuar,r and other 
actuarial starf to assist and advise the Director of Insurance 
in respect of actuarial matters and such other matters as the 
Director may delegate to h~.85 
7.6.6.2 powers of Investigation 
The Director of Insurance is empowered ODce in two ,.e&l'll to 
~ 
investigate the affain of a resistered insurance compa.Dl' for th8 
purpose of satisfying himself that the provision. of the Act and any 
rele'V8Zlt regulation. are being ccapUed with. '1'ha 1nvestigator baa 
power to check the 0&8h .m band, books of account., recorda and 
reg1at.rs, veri1) the investment. and statutory., ~.8erve. and the 
. 86 
legali ty or othe:tw1.e of IZJ7 1naurance transaction. 
If the repoz't is untavou:rable, the D1reoto~ mq au.pend the 
insurer from undertaking new busines. for a speoified. period with. 
a view to enabling b1Da to rect1t,r IZ17 defiOicoie •• 87 If the 
insu%er 1s unwUling or UD&ble to t'eot11'1 the defioiencies, the 
Director ma7 appoint aD tAteria lIYP'apr to ."... the a.ttaJ.ra ot 
the insurer. Retwlal to aulD1 t to the mveatip.t1011 or retusal 
to fun1ah nece,s&rJ intoratiOl1 for the purposea of the inws-
t~ti.cm CIID. le. to the c&DOella.t1on of the cerl1ticate of 
regiatftt1cm.88 
.. ' ..... 
.. ~~ the appointment of the interim an.,.r. the latter baa 
powers to restore the v1abUit7 of the inaun~ and. apeoifically 
he baa authori t7 to. 
(a) oollect all mone,. an4 debts due to the insurerl 
(b) enter, in the insurer'. name, into uq pending 
lepJ. proce.dings againat the insurerl 
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(c) preserve the assets of the insurer; 
(d) exercise staff discipline; and 
(e) review previous managecent decisions. 
The insurer will normally bear the incidental expenses of the 
interim manager who is placed '.lIlder the supervision of the 
Director of Insurance to 'whom all periodic and other reports must 
be made. If the Director is satisfied that the interim manager 
has restored the affairs of the :insurance co.pan7 to a sound 
position, he -7 tem1nate his appointment. Where the continua-
tion in business of the insurer would be haza.rdous to the 
policyholders, the Director of Insurance shall terminate the 
appointment of the interim manaser and cancel the certificate 
of registration of the insurer.89 Unless the insurer is a 
c~ beinB wound up by' the court, the Director is empowered to 
proceed. to appoint a receiver to immediatel7 take cha%ge ot its 
assets and to collect and sather in all other assets due to 
the insurer and administer same as expeditiously as possible 
for the benef! t ot the poliCJholders and cndi tors. Thereafter 
the receiver Shall appl7 to the court for the windinB up of 
the ~ in aocol'dance with the provisions or the Companies 
AC~.$:~~.~ 
. ·li·~~:\·~:.' 7.6.7 Miscellaneous Previa ions 
7.6.7.1 Settlement or Claim. 
The current ftsulaticm ~produce. the provilions of section 10 
of the Motor Vehicle (Third. par~) Insurance A.ct ot 195891 8Zld goes 
OD to provide that When a claia in reapect ot a motor accident is 
made in writing, the insurer must, if he accepts liability, settle 
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it within 90 days cf receipt. !f, however, he is denying liability 
he must inform the claimant 1."1 w=i t:'n; wi thin 90 days of noti:ica-
tion of claim.92 Police reports are r.ot required in some situations. 
',/here only one person in involved in an accident, a statement of 
the facts by that person together with a statement b,y one witness 
constitutes sufficient evidence of proof of claim. Where more 
than one party is involved in the aCCident, each party must 
deliver a statement of the factS. to the insurer or insurers and 
if the alleged facta do not differ in any material particular 
they constitute sufticient evidence ot proof o! 108s. police 
reports are however necessary Where death occurs or there is 
serious bodily injury.93 
7.6.7.2 Insurance o! Imports 
Insurance ot all imports into Nigeria must be effected with a 
Nigerian registered insurer (chapter 8.4). Any oontrawention is punishable 
by ~2,OOO fine plus an additional tine equal in amount to the total 
commission received by the broker in the transaction. Where a 
broker, however, satisties the Director ot Insurance that trom 
the exceptional nature ot the risk it is not reasonably practicable 
to .,tleot the in.urance with an insurer registered under the Act, 
th.:kaot~ ~ authorise in writ1ng a broker to ettect the 
. 
ins~oe with insurers out.ide the countr,y.94 
1.6.1.3 Premium Rate. 
No insurer can make any general 1nareaae in the rates of 
premium without the prior approval of the Director of Inaurance. 
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Any contravention can lead to suspension of business for a specifiQ 
pe=iod or cancellation of the certificate of registration. Fur the r-
more, the i:.su=er must refund any excess premium to the insured. 
'l'he insurer is, however, free to a:;;eal to the Commissioner against 
the decision of the Director to refund any excess payment.95 
7.6.7.4 Rating Committee 
The Commissioner is empowered to set up an ad-hoc committee 
called the Rating Committee. The Committee consists of a representa-
ti ve of the Federal Mift1atries of Finance. Trade and Economic 
Development, two representatives of the Accident Insurance Association 
of Ni;eria.one representative of the ~igerian Insurance Association 
and not more than three other persons ap~·ointed by the Commissioner. 
The functions of the Rating Co~~ittee shall be tOI 
(a) examine and determine reasonable and adequate premium 
rates chargeable for similar risks in any clus of 
insurance business or part thereof, having regard to 
past, current and prospective claims experience of 
insurers and also the nature of the risks; 
(b) group risks by class for the purpose of ascertaining 
minimum and maximum rates charpable therefo%'! , 
(c) ensure that rates are non-discriminator.y except in 
accordance with well established customs and rules 
of the trade; 
(4) canaider factors that should be taken into consider-
ation in fixing rates and premiums; 
(e) examine and consider applications far general increase 
in rates and premiums with a view to making recommendations 
thereon baving regal'd to general anti-innationary 
measures prescribed by the government; and review insurance 
commissions from time to time.96 
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Insurers are prevented from granting loans to any officer of 
the ir_surers except loans on life policies issued to such persons 
by the insurer and loans normally forming part of the terms and 
conditions of service of the officer. ~very insurer who grants 
and every officer there.of who receives any loans in contravention 
shall be guilty of an offence and on conviction liable to a fine 
of double the amount of such loan.91 
1.6.8 Amalgamation and Transfer 
No registered insurer engaged in life insurance business or 
workmen's compensation insurance may amalgamate with or transfer to 
any other insurer any such business or part thereof except with the 
approval of the Federal Revenue Court. Notice of intention to make 
an .. application to the court must be published in the Federal 
Gazette and a copy served on the Director of Insurance at least 
three months before the making of the application. 
The terms of the amalgamation or transfer, the balance sheet, 
actuarial reports in respect of life business and a report of the 
proposed amalgamation prepared b,y an independent actuary must be 
~. 
kept at the principai and branch offices for inspection b,y the 
Shareholders and polia,yholders. 
The court may approve the arrangement if there is no 
sufficient objection but it cannot sanction the application if 
not less than one-fifth of the policyholders insured by the insurer 
object to it. Even where the ar~Sement is approved no policyholder 
172 
is de~rived of his claim against the original insurer unless he 
has signed a written document abandoning his claim and accepting 
thereof the liability of the new insurer. 
After the completion of the amalgamation or transfer, the 
insurer must send to the Director its balance sheet, terms of the 
amalgamation, deed of agreement, the actuarial reports and a 
declaration as to the payments made under the amalgamation or transfer. 
It is also provided that the transferring insurer Shall not be 
licensed -.anew to undertake the same class of business transferred 
until after the expiration of, . .five years from the issue of the 
sanction of the court.98 lSee 'section 7.3.6). 
7.6.9 Winding Up 
Not less than ,50 policyholders, each such policyholder having 
a policy that has been in force for at least three years, may 
present a petition for the winding up of an insurer under sections 
209 and 210 of the Companies Act of 1968. In addition the 
Director of Insurance may present a petition for a winding up on 
any of the following grounds, namely tbat:-
(i) 
(11) 
(iii) 
the insurer has failed to comply with section 7 (1) 
of the Act; 
the insurer having failed to comply with section 7 
(1) has continued such failure or contravention for 
a continuous period of six months after notice of 
such failure or contravention has been served on 
him by the Director; 
the insurer's registration bas been cancelled 
under section 7(2); 
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(iv) it appears from the insurer's ~~ual returns or 
from the results of an L~vestigation under section 
37 that the insurer is insolvent.99 
Notwithstanding the ?rovisicns of the Companies Act of 1968, 
an insurer who is engaged in the life business cannot voluntarily 
wind up its business except for the purpose of amalgamation or 
transfer under the Insurance Act of 1976.100 ~(.sea section 7.3.5). 
7.6.10 General penalties 
The Act gave the Director of Insurance powers to 
insti tute and prosecute criminal proceedings in his own name 
in the Federal Revenue court. 101 Any fines102 imposed under the 
Act must be paid within 30 days of imposition or confirmation of 
the judgement on appeal. If not paid, the Director. ma1. in 
writing, suspend the insurer from engaging in any new business 
for at least one yea:r. If the insurer fails to pay within the 
period of suspension, its certificates of registration shall be 
cancelled. 103 
1.7 Evaluation of the Insuranoe Act 1916 
In the preceding section the main provisions of the insuranoe 
control legislation are identified. These in the main are the 
minimum oapital requirements; the registration or licensing of 
insurers, brokers and agents; the powers of inspection and 
intervention by the Itrector of Insurance; tne annual submission 
of accounts and returns; investnent of insurance funds; 
settlement of claims; insurance of imports; suspension and 
cessation of business; organisation of supervision; and 
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miscellaneous provisions. ~is section critically examines these 
provisions with a view to focusing attention on the effectiveness 
of Nigeria's regulatory legislation. 
7.7.1 Financial Conditions for Commencing 
Underwriting Business 
The basic function of insurance is the spreading of risk. 
This is achieved by the insured ps\ying small sums of money into 
a pool out of whioh mq be drawn much larger sums to compensate 
the few who suffer misfortune. The pool is administered by the 
insurer Who knows trom experience how much is required by way of 
premiums from the policyholders if the pool is to be large enough 
to meet the likely claims made upon it. Since the premiums are 
plqable in advance. it must be ensured in the interest of 
policyholders that insurance companies are always able to meet 
their obligations under the policies they have issued. This is 
achieved by requiring insurers to comply with certain financial 
condi tions before the company can commence business. namelYI 
(1) a minimum share capital, and (2) a guarantee deposit. 
7.7.1.1 Share Capital 
The Insurance Act of 1976 increases the required tigures preci-
pitatel;y as tollowsl .50,000 to =.300,000 (or 500 percent) for a non-life 
company; .50.000 to .500,000 (or 900 percent). tor ~ life company; and 
.100,000 to .800.000 (or 700 percent) for a composite company. In the 
case of reinsurance bUSiness, not less than ten times the 
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revised figures are required. This =equirement creates a barrier 
to entry. The figures are very hi,_h by international standards.104 
~here is no doubting it that our vast financial requirements do 
not harmonise with what obtains in member countries of the 
Commonwealth and the ECOWAS community (Chapman. 1976/77). 
To contemplate further increases (Nigeria. 1986) is to compound 
the problem. 
It is. therefore. clear that this financial condition 1& 
prohibitive and most probably has been promoted by men (both 
Nigerian and non-Nigerian) who are motivated by 8elf interest. 
At a stroke it has restricted competition and protected entrenched 
positions. It has enshrined a likely monopoly by the present 
successful insurers with the effect that prospective, but suitable 
competitors will either be put out of business or excluded from 
starting up. We can confidently B&1 that 1£ the present control 
law had been operative in 19$0 many succelstul inaurera now in 
business could never bave taken otf. In a countrJ where capital 
is not easily raised a high capital requirement will forestall 
the appearance of new insurance campanies that maJ prove succe-
.sful 10 future and luccesstully erode the pre-eminent position 
of tbI toreicD aasociat.d companies. 
It 11 evident that there il no scientific or actuarial baais 
for the new figurel. What will ultimately and effectively enlure 
the financial securi tr ot an insurance comP8Jl1 11 not the quantum 
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of ~_~ i~-u:, c2.'I"\;"a' bu~ t"'e ,..·."'1.; +-, ,,:" ~ .. ~ !";"',..~ -e ... ·",.,· ("::'u-e"" 1Q~l.:. !:' -l:''''- - ....... ~""""''''-~,i 1- _~..:) ... c:....-c;, .. ~_ •• Y ... __ ... , ,'\.11 
~ ,,: •·· .. ·do'n 197" :<.r..._ .'."-- - •• , 0 J • As a CC::lpa."lJ .. 70'.-[S t::e s::a=er-_olde:-s I capital 
'.",i11 baa:- 1i :tle relation to -:he liacili ty 0: the com~any. 
3asically the quan~um of paid-up ca~it~ should be based on a 
wo=kL~g capitaJ fund which is sufficient to cove:- the initial 
overheads, and rur~ing expenses for ~~e first few years until 
the company is properly established. ~t should also cover possible 
uD,ie=wri ting losses and possible falls L~ the market values of 
investments. 
7.7.1.2 Guarantee Denosit 
The second financial re;uirement, the guarantee deposit, 
also constitutes a bs-"Tier ~o ent:=y. The statuto!"J deposit is 
out of date as a tool ror govern:nen t control of t.."'e insurance 
industry. It was merely used as a protectionist tool in the 
United States in the nineteenth centur,y to discourage foreign 
insurers from the old world (Carter, 1973). Since 1946 the system 
of deposits has been superseded in the United Kingdom by the 
requirement of a solvency margin (cockerell, 1976). It is not 
particularly effective in ensuring that insurance companies are 
alw~~ able to meet their obligations for it ties up ca~ital 
and ~ worsen rather than im~rove the financial seauri ty or an 
.. 
insurer. In the case or a..' com~ with millions of Naira or 
insurances, it is only an illusor/ safeguard because as a 
company grows the deposit will bear little or no relation to 
the liability or the company. 
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What we require in the place of the statutory deposit, therefore, 
is a prescribed margin of solvency (Falegan, 1982) which is a 
requirement that the assests of a company Should exceed its liabilit-
ties by a fixed amount or a certain percentage. As a buttress to 
the safeguard which the solvency margin provides we would further 
suggest the use of a bank or fidelity guarantee equivalent in 
value to the deposit required. The advantage of such a device is 
'. 
that it enables the company to continue to use its funds freely 
in its total operations. 
7.7.2 Licensing of Insurers, 
Brokers and Agents 
The 1976 Act stipulates the respective conditions which a 
prospective insurer, broker or a,eent must fulfil before he can be 
allowed to carry on insurance business. These different situations 
are examined separately. 
l:I 
7.7.2.1 Insurance Companies 
The inadequate control of insurance operators WhiCh existed 
prior to December 1976 led to a lot of abuses and malpratices, 
resulting in a sorr.y situation where: 
"... anybody could put up a signboard that he was in 
insurance business. Whereas he knew little or nothing 
about insurance. These firms operated without the 
government knowing of their existence. Such was the 
nature of firms engaged in fraudulent practices. 
They charged large premiums and were unable to 
settle claims of their clients ••• ,,10' 
The purport of anY' moderate conditions for commencing business 
is to deal with these anomalies. Therefore, the conditions which 
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ensu~e that business will be conducted in accordance with sound 
in.::urance principles are welcome. ;:owev"r, it must be pointed 
out ::.:.t the condition which says th:.t "at least one co:npetent 
and p=cfessionally qualified person ( s) to man each dep~tment 
of insurance business" is unrealistic and sometimes unattainable 
by a well developed oompany. 
In Nigeria, today, the prinoipal oonstraint an development 
is not finance but shortage of exeoutive capaoit.y. There is not 
nearly enough trained manpower to go round. This is experienced 
both in govemment and in almost eVer,( other. field of aotivity. 
It is, therefore, illogioal to rigidly insist on a oondition 
whioh no one can meet. At this atas- ot our manpower development, 
we think that this str~~ requirement is desirable in 
prinoiple only. It is appreciated that it empbaai.l. the need 
for professionalisation and should spur the companies to 
support such. What i, required just now is nlxibility in its 
applioation. Like the teaching prote.aion where qualified 
teachers unlike before -.rl nov laq to Coml by, the personnel 
position in the insurance industr,( will tmprove with ttme. 
The 1D8t1tutioDB of hisber learning have started to offer 
course. in insurance and/or actuarial soiencel the Nigerian 
lnauraDOe Institutl has begun to award its own tellovahip 
and will in due oourse conduct its own professional examina-
tions; and professionally qualified Ni,arians vill certainly 
come from abroad. We do not have to stretch our tmagination 
before we foresee that the future of our industry looks 
brigh"t. Therefore, let us in the meantime JDan88e with wat 
we have got until the situation improves. 
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7.7.2.2 Insurance Brokers 
The close control system of supervision, (chapter 4.4) Which the registratic: 
of insurance brokers adumbrates exposes the inefficienCy of over-regulation. 
The Nigerian experience of the detailed regulation of the 
brokers since 1976 has shown that it is no use piling up laws if 
they will not be enforced, as is often the case in Nigeria. This 
experience has also shown that the close control system has not 
demonstrated itself as a positive approach for protecting the 
, 
interests of the insurers and the consumers. Table 7.2 which 
covers the period 1977 to 1982 shows the stining of the cash now 
of the insurance companies by curtailing their premium income and 
therefore their investments. The situation> where a sizeable 
amount of the premium income of insurance companies is not handed 
over by the insurance intemediaries is clearly a th:ifeat to 
the solvency of the insufance offices and therefore the interests 
of the policyholders. (See Cbapters 9.3.1 and 10.2.4). 
Class of 
:Business 1 
I Life 0.54 0.74 0.72 1.72 5.15 
II Non-Life 58.65 65.35 62.73 79.11 111.89 
III Life 
Premium 
Retained 45.21 54.34 65.31 8l~37 113.05 
IV Non-Life 
Premium 
Retained 149.89 141.62 145.22 158.90 207.20 
I as % nI 1.1~ 1.36% 1.1~~ 4.561}6 
Iaso~IV 
Table 1.2 
Source: Federal Ministl'1 of Finance, Insurance Department 
Amount Due from Intemediaries as a percentage 
of "Retained" Premiums 
1911 - 1982 (M. Natra) 
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82 
3.14 
125.12 
11.2.63 
244.42 
2.7~ 
The point must be ma1e that those who are so preoccupied with 
tightening the control laws and "plugging the loopholes" overlook 
the very fact that in Nigeria the~e are no brokers in the correct 
definition of the word. '~at we have are "ccnduct pipes or post 
offices" who are best described as glorified agents (Okwor, 1984). 
So no matter how one looks at it, regulation or no regulation, 
there seems to be 80me problem with the manner in which insurance 
brokers in Nigeria carry out their trade (chapter 10.2.4) •. !rokers have 
been know.n to abuse the privilege of collecting premium tram their 
clients (Soleye, 1984). In the initial period when indigenous brokers 
emerged, some of them did not live up to expectation, a situation 
which tarnished their reputation within and outside th, insurance 
industry. Hence government's decision to cut them off from the insurance 
of government property (Chapters 2.2.3 and 9.3.2). 
The current 30 day deadline for closing praiUllls to underwriters 
has more often than not been ignored by the brokers and such a 
practice has hurt the policyholders and third party claimants in 
the event of loss. Not only do they tarnish the 1JDap of insurance 
business b.Y various malpractices, including collusion with 
unarupulOU8 statt of insurance canpanies to mani]lulate the system 
to the 4.tr~ent of policyholders they also behave as if they are 
engapd. in a 0& t aDd mouse game, with the insurers by hawking the ir 
clients' proposals from one insurer to the other on the pretext of 
searching for the most favourable deals for the clients. Hence, 
some insurance companies are forced to tolerate the activities 
of such unscrupulous brokers. The fear that such insurance brokers 
may not give them future business, following a report to the 
D1=ector of Insurance of their malpractices is real. 
In this much protracted and anomalous si~~tion, the only 
solution is to make it compulsory for all premiums to be paid by 
the insured direct to the insurance companies who are then free 
to give the placing broker his commission. This has to remain 
the position until the brokers' association can prove to the 
government that it has put its house in order. In that event 
government need not concern itself with supervising the brokers 
since they will be classified as insurance agents for all 
practical purposes. 
The second implication of the mandatory payment of premiums 
by the insured to the insurance companies is the restoration by 
implication, of premium rebating which was unjustly abolished by 
section 47 of the 1976 Act. The current practice is that when the 
insured pays his premiums gross, what the insurers receive is a net 
figure leaving a margin of oommission which mysteriously ends in the 
pocket of insurance employees Who have registered as agents not 
only of their employers but also of other insurers. This practice is 
irresponsible, has deprived the individual insured of the cOllDld-
ssion to which he is justly entitled by approaching the insurer 
direct'.:;' and may tarnish the image of insurance further. It has not 
only helped to completely eliminate the own case agency but 
created dubious insurance practices at the expense of the insuring 
I 
public as well as the insurers and brokers. There is therefore 
the need to restore the own case agency. 
7.7.2.3 Insurance AgeD ts 
The licensing of insurance agents is unnecessary for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, insurance agents are both a large and 
less homogeneous group than insurance brokers -- they constitute 
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a .. dde spectrum (Colenutt, 1979; Okwor, 1984) ranging from 
under',o/riting agents of SO!lle life i.'1surance companies and indivi-
duals iv-ho obtain an agency for the purpose of drawing commission 
which they are free to pay over in whole or in part to the 
policyholder, to part-time agents such as solicitors, acountants, 
garage proprietors and employees of insurance companies. 
Table 7.3 shows that over 8,000 agents were licensed per annum 
during the period 1979 to 1985. Secondly, high costs in terms 
of manpower and money of an effective system of central control 
is crippling. Thirdly, the supervisory authorities have little 
experience in the detailed supervision of insurance operators. 
Fourthly, an effective system of central control will increase 
the demand for public expenditure and result in a swollen 
bureaucracy. Fifthly, in our present level of development and 
~tandard of morality, it is reasonable to s~ that it is 
those people who have the means to oil the Wheels of bureaucracy 
that will succeed in obtaining and retaining the annual licenoe. 
Sixthly, the current praotioe of iz:taUz:anoe oompanies' emploYe-... 
registering themselves as agents of their employers as well as 
other insurers is improper. 
18) 
, 
Year No of Licensed Agents :~o of Registered Erokers 
1979 5.762 74 
1980 6,394 86 
1981 7,123 106 
1982 7.984 121 
1983 8,828 148 
1984 9,742 155 
1985 10,724 182 
Total 56,557 872 
Average p.a 8,080 
Source. Insurance Department, Federal M1niat%'7 of Finance 
Table 7.3 
NUmber of Licensed Apnta aDd 
Regiatered Brakers, 1979 - 198$ 
'.'lhat should. be done in future 18 to make the inaurance 
80mpanies employing thea f~lly ~.pon.1ble for the aqenta' conduct 
in carrying out the teru of their agenoy asreement with the company. 
The advantap of this .pproach is to induce the inaurance companies 
emplo7iDa th_ to exerciae stricter standarda in future in the 
seleot~cm mel tra1ning of their agents (Falegan, 1981). 
f· 
7.7.3 The powers of the Director 
of Insurance 
The former, succinct· name, Regist.Br(chapter 7.3), has now given way to 
Director of Insurance. We think that the powers are too wide. This 
is an unhealthy development for an indust~ that traditionally 
operates on the lofty principle of Ub.rr~ fides or utmost good 
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fai the It is an evidence of the bad image 'which some of the 
insurers have earned for themselves over the years. 
There are no sufficient and convincing grounds for such 
extensive and far-reaching intervention. Our industry is still 
largely in the private sector and Where a group of men put up risk 
capital to run an enterprise within the rules of the game, they 
ought to be allowed to run their business as they wish. Their 
freedom to conduct their business as they think fit within the 
general framework of the law should bot be eroded by bureaucracy. 
They ought to be free to appoint a chief executive who meets a 
stipulated standard of integrity and professional skill, and decide 
when and where to open a branch office within and outside Nigeria. 
If the present control law had been enforced -to the letter, without 
£1exibilities and amendments the result would have been too rigi-
j \ 
dly burea~_cra~~~_ for the insurance industry in Niqeria., in that 
eventuality, it is everYbody" the lnsurer~,. the' insur~d' and"the-
taxp~ers who would bear the cost of heavy bureaucratic overheads. 
Moreover, the conferment of such dictatorial powers on the 
Director assumes that he controls a large organisation made up of 
highly skilled staff. It assumes that the functionaries of the 
office include personnel versed in law, actuarial science, 
accountancy, statistics and other related disciplines. It also 
assumes that an underwriter and an adjuster of claims, etc, are 
available. Experience in Nigeria and elsewhere has demonstrated 
beyond reasonable doubt that the supervisor" authorities not only 
• 
lack a number of offiCials106 with the expertise and knowledge of insurance 
production and sale but also are subject to red t~~e and are 
therefore slow in performing their function. The situation 
is aptly summarised by Lijadu (1975): 
"The shortcoming of the insurance indus try in 
developing countries'is not so much due to the 
inadequacy of the insurance control legislations 
in these countries, but for the machinery 
established for enforcing the laws... Where the 
supervisory services as in most of these coun-
tries are unable to carry out the tasks for 
which they are set up, the resulting distortions 
are likely to render the laws in-operative and 
the purpose of the legislations are then frustrated" 
We can confidently conclude that if the provisions of the 
Insurance Companies Act of 1961, the Insurance (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act of 1964 and the Companies Act of 1968, have been 
enforced in detail, we all could have been saved the agony of the 
present control legislation. Chapman (1976/77) bas correctly 
remarked that 
"at times the authorities are slow in performing 
some of their functions. Some could have firmly 
prevented selective underwriting in motor 
business in some West African countries but they 
do not do so effectively because of pressures 
outside the industry andother implications. 
Similarly, they could have easily permitted 
review of motor insurance rates where this is 
clearly necessary but they ~nvariably fail'to 
exercise the powers conferred anthem ,bY tne 
legislations, even though they were aware that 
their default could cause some insurance 
companies to fail." 
Lijadu (1975) goes further to deplore the statistical deficiency: 
186 
"in so far as sta.tistics are concerned, the response 
to the questio~~aires sent out to African countries by 
UNCTAD and ADB in recent years for data relating to t."le 
~3urance industry leads one to conclude that there 
are no reliable statistics compiled by the superli-
sory authorities in these countries." 
One wonders therefore why an institution which traditionally suffers 
from red ta~e should be given such far reaching powers of control 
over an industry whose operations are so dynamic and ever-changing 
as not to be easily understood by the uninitiated. There is 
therefore a pressing case for overhauling the machinery for control 
(chapter 12.2.3). 
7.7.4 Annual Actuarial Valuation 
of Life Business 
To ask for an annual valuation report (section 7.6.3.7) in a 
setting of under-development is to compound the difficulties 
in which the life insurers operate. It will increase the expense 
ratios of the producers of life insurers to the pisadvantage 
of the policyholders. 
Perhaps what we need in Nigeria, is not annual valuation but 
that life insurers should carr'! out an actuarial investigation 
whenever they want to make a distribution of profits in.the form 
of bonuses to the policyholders, but that the investigation must be 
made at least once in every three or five years. 
In this connection it is pertinent to point out that it is 
probably too cumbersone, expensive and obstructive to make it 
mandatory for the Director of Insurance to investigate the affairs 
of a registered insurer once in two years.107 In view of the 
massive amount of work involved, a period of five years should be 
preferred. 
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7.7.5 .3tzndardi32,-';L.:'1 cf In;~ur2.nce 
policies 
::::',lied. in the ~rovisior.8 of Ge~t::'(n 14 of the Insur2.nce ;.ct 
1976 i::: th2..t i:1~:ur2.::ce policies shculd be st.:nd:.rdised \-rh3:1ever 
pos:::ibl::; • ~:-:..i3 contention is upheld. 'u:, C;.rcbc,dGjo (1977), ::.nif:.laje 
clotu (1983), and Ckwo:::- (1;n8~ c..mongc:t a host of ott ·2!.' 
COm::l8ntc.tors. 108 The aPI;e~.tX311ce of t~:e ?~.tins Corrrr.ittee in section 
33( 2) h:.s been accepted by t~e ir..~,-1.i.2t::'7. 
It ;;rust be observed. that the con:~,i -'cians ',\'hich led to 
109 
the sordid st?te of affairs :;:::-ior to 1977 have been washed a\.ro-y 
by the rigorous enforcement of the entr"J rqquirements,a situation 
which is leading to a changed and h-32.1 thy climate. In this new 
cli.m,~te, a noticeable awareness of the nature and uniqueness of 
insuxe.nce is emerging.110 
Though intangible, insurance is a marl"l:)te.ble product. Even 
though it is extremely difficult to secure public interest in it, 
in quite some respects it is like a tangible object, for example, 
a ce.r. There are various brands of cars - Peugeot, Datsun, 
Volvo, Toyota, Ford, etc. Within each make, there are various 
grades to meet the needs of the different consumers. So it is 
with insurance. There are various classes ranging from property, 
liability, loss of profits, motor~ engineering, transit, to life, 
pensions and health insurances. Each class is made up of numerous 
subdivisions so that policies are available to cover all 
aspects of human endeavours. Life in~urance needs for example, 
depend on the ciroumstances of the individu21 and it is obviously not a 
difficult task to olassify people acoording to their circumstances. The 
property insurance needs of an individual depend entirely on - .-
his personal situation. The insurance needs 
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of a farmer at Ado-Skiti are different from that based at Iso10. 
A house located at the edge of the Sahara desert is exposed to 
different perils from that located at the riverine areas of the 
Uiger Delta. Nigeria itself is a geog=aphically and culturally 
complex entity. The standardisation of the fire policy in such 
an heterogeneous landscape would not seem to be helpful. 'Y.hile 
it can be standardised for convenience, insurance business is 
essentially a personal service; it is designed to meet and has 
met the needs of an individual. There is therefore no case 
for a wholesale standa-~isation of insurance policies in 
Nigeria even though the tariff system may be adopted in some 
such classes as marine and aviation hull, motor and fire insurances. 
Where the L~dividualist element will influence claims experience, 
as in cargo insurance, individual rating is inevitable. 
Section 14(1) actually is unfortunate because it calls into 
question the professional competence and integrity of the insurers. 
'. 111 Compliance with it will mean an unnecessarily large arD01,Ult'of Paper 
work by the insurers and the supervisory authorities who no doubt 
lack officials with the necessary expertise and who would have 
difficul ty in acquiring them in the foreseeable future. There is 
therefore no hesitation" in advocating that section 14 on insurance 
policies be abrogated because it is the professional duty 
of insurers to design their products and explain them to the 
consumers at the time of purchase. In this connection insurers 
should avoid the use of 'small print' aius prepare their 
policies in the lansua&e o£ the ordinary people. There is nothing 
wrong with the use ot exclusions, restrictions, condi tiona and 
warranties. These £om the 8h4ilet "anchor for" ·!n.urers ~~id' 
; I 
selection against them by sharp consumers. The complaint agali1st 
in~urers in Nigeria is that they del~y in the payment of claims 
and not that they sell the tin~erior products.' 
7.7.6 Tecr~ical Reserves 
Insurance legislation in some countries requires that the 
insurer shall maintain at all times assets "'lhose value exceeds 
the value of the liabilities by a prescribed percentage of the 
latter. This, according to Ogunshola (1985), is an alternative 
to the contingency reserve approach which is contained in the 
1976 Act (section 7.6.3.5). The contingency reserve is 
definitely not equivalent to the assets exceeding the liabilities 
by a prescribed percentage. In practice the contingency reserve 
is related to premium income and no further allocations have to 
be made after the reserve has reached the level of ~500tOOO in 
life insurance and ~300,OOO in non-life business respectively. 
However, the combination of the contigency reserve and the 
minimum paid-up capital is effectively a prescription for a 
margin of solvency. If the levels are set appropriately it is 
propably preferable to a solvency margin which is a percentage 
of the liabilities. The snag of this approach in the Nigerian 
context is that it is far trom clear what steps are taken by the 
authorities when the amount in the shareholders' fund falls 
below the level of the minimum paid-up capital. 
There is therefore, a need for a specific introduction of 
a solvency margin. 
7.7.7 Investments 
The investment outlets detailed in section 18 of the 
112 Insurance Act of 1976 are too restrictive and therefore not in 
the best interests of the insurers and the policyholders the 
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law is out to protect. A brief description of the oPeration of 
insurance companies will illustrate the point. In order to carry 
out his underwriting functions, the L~surer must meet a number of 
expenses. This includes agents' commission, office and other 
establishment charges, the necessarJ margin for building up a 
reserve fund and amounts paid out and estimated to be paid out 
in claims. In a normal year, claims costs absorb about two-
thirds of the non-life premiums received whilst the remaining one-third 
is spent on administrative and other costs. In a good year, if 
claims experience is favourable then after all outgoings a profit 
of one or two percent of premiums may be made (Chronicle, 1975). 
If, however, a major disaster occurs, claims could rise to 70 
percent of premiums, with the result that a major underwriting 
loss is sustained. A change of just one or two percentage points 
on underwriting can make a substantial difference to the 
underwriting results of an insurance company. The aafequarcr: 
insurers against predictable underwriting losses, which are more 
prominent than profits, is investment income. 
Thus we have demonstrated that underwriting losses and 
investment income interact. If underwriting losses are more promi-
nent than underwriting profits, and therefore if insurers are obliged 
to rely on income from invested funds, representing reserves against 
possible losses to cover outgoings and .-diVidends then a.ttention 
... -.~, 
must be directed at the rate of return on the asset portfolios 
of an insurance company. In Nigeria a fixed deposit account 
yields until recently about three percent113 whereas the yields from 
funds invested in the Shares of companies quoted on the Lagos Stock 
Exchange can be as high as 20 to 40 percent. Table 7.4 shows that the 
cash holdings of Nigerian L"lsurance companies have taken an unduly 
large percentage share (about 20 percent per annum) of the 
asset portfolios. Obi Mardi has observed, 
"In 1970, for instance, the ratio of cash 
holdin~ to asset holding of a group of 
companies was, on the average 0.481:1. 
That is, for every~100.00 of the said 
assets there was a caSh holding of 
~48.14" (Mordi, 1975). 
It will be revealing if table 7.4 is compared with table 7.5 which 
depicts the invested assets of British insurance ccmpanies as 
revealed by the Association of British Insurers. The table shows 
that the asset portfolios of British insurance companies are 
dominated b,y mortgages, ~ritish government securities, debentures, 
stocks and shares; needless to sa:y that caSh holdings are 
negligible. 
Because the provisions in the successive insurance laws in 
Nigeria are restrictive, insurance companies are obliged to invest 
a sizeable proportion of their funds in bank deposits. They are 
not exploiting the investment advantage of the funds at their 
disposal. The importance of insurance companies lies in the 
fact that the savings of the community are an essential contri-
bution to real. economic growth. In the present circumstances 
insurance companies are not performin~ their traditional. function. 
They cannot be regarded (as they ought to be) as a major 
source of finance tor industry directly or 1ndirectlr. Thus they 
have not been doing such things as financingbt:i.dgingoperations, 
or the provision of expansion facilities, for example. The 
problem of the small and growing trading or manufacturing companies 
," 
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ASSETS 1980 I I'1SI 1982 198) 1984 
Lone-term (Life) 
Federal Govt. Securities 50.99(19.11) 58.85(21.10 66.10(21.26) 98.98(23.77) 111.11(22.12) 
state Govt. Securities. 1.07(0.40) 1.54(0.56) 1.46(0.41) 1.38(0.33) 2.14(0.56) 
Semi-Govt. Bodies Securities 0.01(0.26) 0.96(0.34) 2.18(0.89) 2.99(0.12 ) 9.73(1.98) 
other Bonds and Stocks 11.47(26.87) 86.29(30.94) 98.82(31.50) 12S.42( JC.12) 1l~1.28(28. 71) 
Real Estate 23.94(9.00) 17.18(6.16) 21.47(6.84) 3C.86(9.33) 33.91(6.89) 
Mortgage Loans on Real Estate 33.26(12.51) 39.95(14.32) 41.69(13.29) liB.92(11.75) 46.26(9.40) 
Loans to policyholders 10.62(3.99) 14.13(5.07) 20.99(6.69) 21.77(5.23). 27.97(5.68) 
Other Loans 14.65(5.51) 9.87(3.54) 19.41(6.19) 25.66(6.16)! 28.14{5.72) 
cash on Deposit Ale 52.23( 19.64) 46.55( 16.69) 33.03( 10.53) 45.78(10.99) I 82.61 (16.79) 
Bills of' Excbanse 1.01(2.64) 3.59(1.29) 7.40(2.23) 6.66(1.60) I 1.63(1.55) ~ Total 26~.9J(loo.0) 218.~(loo.0) 313.16(100.0) 416.42(100.0) I 492.04(100.0) 
\.0.1 
General (Nan-life) Assets 
Federal"~. Seourities 35.15(18.71) 44.60(17.61 ) 42.16(12.43) 42.32(11.80) 41.63(13.42) 
state Govt. Seourities 3.80(2.02) 2.96(1.11) 3.04(0.90) 1.57(2.11) 6.68(2.15) 
Semi Govt. Bodles Securities 3.87(2.06) 4.27(1.69) 3.56(1.05) 29.24{8.15) 4.81(1.55) 
Other Bonds and Stocks 43.05(22.91) 63.74(25.16) 114.18(33.85) 103.78(28.94) 83.71(27. 01 ) 
Real Estate 21.02(11.19) 40.80(16.11) 44.11(13.18) 47. 00(13. 11 ) 59.51(19.20) 
Mortgaae Loans OD Real Estate 8.86(4.12) 7.66(3.02) 19.41(5.14) 1C.09(2.81) 10.88(3.51) 
LoaDS to polioyholders 1.21(0.64) 4.11(1.62) 7.)4(2.16) 0.15(0.04) 4.63(1.49) 
Other Loans 5.74(3.05) 15.21(6.0.3) 28.08(8.27) 30.36(8.47) 13.81 (4.45) 
Cash on Deposit Ale 51.96(JO.85) 63.31(24.99) 13.67(21.72) 86.15(24.19) 83.51(26.92) 
Billu of Exchange 1.23{3.85) 6.58(2.60) 2.JO{0.68) 1.34(0.37) 0.93{0.JO) 
Total 187.90(100.0) 253.30(100.0) 339.13(100.0) 358.59(100.0) 31C.~0(100.0) 
Source: Insurance Department, Fed. lan of Finance and Economic planning percentage dis Lr:'lmtion in parenthe~,t.s. 
Table 7.4 
Distribution of In!99tments by Insurance companies in Nigeria, 1980 - 85uL'llillion) 
" 
• 
-a. 
Assets 
LOll8'-te1'Dl {Life) 
H, 
R 
o 
T 
G 
-- -. -
ritish Govt. Seourities 
oreign Govt. Stooks . 
ebentures 
rdinary stocks and Shares 
ortgages 
9al property &: Ground Rents 
ther Investments 
)tal 
aneral 'Non-Life) 
~Br 
P, 
De 
o 
H 
R 
o 
1980 -l'iS/ 
14,089(25.9) 14,663(23.5) 
1,357(2.5) 1,732(2.8) 
2,457(4.5) 2,605(4.2) 
11,476(~2.1) 20,673( 33.0) 
3,923(7.2) 4,379(7.0) 
12,821(23.6) 15,570(24.9) 
2,313(4.2) 2,877(4.6) 
: '54,436( 100.0) 62,499(100.0) 
2,530(18.7) 2,912(18.4) 
:;1 ,961( 14.5) 2,454(15.5) 
1,718(13.1) 2,207(13.9) 
3,758(27.7) 4,156(26.2) 
597(4.4) 634(4.0) 
1 ,579( 11.6) 1,870(11.8) 
1,352(10.°) 1,610(10.2) 
1 ~ a ~~C;( 100.0) 15,843(100.0) 
1982 198) 1984 
21,681(26.4) 2!i,489(24.7) 26,368(22.4) 
2,739(3.3) 3,695( 3.7) 5,129(4.3) 
3,734(4.6) Ii ,592(1,.6) 5,821(4.9) 
28,065( .34.2) 37 ,620( 37.9) 48,067(40.7) 
5,100(6.2) 5,550(5. 6) 6,460(5.5) 
17,267(21.1) 18 ,S50( 19.0) 20,520(17.4) 
3,461(4.2) 4,506(4.5) ),612(4.8) 
82,047(100.0) 99,302(100.0) 117,977(100.0) 
3fi777(18.8) 4,124(17.1) ),886(14.6) 
3,709(18.5) 4,255(18.2) 5,447(20.4) 
2,951(14.7) 3,229(1).8) 4,118(15.5) 
5,100(25.4) 6,689(28.6) 7,676(28.8) 
742(3.7) 786().4) 821(3.1) 
2,041(10.2) 2,153(9.2) 2,218(8.5) 
1,751(8.1) 2,116(9. 1) 2,428(9. 1) 
20,083(100.0) 2),)52(100.0) 26,654(100.0) 
To,;a~ I - .---,. I • Souroet Assooiation of British Insurers (Formerly »ritish Insuranoe Association) percentage distribution 
in parentheses. 
Table 7.5 
1980 - 84 (£1 11illion) 
In_the matter of finance is well known: they may wish to have 
capital in such amounts and for such periods as to be not, on the 
one hand, a banking proposition or, on the other hand, not meriting 
resirt ti tge Stock Exchange. It should be noted that the invest-
ment market is not meeting the needs of the small investor so 
that the insurance companies ideally should afford him a method 
of indirect investment. In short, our insurers are not contribu-
ting sufficiently to productive investment, especially by smaller 
firms which are often in need of longer term finance for capital 
expenditure programmes. 
_~~: this is to the disadvantage of the policyholder ',.;ho '.11 ~i::la'telY' 
., ~ , WL_ :l3.ve to "pay higher premiUl'!ls. It is l;a::tly becaU!~e the 
~·T.!'c:.:;- t~.;:t so~e of tr.e cOl!lpani~s are not doi."lg' 'Nell. :t is 
ce::t::.i::.ly :lot because ";he :ni."li::lu:n p:3.i:'-up ~:;.:.;i -:301 i3 10\"'. 
It is therefore emphasized ~~a~ the::e is need for the range of 
i.."lye~tments to be , ..lidened to alIa',.,. tl:e cc:np311ies to ca~/ out their 
t:::;.ditior2l f~"lctions as L"lstituticn~l invGstors ~or the good of us 
al~. "Jor th!.:;: reason it is essenti.;.l th;;.t each insu:::ance company' 
should :e f:::~e to work out its own L~ves~ent policy. This 
fle::ible approach wi:l allow new gro1.:r.ds to be ex;lored. 
7.7.8 :_n."lu~l Retu.-ns 
Section 19(7) of the Ins~a~ce Act of 1976 calling for the 
pu~:!.:'cation of the annual account3 cf ti:e i.~s'Urers ir. at least 
or.g :le'Nos;a;er enjoying 'Nida circul:ltion ~...s.3 focused attention 
to ~::e cf the basic "'r;nci ' eft' .a. 1 .... ~ _ p.a. S 0 ~a cu==en~ re~ a~~on. It 
i3 ~ccountability. If L"l the ey~s of the public an au=a 
-
sur=o~~s the ~echanism on which ~~~~r~~ce is based an~ the=efore 
t~e b~ye=s of ou= products h::J.ve to rely or. a "p=cmise to pa;j if ••• " 
then there must be ways by 'Nhicr. ',ie have to explai."l our yea=ly 
results to the government, the sh::J.reho1ders and the policyholders. 
This provision achieves just that. lile can therefore conclude 
that the philosophy of insur~"lce legislation in ~igeria is olose 
oentrol and acoountability. 
1.1.9 Settlement of Claims 
In view of the faot that the widesp::-ead co~laints about the 
undue delay that accompanied the settlement of motor e1aims gave 
the ir.su::-a.nce business a very bad image and led to the setting up 
of the Obande Commission (Aje, 1918) in 1980, the stringent provi-
sions on the settlement of claim a--e welcome. The specifioation of 
time-limits for the settlement of motor accident claims and the 
threat of the cancellation of insurers' licence under section 1 
of the Aot are bound to be beneficial to the insuring public. 
1.1.10 Amalgamation and Transfer 
The regulation protects the policyholders who object to 
amalgamation wi~~ or transfer to another insurer because where their 
objeotion fails, such polioyho1ders can oanoel their polioies and 
be entitled to a-refund of the proportionate part of their premiums • 
. In order that the policyholders ~ have a meaning.ful opportunity 
to object, notice of the intention to apply to the court for the 
purpose of amalgamation ought to be advertised in the dailies. 
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7.7.11 C~~cellation of Ce=tificate 
of Registre.tion 
The cancellation regulation io more compreher.sive than 
section 9 o! the Insura..."lce Companies Act of 1961 ·,."hich stipula~ed 
only five grounds on which to effect cancellation (section 7.3.6). Under 
the cu=rent provisions 18 grounds for cancellation are cited. These 
are intended to ensure that insurance companies are run at all 
times on sound insurance principles and practice. In the past 
public confidence in insurance was lost because government 
control under the ~pealed enactments was inadequate. The 18 
grounds for cancellation of the certificate of registration have 
~e effect, in addition to the registration conditions, of 
removing the inadequate control which was the cau'Se of past 
abuses and malpractices. 
The appeal114 to the Commissioner where the Director intends 
to either effect cancellation or reject an application for regis-
tration deserves a comment. Since the office of the Commissioner 
is a political appointment, an appeal to him is a dangerous 
requirement which should not escape the notice of an observer. 
It raises the issue of the fundamental rights of every Nigerian. 
By ihe nature of red tape and. the bureaucratic nature of the 
civil service •. it is inconceivable that the Commissioner will 
lightly reject the decision of the Director on whom he relies 
for technical advice. In the interests of the generations of 
Nigerians to come, these provisions should be amended to the 
effect that ap~eals should be made to the High Courts for 
redress. Otherwise, it will be too dangerous to leave the 
interest of a section of the community to the whims and 
caprices of civil servants and politicians. 
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7 '7~2 -f' to. ",' • I • I .::.IU orcemen l·~a.c .. L"ler"J 
0:.1 though the insu:-ar:ce ccnt::'ol l:'",is ccr:.sti tute the basis of 
i::::t:.:;::nce regulation i..."l the countrj', the st:.~e:'V:'sory au"thori ty is 
dele~ted the ~ower by the legislatu=e not only to enforce the 
statutory provisions but also to exercise discretion~1 powe:-s to 
interpret and to implement the stai;utes (section 7.7.3) ...... govern-
ment department, called the Insu=ance Departoent, in a federal ministrJ 
is Charged with the responsibility of administerL"lg insurance regu-
lations. This department, which up to 1979 was housed in the Federal 
Ministry of Trade, has since been moved to the r~inistr.r of Finance 
and ~conomic Planning (chapter 9.5). It is headed by the Director 
of Insurance.:(chapter 5.'6.3). 
That there is inadequate enforcement of the legislation is not in doubt 
(section 7.7.3). This inadequate control is due to the fact that 
government has no effective means of controlling the insurance 
companies. This was particularly the case prior to 1977 when the 
Insur~"lce Division of the Federal Ministry of Trade Which was 
cha=ged with the respons ibili ty of supervisi;lg the market, was short-
staffed and could not effectively monitor the activities of the 
insurance operators. However, since the transfer of the Insurance 
Section to the Ministry of Finance, the staffing situation has 
considerably improved, though important and crucial positions are 
yet to be filled. The already unsatisfactory situation is constantly 
being made worse by the fact that the few technical staff recruited 
do not hold on to their jobs for long before resigning because the 
Ministry is unable to offer salaries competitive with the insurers, 
brokers and agents. 
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An inve~tigation of the industry carried out by tr.e Gove~~er.t L~ 
198611~ (chapter 1.4.6) shows that the Insu=~~ce Depa=t~ent is inade~uatelJ 
funded. The enquiry found that the foreign exchange outflow through 
reir~urance cessions was partly traceable to the weakness and 
.) 
ineffectiv~ness of the Department. Eefore recommending the Nigerian 
Insurance Commission as an alternative to the Insurance nepartment 
it observed that: 
" ••• The pl'Ocedure for P1lIlishing errant or 
defaulting companies is open-ended in that 
at the stage of appeals to the Minister 
of Finance, the issues become politicised and 
the guilty com)anies are eXCUlpated either 
by acts of omission or commission ••• 1t 
(Nigeria, 1986). 
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7.8 Hotes 
1. ?or example, the Companies ~ct, Cap. 37 
2. 3ect~on 6 (1) Insurance Comp~nies Act 1961. 
3. Section 6 (2). 
4. See par8.0~a.J?h 4 of the I:l.surance Companies Regulations, 1968. 
5. ll.lthough the phrase "sound insurance principles" is not 
defined by the Act, an insight into its purpose is given 
by paragraph 4 (3) of the Insurance Companies Regulation of 
1968. 
6 •. Section 7 (2) Insurance Companies Act 1961. 
1. See Schedules 1 and 2 of the Insurance Companies Regulations 1968. 
8. Section 7 (3) Insurance Companies act 1961. 
9. Sections 8 (1). 
10. Section 4. 
11. Section 11 (1). 
12. Section 11 (2) • 
13. Section 12 (1) • 
14. Section 12 (2) • 
15. Section 13. 
16. Section 29 (1). 
17. Section 31. 
18. Cap. 37, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, 1958. 
19. The relevant enactment is now the Companies Act No ;1 of 1968 
and the relevant sections are SSe 209 - 210. 
20. Section '35 (2) Insurance Companies Act 1961 and section 210 
..• 
(d) of the Companies Act 1968. 
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21. :ect!~n 9, Insura~ce Co~p~ics ~ct 1961. 
22. Section 8. 
23. Section 9(2). 
24. 2ection 17. 
25. Section 209, Comp~~ies ~ct 1968. 
26. Section 28 of the 1961 Act ap~e~s to say that an insurance 
company could invest ~iree percent of its profits L~ any 
financial yea:r:. 
27. Section 1 (1) Insurance (I'liscellmeous provisions) Act 1964. 
28. 3ecticn 1 (2). 
29. Section 1 (2 & 3). 
30. Section 2. 
31. Section 5(1). 
32. Section 5(2). 
33. Section 1 Insurance Act 1976. 
34. Section 2 (1) & (2). 
35. Section 2 (3). 
36. Section 3 (1). 
37. Section 7 Nigeria Reinsurance Corporation Act, 1977. 
38. Section 3 (2) Insurance Act, 1976. 
39. Section 3 (3). 
40. Section 3 (4). 
41. Section 4. 
42. Regulation 1, Insurance Regulations, 1977. 
43. Section 8 (1) Insurance Act 1976. 
44. Section 8 {2}. 
45. Section 9. 
46. Section 10. 
47. Section ,. 
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49. .3ec"tion 11. 
50. ]egulations 16, Insurance 3egulation, 1977. 
$1. Section 12 Insurance Act 1976, 
$2. Section 13. 
53. Section 14. 
54. Section 15. 
55. Section 16. 
56. Section 17. 
57. ;:)ection 1 Insurance Companies (Hiscellaneous Provisions). 
Act 1964. 
58. Section 18 Insurance Act 1976, 
59. Section 19. 
60. Section 50. 
61. Section 19(6). 
62. Section 19(7) See also Form 24 Schedule 1 Insurance 
Regulations 1977. 
63. Section 20 Insurance Act 1976. 
64~ Section 7. 
65. Section 40. 
66. Form 24 Schedule 1 Insurance Regulations 1977. 
67. Regulation 18 Insurance Regulations 1977. 
68. Schedule 2, Insurance Regulation 1977. 
69. Section 25 Insurance Act 1976. 
70. Sehedule 2, Insurance Regulations 1977. 
71, Regulation 18, Insurance Regulations 1977. 
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72. 
73. 
74 
75. 
76. 
77. 
78. 
79. 
80. 
81. 
Section 26 Insurance Act 1976. 
~Ae 'QAgu'at~on 19 Tn ... ·· ... ~"'ce ""'-....,,'- .. i~"'- 1977. 04_ ........ ..... , _ • ...,) __ • • .. t.;~"""' __ ..... __ •• .;;, 
T!1e ;:-ocedure for a::::~'=3.1 is C:::Y~::'r.ed b'! :. 6 of tl':e 
:nsurance Act 1976."" ~ 
~he registration fee is ~200 - Sccedule 2, Insurance 
Regulatiosn 1977. 
Schedule 2, Insurance Regulatiosn 1977 • 
section 27 Insurance Act 1976. 
Section 28. 
Section 29. 
Section )0. 
Section 34. 
82. Section 47 The penalty for contravention is a fine of 
~1,OOO on conviction. 
83. section )1 Insurance Act 1976. 
84. Section 35. 
85. Section 36. 
86. Section 37. 
87. Section 38. 
88. Section 37. 
89. Section 39. 
90. 8.0*ion 40. 
91. Section 43. See also Cap 126, Laws of the ?ederation. 
92. Section 44 Insurance Act 1976. 
93. Section 45. 
94. Section 46. 
95. Section 32. 
96. ~ection 33. 
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97. Section 48. 
oP Section 21 • .; .... 
99. Section 23. 
100. Section 24 See also Section 41. 
101. Section 49. 
102. See section 5'0, 5'1, 5'2, and 5'3. 
10). Section 5'4. 
104. For more details see OEc!) (1963), Marden (1976), UNa".AD (1972) and Ripoli (1974). 
105'. See The Guardian (31/7/84). 
106. The failure to enforce t."'le current control law is discussed 
by Anifalaje (1984). 
107. Section 37(1) Insurance Act 1976. 
108. The most notable among these other commentators is 
prof. Ayodele Awojobi. See DailY' Sketch, 29 March 1979 pp 1. 
109. For confirmation see Ejikeme Omenazu, ttA remarkable growth 
and changing image", in "Supplement on Insurance" The Guardian, 
31 July 1984, pp 7. 
" 110. See''supplement on Insurance", Also "SUpplement on 
Insurance Industry in Nigeria", Business Times 5 
August 1980 and ttSupplemen t an Insurance Industry", 
:Business Times 3 July 1979 pp 9. ' 
111. It is fortunate, if ironical, that the Director of Insurance 
has not been able to enforce the provisions of 
section 14. The :explanation tor this handicap is 
detailed in Anifalaje (1984). 
112. For detailed comment see Olawa,yin (1982). 
113. This figure has been raised to more than 1 $ since 
the middle of 1986 when the structural adjustment 
programme (SAP) was introduced. 
114. Section 6 & 7, Insurance Act 1976. 
11$. See Nigeria (1986). 
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Chapter 8 
IndigenisatiOn of the Insurance Industry in Nigeria 
8.1 Introduction 
The localisation policy was designed to enable the Nigerian 
Government to occupy the "colllll8llding heights of the economy" 
(chapter 2 .4) • To attain the objective, govemEnt adopted three 
approaches. The first was to restriot the insurance of local risks 
to Niprian insurers, the second was to set up its own institutions 
and. the third. was to participate in the equity holdings of expatriate 
firms operating on the market. The legislations used are summarised 
as tollowss 
8.1.1 Insurance (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act 1964 
Although not enforced until 4 May 1967 (cllapter 9.3.2), the Insurance 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 1964 was the precursor ot indigenisation. 
Section 1(1) ot the Aot prohibited the payment ot compensation under 
an insurance contract in respect of local risks wess such person 
paying the ccapensation was a ligerian COllP8D1. Section 2 provided 
that life contracts on liprian ci tizms should be iaaued b7 ligerian 
coapanies in Ripri8D curreDC7. \\bile it would appear that section 1 
atteapted to reatrict the inaurance ot local raks to Nigerian 
inaurers, section 2 was intended to limit £oreill1 exchange expenditure 
on lite insurance. Aa a cOl18equence, all sterling contracts were 
expressed in lUgerian currenC)', except those which could be paid 
tor bJ the polic7holdera abroad. It should, howeTer, be stressed 
that the Act penitted insurers to remit reinaurance preai'WU on 
lite contract. to oversea. reiDsurers. (See cba~ter 7.5). 
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8.1.2 Compaeies Act 1968 
The _jor ettect of part X of the Companiel ~t of 1968 was 
to sever the bus1D.es8 operations or foreign enterprise a in Ripria 
trom their parent companies and to constitute them aa aeparate 
independent entities of their own. Thus, as frOll 18 Noftmber 1968, 
when this part of the Act came into force, eTery foreisn company' which 
before the commencement of the Act, was incorporated outside Nigeria 
and, baving an eatablished place of 'busille.a ill Nigeria, was deemed to 
have becoJle a aeparate entity from its parent co~ abroad. 
8.1 .3 Insurance Ccmeies Reela tiona 1968 
The 1968 Resula tiona required existing insurance companiea to 
applY' for registration 1D. the Register, and .ubUt returna on their 
standing and financial position to the Registrar of Insurance. 
8.1.4 National Insurance Corporation of Nigeria. 
Act 1969 
The function. of NICOli as set out 1n the IICOR Act vere to: (1) 
insure public aector property, (2) undertake reinsurance business, and 
(3) act as broker on public sector insurance. Every ligerian insurer 
was compelled to cede 10 percent of ita direct bua1nes. to the Corporation. 
8.1.5 The lie rim BIlt8rprise. ProllOtion Act 197207 
The indiseniaation Acts precluded expatriate iDsurance companies 
trom 1nvesting ill the equi tiea of cODlpanies coad.ng under .obedulea 1 
and 2 of the Acta. On17 1ndigenous companies vere allowed to 
invest their funda under the provision. of the Act.. The Acquiaition 
of Land b1' Aliens EcUct 1972 (Lagos State) cUd not allow expatriate 
companie. to own or develop real propert,r unle.. the consent ot the 
Go'ftrDor was obtained. 
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In keeping with the provisions of the 1972 1ndigenisatiOD Act, 
the 'ederal Government decided in 1975 to participate in the equity 
shares of foreign owned insurance companies. Forty- nine percent ot 
the shareholdings in 14 of these companies was acquired and the licences 
of those considered not viable were withdrawn. Following tne Nigerian 
Enterprises Promotion Act of 1977, state gove1"lUl8uts were able to 
acquire 11 percent of the shareholdinl!$ of these companies to bring 
the Nigerian owned proportion to 60 percent. 
8.1.6 Nigeria Reinsurance COrporation Act 1977 
Under the 1977 reinsurance Act, the reinsurance functions ot 
IICON were transferred to the Nigerian Reinsurance Corporation 
(Nipria He) and cons ide.rably- strengthened. Nigeria Re receives 20 
percent cOlllpulsol.'7 cession trom all Nigerian insurers, has the 
right of first refusal on Nigerian reinsurance bus iness before 
such business can be placed abroad, acts as the channel of compulsory 
cessions from Niserta to the African Reinsurance Corporation (Africa Re) 
and pnerallr acts as a reinsurer both inside and outside Nigeria. 
8.1.7 Section 46 of the 1976 Insuranoe Act 
Section 46 of the 1976 Insurance Act require. that imports into 
the countrr be 1Daured 011 the market, except that where a particular 
risk oannot be oovered 1»7 a Jiserian insurer, the Director of rnaurance 
~ allow a broker to place the business abroad (Chapter 7.6.7.2). 
There are, then, two separate elements to the domestication of 
the Nigerian insurance aa%ket. The first is the protection of 
daaestic insurers ap.1nat fonian competition b7 such means a8 the 
special role of RICOB in vri ting public sector insurance, the Nigerian 
Enterprises Promotion Acts and the section of the 1976 Act conceming 
the 1naurance of imports. The second aspect i8 the promotion of the 
development of domestic reinsurance capac1 ty. 
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8.2 Indigenisation of Expatriate COmpanies 
Despite the setting up of NICON in 1969 the insurance indus try 
was stUl dolllina ted by' foreign owned companies (Nigeria, 1910l~ 
Al though there were only 15 expa tria te companies out of a total 
of 14 companies operating on the market in 1970, they nonetheless 
shared t50 percent of the bu*1ness.1 Six years after, this 
concentration ratio had still not altered as confirmed by' the then 
ChairDlan of NICON, Alhaji Aliko Mohammed.2 It caused concern 
particularly in govermaent circles that most of the compulsory' 
10 percent cession made to BICON by the direct companies was 
reinsured abroad owing to lack of underwriting capacity 
(Durojaiye, 1981). The 1~88 scale foreign exchange flows 
caused b7 the reinsuring ot a large percentage of risk outside 
the econo~ soon gained the attention ot government (Nigeria, 1910). 
The ~ederal M11i~~ Government responded to public opinion 
and the 1974/75 l3wiget speech ot 1 April 1974 included the 
government •• intention "to reorganise and revitalise" the 
insurance indusU7 as well as its decision to "take over 40: - 49 
percent of the equity Shares ot viable lnsurance companies 
transaoting lite and general insurance busiDes. in Nigeria."3 
The speech also contained the Federal Govemmant •• proposal to 
undertake a "comprehensive review ot the laws governiDg insurance 
so as to remove abuse. now rampant in the 1ndustl'1."3 
In t"ultillllent ot that intention, the lederal Minilt1'1 ot 
Trade and Industriel issued a Stataent4 on 13 December 1974 that 
in "further pursuance ot its indigenisation policy the Government 
decided to acquire 40 - 49 percent in the equities ot viable toreign 
200 
controlled insurance companies.,,5 However, government parlicipat.ion 
was to be "without prejudice to the existing Nigerian 
shareholding prior to Government's decision.,,6 The statement 
revealed that negotiations for acquisition of the equities had 
commenced since 28 November 1974 and added tha.t negotiation 
with other specified selected companies would continue with a 
view to making similar asreements with them.7 
Meanwhile, nCON concluded the take-over of the Niger 
Insurance Company from the Yorkshire General Life Assurance Company. 
Tbe latter's fund stood at .11 million at the time of the takeover. 
RICON a1s~ acquired equity participation in the Nigerian Acceptance 
8 
company which is not an insurance organisation. 
Two years later, in February 1976, the Federal Military 
Government signed partnership agreements with six other- insurance 
companies.9 ]y the agreement, government was to acquire not 
less than 49 percent of the shares of each company, wi th the 
exception of the companies where there was a substantial 
Nigerian shareholding. The sixth co~ was the Royal 
Exchange which was included on the indigenisation list in 1974 -
it would appear that the eDvisapd participation in that yea:r 
did not materiali.e.10 
Apart fro. the detemiDa tiOl1 to balance the ownership 
struoture of the insurance companies, goverlUDlnt participation 
was stated to be in keeping with the nation'l policy to indige-
11 
nise the key sectors of the econOlQ', "so that as partners in. 
12 progress, we may continue to proaper together." ~e then 
chairman of NICOl, Alhaji Aliko Mohammed, later stated that 
government acquilition of shares in & major insurance compa.rq 
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was to compel the compaD1 to "Nigerianise its top position and 
to re-invest its profits in Nigeria.1) 
Earl;y in September 1976, one more insurance companr, 
the Mercur,y A.ssurance, vas added to the list. Although the 
agreement for government's 49 percent participation was signed 
in September 1976,14 it nevertheless took retrospective 
effect from) March 1976. The partnership agreement was still considered 
to be inadequate b7 the New Nigerian which again repeated 
its earlier stand that "the ul tjmate policy should be 
the nationalisation of the insurance buS1ness."~S 
tkile all this vas in progress, the omission of the insurance 
broking business tram the list at enterprises in sChedule one to 
the Nigerian Enterprises Pranotion Act ot 1972 was criticised 
b;y the indigenous members at the Nigerian Chartered Corporation 
of Brokers. '!'hey argued that since insurance braking is 
16 
analogous to retail trade, it should ha~ been ind1genised. 
The Schedule Two list was also attacked because S0D8 ver.y 
critical enterprises like petrolewa, mining, banking, insurance, 
textiles and shoe manufacturing were omitted trom the list.17 
Th. DailJ' Time. tel t "'the total omission ot the insurance 
busine.s and pe trole • .arke ting 8Z1d exp10ra ticm t1'01I the 
18 
.econd schedule UDder the new law is .,.teriou •• " !he •• 
teelings were expressed because it was felt that IIIEU1Y ot the 
enterprise. Mntioned required neither sub.tantial capital nor 
19 
expertise be;yond the reach or JII&Il1 indigenous entrepreneurs. 
It is theretore no surprise that 1Dsurance vas brought into 
Schedule Two ot the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act ot 
1977.20 B7 the provision8 or this Act, indipnous participa.-
tion in the expatriate companies was railed to 60 percent with 
etfect rrca 31 Dec_bel' 1978. 
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Ey the end of 1976 when government had acquired shares in 
12 e%p8.triate firms, it became "the policy of the Federal 
Government that existing expatriate insurance companies which 
for various reasons vere considered unsuitable for government 
21 participation should not continue to operate." Hence the 
cancellation of the certificates of registration of Eri tish 
India General InllUrBDCe Company' and New Nigerian COIDp&n7 in 
March 1976.22 
8.3 Goveraaezrt· As Insurer 
The seneral phlloaoPQ1 of tbe political 01aaa23 prior to the 
24 Nigerian oivil war, exoept among those oppoaiti011 leaders who 
subscribe to government participation in banking and insurance as 
a means of promoting eoonomic development (:Baratz, 1964), was that 
the state should not transact insurance if the commercial market 
could give the consumers what they need. 
A turn about was forced on the Nigerian political class b,-
the chronic foreian domination of the econ~ and the belt-tigbtening 
experience which Nigeria had underpe in the 1967-70 B1a.fran war 
(chapter 5.5.2). The less011s in self-relianoe bad been learnt. 
The establishllent of RICON 011 1 JulJ 1969 (a.ction 8.5.1) i8 
concrete evidence of change of course. 
That a natioll&l msurance cOIllp&l11 would .. erp in a situation 
where expatriate ccaapa.nies dominated the 1naurance industry was no 
lIore in doubt in view of the economic nationalism which accompanied 
the countr,'s political independence. In the defunct Western 
Region, a state owned cOJllpanJ, Great NiSeria Insurance, was esta-
blished because "all iDaurance companies operating in the 
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countr,r were owned and managed by foreigners" (Great Nigeria, 1981). 
The underlying reasons for the formation of BICON were tha.t 
"the IIl&jority of the companies, which were, of course, foreign, 
deliberately kept low retentions" and that "about 90 percent or 
the premium paid is sent" to London" (Ligadu, 1981). 
Following the Obande Commission, whoae report formed the 
basis of the Insurance Companies Act of 1961, an Indian adviser 
on insurance matters, I. K. R~ Rao, produced a feasibility report 
(ODor, 1984) in 1962 on the advan taps of insuring the produce 
of the former Niprian ~roduce Marketing ~rd with an indigenous 
insurance company. ]ased on the Rao Report, the Pirst National 
Development plan had earmarked the sum of ~2 million for the 
creation of an insurance company which will undertake the 
insurance of Nigeria's export crops" (Nigeria, 1962). owing to 
implementation problems, the project was not executed but was 
again renewed in the Second plan. The reasons for government's 
continued interest in the eventual take-off of the comp&n1 were 
that "foreign owned 1naurance companies not only controlled about 
95 percent of the market but also reinsured heav1l7 with sOlIe 
of their parent cOlDpanies abroad" (Olevor, 1984) and, therefore, 
"government took cognizance or the need to conserve the 
coun'trJ's foreilll exchange resources to forh the developaent 
of the economy" (Biseria, 1962). The formation of IICOI gave 
the government the opportunity to partiCipate in all classes of 
insurance, particularly arine insurance, which up to tba t time, 
was in the hands of the foreign owned companies (Niseria, 1976). 
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The National Insurance Corporation of Niseria Act of 
1969 established an insurance corporation with powers to carry 
on every class of insurance and reinsurance business (Chapter 9.3.1). 
In particular, the Corporation has inter alia, power to insure a:n:t 
property of government - Federal, states or of any statutory 
corporation.25 The RICaN Act compelled with effect: from 1 
october 1969, every registered insurer to insure with the 
Corporati~ an amount equal to 10 percent of the BUll insured 
in respect of every insurance policy.26 It, however, gave the 
Corporation a discretion to accept or refuse to accept fram 
any registered insurer ~ reinsurance accommodation relating 
to any particular risk.27 This provision on state reinsurance 
has been superseded by section 7 of the Nigeria Reinsurance 
Corporation Act of 1977 which repeals section H or the NICON Act. 
Although NICON (arter its formation) found itself at the 
apex of the comtry's insurance industry, it could not cOJlllllBnd 
the authority and prestige of the central Bank which regulates the 
banking industry. This is because NICON functioned both as a reinsurer, 
an insurer, a broker and. an agent. This clearly undermined its 
authority and leadership as a ccmpeti tor can bardl7 be accepted 
as a controller (Durojai1e, 1981). Th1a was hotlr debated in 
insurance and official ciro1e.. Some re1 t that NlCOR should 
concentrate on the more important businea. of reiDllurance. 
others argued tbat it should not involve itaelf in reinauranee 
but should rather confine itself sole17 to writing of insurance 
business of goV81"1lDlent bodies and. statutory corporations and 
leave private insurance business to other insurance campanies. 
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Another trend in the debate was that NICON should discon-
tinue being. . sh1elded'b7 the automatic acquisition of a percen-
tage of businesses gained by other companies but should have 
these interests in these companies and operate them as 
branches or NICON. It is only then, the argument went that 
the efficiency of the Corporation could be meaningfully judged., 
perhaps the mostcontrovex81al part of the whole debate 
was how the 1974 proposed 40 percent acquisition ot the leading 
expatria te i.nb _'ance companies could be efrected. some argued 
that it should be done through NIeON' s acquiZ'ing these interests 
on behalt ot the government while othera argued tha t gove~ent 
should acquire the interests directly as it did with the majar 
banks (Nwankwo, 1974). 
The current dimension in the debate is that NICON, being 
the leading state owr.ed enterprise, should provide leadership 
for the induat1'1 by pioneering such untried areas as crop 
insurance, credit and deposit 1naurance and other new forms of 
insurance (Rigeria, 1976). 
The tuture of a corporation that has baco. the subject 
cOlltroverl1 ia tar frCJI certain. It i., therefore, hardly surpri-
sing that the leadership of the liprian iDauranoe industry i. 
today shared b7 both nCOK and. Bipria Re which wa ••• tablished 
by Decr .. .,.ber 49 of 1977. 
Man1 reuon. account tor the tomation of Ripria Re. 
BlCOR aoon ran into difficulties through it. attempt. to do 
too much too quickly and bad to be bailed out b7 expert. 
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brought in froll the international reinsurance cOllllUDity such as 
MUnich Reinsurance Compa.D1' and Swiss Reinsurance COlipaDY 
(Re-Actions, 1981). This lack of reinsurance infrastructure 
in the country has resulted in an uncontrolled outflow ot 
insurance funds b7 wa:r of reinsurance premiU1l8. Local. 
companies often face difficulties28 in placing abroad the business 
which is above their retention capacity. In addition, inapite of 
more than fifty years of the insurance industry', no specialist 
market has developed. It was in the light ot this situation 
that the Federal MUitarr Government earmarked the sum of :20 
million in the Third. National Development Plan for the establish-
ment ot the Nigeria Re (Nigeria, 1975). The Corporation would 
give the national market a stronger bargaining power than 
hitherto for negotiating reinsurance treaties with foreign 
reinsurers. This would result in better te%ms for the total 
national reinsurance cessions and thus ensure that a higher 
proportion ot the premiUJI income of the indust%'1 was retained in 
Nigeria. It would pr~ide the capac! ty for insurance cover ot 
large and cCllplex risks in the countrJ whieh are bound to emar .. 
as major industrial sad agricultural schemes pt UDierwlq. The 
Corporation would contribute to the sound development ot the 
insurance market by, tor example, providing 1nf'ornation on risk, 
taritfs and claims (Chapter 2.4). 
The Nigeria Ile1Daurance Corporation Act at 197729 repeal. 
seetion 8 or the N1COR Aet and establiShes a national reinsurance 
corporation which shall have the powers within and outside the, 
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country, to carry on reinsurance of any class of insurance 
business including life insurance business and to reinsure 
against loss of any risk or contingency. It is given powers to: 
(a) acquire any undertaking of any registered insurer, 
hold or have any shares or stock in, or any 
financial. interest :in any such undertaking; 
(b) acquire and invest in any other profitable 
business; 
(c) assist in organising training schemes for 
emp10yeea of any registered insurer. 
In addition, it is authorised to serve as the Channel for 
ceding compulsory cessions from the Federation of Nigeria to 
Africa Re. 30 
The Act makes it verr clear that the Insurance Act of 1976 
shall apply as far as it is possible to Nigeria Re as well as 
NICON. 31 It is made mandatory for a registered insurer to cede, 
in respect of every insurance policy issued or renewed by it 
on or after the 1 Januarr 1978, 20 percent of the SUill insured in 
the policy and the registered insurer shall forthwith pay 
over to the Corporation an amount equal to 20 percent of the 
premiua received by the registered insurer. 32 
Provisions are made for the recover, of debt owed br a 
registered insurer to Nigeria Re.33 It is made mandatory for 
everr registered insurer to produce to any person authorised by' 
the Managing Duector such informaticm or record as may be 
required by the Corporation34 whose authorised capital 1s 
stated as .10 million.35 
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As a further effort to develop the reinsurance market not 
only in Nigeria but also on the continent of Africa, the 
Nigerian government played' m active role in the establishment 
of Africa Re (chapter 2.4). 
8.4 Localisation of Imports Insurance 
The third major element of localisation of business is 
section 46 of the 1976 Insurance Act which requires that 
imports into Nigeria be insured in Nigeria (chapter 7.6~7.2). 
8.5 Evaluation of t..~e Localisation Policy 
Policy is briefly examined under four sub-headingsl 
government participation, DlOnopoly of government business, state 
reinsurance and indigenisation of imports insurance. 
!j. 5.1 Govemment Participation in Insurance 
It has become fashionable in Nigeria for each government in 
the Federation - Federal or state - to own its own insurance company 
or bank. All in the name of a mixed. economy. There are grounds 
for questionning such an approach. i'irat! 1nsuranee requires 
little investment in fixed capital, but is a labour intensive 
enterprise demand~ a well-educatedlabour force. Capital is 
mostly required to ac,1£II and equip office accommodation, train 
starf and maintain relatively' liquid and marketable tuDda for 
investment. Insurance is, therefore, ellinently suitable for 
indigenous private investors. Second, it makes more economic 
sense for government to concentrate on the development of 
public utilities, econollic infrastructures and new industries 
than her competition with indigenous private investors in e&81 
areas. Third, the reasons why government bought shares in 
for8i8l1 owned. companies are transient and have been put behind 
us. i'ourth, state participation often resulta in "concentration" 
(table ts.1 ) with the &asocia. ted drawbacks.3& It usuallr r8sul ts in 
217 
Non-Lite premiums Lire Premiums 
Year Gross or 10~ Net or Retained Gross or 1~ Net or Retained 
19'(ts 
NICOB 
other Direct Insurers 
Nigeria Re 
Total 
1979 
BlCON 
Other Direct Insurers 
Nigeria Re 
Total 
1980 
NICOH 
Other Direct Insurers 
Nigeria Re 
Total 
1981 
NlCON 
Other Direct Insurers 
Nigeria Re 
Total 
1982 
BlCON 
Other Direct Insurers 
Nigeria Re 
Total 
1983 
BleON 
Other Direct Insurers 
Nigeria Re 
Total 
50.ts4( 1tj.·(1 
199.15(73.29 
21.75(8.00) 
271.74(100.0 
56.20(18.20: 
187 .88(60.85~ 
64.69(20.95~ 
308.77(100.0) 
83. 79( 21 .45) 
243.29(62.28) 
63.56(16.27) 
390.64(100.0) 
97.45(19.65) 
305.59(61.62) 
92.87( 18.73) 
495.91(100.0) 
115.19(22.02) 
313.37(59.91) 
94.52(18.07) 
523.08(100.0) 
102.99(20.85) 
279.54(56.59) 
111.41{22.56) 
493.94(100.0) 
10.03(11.3;) 
104.96(74.34) 
20.19(14.31) 
141.18( 100.0) 
21.59(13.30) 
101.26(62.36) 
39.50(24.34) 
162.35(100.0) 
27 .65( 14.80) 
120.11(64.27) 
39. 11 (20.93) 
186.87(100.0) 
51.14( 18.74) 
159.10(58.30) 
62.66(22.96) 
272.90(100.0) 
63.73(21.06) 
173.18(57.21) 
65.78(21.73) 
302.69(100.0) 
37.80(15.03) 
151.26( 60.15) 
62.40(24.82) 
251.46(100.0) 
4.17lts.33) 
45.63(91•17) 
0.25(0.50) 
50.05(100.0) 
4.17lts.bb) 
43.74(90.82) 
0.25(0.52) 
48.16(100.0) 
4.57(6.94) 4.27(6.75) 
60.70(92.19) 58.46(92.35) 
0.57(0.87) 0.57(0.90) 
65.84(100.0) 63.30(100.0) 
6.76(7.62) 
80.91(91•25) 
1.00(1.13) 
88.67(100.0) 
6.47(7.57) 
78.05(91.27) 
1.00(1.16) 
85.52(1oo.Ql 
11.03(9.31) 10.97(9.78) 
106.05(89.49) 99.87(88.96) 
1.42(1.20) 1.42(1.26) 
118.50(100.0) 112.26{100.0} 
10.14(8.81) 8.81(8.15) 
103.47(89.91) 97.79(90.49) 
1.47(1.28) 1.47(1.)6) 
115.08(100.0) 108.07(100.0) 
15.14(10.19) 14.96(10.54) 
131.70(88.60) 25.12{88.18) 
1.81(1.21) 1.81( 1.28) 
148.65( 100.0) 141.89{1oo.0J 
Sources The B-man Inaurance Investigating Panel (1986). ligures in parentheses 
show percentase distribution. 
Table 8.1 
Distribution ot Market Share. in the Hiprian lnIuraDce Industrr 
on the Baais ot Prea1ua Income, 1978 to 1983 ("1I1llion) 
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a welfare loss for policyholders because the consumer is unlikely 
. 
to get his insurance as cheaply as in conditions of competition. 
The success of a competitive state insurance institution is 
uncertain. It postulates the selection of managers with an 
entrepreneurial skill, who, working on stricter self inposed 
rules than their c01llllercial competitors, are going to outdo th_. 
It is also any-body" s guess whether these state enterprises are 
not subject to politic1al interference and pressur8s.37 
For the above reasons, this study is of the view that state 
participation should only arise in special circumstances. First, 
there is the residual market philosophy or the need to fill the 
insurance demands not met b1 private insurers as where private 
insurers are unable or unwilling to provide cover demanded by' 
the public, consider the risk beyond their resources, or see no 
prospect of profit in providing the cover required. In such 
circumstances government mq intervene and operate an insurance 
or reinsurance fund to meet legitimate public demands (Uockerell, 1980). 
Second, where the nature of the insurance need is such that 
private insurers do not seem organised to respond to it, it is 
easier and falter for sovernment to set up an insurance fund for 
the particular purpole. This is particularl1 expedient during 
war time. Third, where some insurance prograllllDes need the 
element of compulsion for success it is easier for government 
to take over the programmes (Green, 1976). An example or this 115 the 
Rational Provident Fund or the social securit,y system. 
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8.5.2 Monopoly of Government Insurance Business 
The reasons for the establishment of NICON are transient -
reorientation to the domination of the market by foreign owned 
companies, curtailment of foreign exchange disbursement on the 
import of insurance and reinsurance services, govemment partici-
pation in marine, aviation and engineering insurances and the 
displacement of insurance brokers from handling government risks. 38 
The real issue to examine is how effective and desirable 
NIeON's appearance on the Nigerian insurance market has been. 
Clearly it has curbed the domination of the market by foreign 
monopolY' capital, but in the process it has itself dominated the 
market by its monopolY' of government insurance business. This 
is detrimental to competition and efficiency because it encourages 
"concentration" of business in one company at the expense of the 
other companies that are indigenous companies too. 
Secondly there is the problem39 which is found in a restricted 
market. As mentioned below, (section 8.5.4) this is that under 
the conditions of localisation of imports insurance rates are 
higher (UNCTAD, 1975) than those in developed markets. Two 
arguments can be raised on this. The first is that under a 
monopoly (in other words, where external or looal cOlllpeti tion is 
excluded) the consUJDer is unlikely to get his insurance as 
cheaply as in conditions of competition. The second argument 
is that NICON has neither the capacitr let alone the expertise 
to handle gigantic government risks like the iron and steel complex, 
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petroleum refinerises, motor assembly plants, chemical industries, 
the Nigerian export produce, NNSL fleet of vessels, the aircraft of 
the Nigerian Airways, etc. In handling these risks NlCON has no 
choices but to retain for its net account only a small proportion 
of these businesses and reinsure the balance with the reinsuring 
centres of the world leading to unabated loss of the country's 
foreign exchange on reinsurances. 
Thirdly, the foreign exchange outflow is further assisted by 
the exclusion of insurance brokers from handling government and 
quasi .-government risks, a peculiarity which makes NIOON an insurer 
and broker at the same time. 40 
With the Changed climate introduced br the Insur~~ce Act of 
197b, leading to the registration of the brokers, government may 
restore the previous position of giving government risks to brokers 
to handle. It is more economical for these huge risks to be 
spread firstly among all the insurers in the country and thereafter 
among foreign companies through the brokers using the slip than 
to allow UICON to be spoon fed by them. Moreover, the latter 
is no longer the captive insurance company it used to be lince 
it now accepts ncm-government risks. What il more important, 
the totally Ul'l&Cceptable contradiction of broker and insurer 
rolled into one will be removed. This implies that our insurance 
companies both private and government owned should concentrate on 
their faDotions as insurers and employ local brokers to do those 
things, such as placing reinsurances both facultative and 
treaties with local and overseas reinsurers, which are normallY' 
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entrusted to brokers on other international insurance markets. 
This will have the effect of reversing the trend whereby 
insurance brokers not registered under our laws frequent our 
market and illegally obtain business in Nigeria. 
8.5.3 state Reinsurance 
The provisions of Decree No. 49 of 1911 confer a monopoly 
position on Nigeria Re and clearly constitute concentration with 
all the diSadvantages.41 Compulsory reinsurance appeals at first 
sight as a cheap and certain method of obtaining for the state 
a share of insurance profits but whether it makes for a 
healthy insurance market is open to question. If too much 
cream is skimmed off the vigour of private insurers, their 
willingness to stay in the business will be reduced, and the 
reduction of competition can result in the insured paying a 
higher premium than is necessary (chapter 10.4.1). The state's gain 
can be at the expense of the indigenous consumer, with repercussions on 
import and export prices, a consequent d1a1nution of trade and 
a disincentive to the public from covering their risks by 
insurance l Cockerell, 1974). 
To correct the position some suggestions are put 
forward as follows. First, until v1&b1e competitors emerp a 
fixed proportion of all reinsurance treaties should continue to 
be channelled through the Corporation. It should also enjoy 
the first right of refusal of all faoul tative business. This 
is as far as patriotism should go. The ceding companies 
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should be free to place the remaining portions with other reinsurers 
without the concurrence of the Nigeria Re. In other words, 
non-regulation of reinsurance business above the figure compulsorily 
ceded is recommended for the country. Otherwise the direct 
insurers '11111 be turned to mere agents of Nigeria Re with concani-
tant disadvtanges. Moreover, the initial difficulties confronting 
a pioneer necessitates that the Corporation Should not take 
too high a share initially from the ceding companies' bu8me.s 
as otherwise most of the business will leave the country by way of 
retrocession. 
Secondly, flexibility is needed in applying section 7(2) of 
the Nigerian Reinsurance Corporation Act 1977 dealing vi th cOllllllission 
rates which should be similar to those payable on the intemationa1 
markets. This is necessa17 to enable the ceding companies to enjoy the 
maximum value of recourse to reinsurance. 
ThJ.1'dl.y, the ceding coapanies should be allowed to open up 
reinsurance departments to operate side-b.r-side with specialist 
reinsurers that are bound to emerp in due course. In that case the 
lIODopo17 current1,. enj0J'8d bJ" Nigeria Re wou.l.d becClie a thing ot the past. 
a.S.4 InauraDC8 of IriEoris 
'!he assertion that the localisation of ineuraDce ot illport. 
was a1aed at coneenation ot the comt17' s fore1&D exch&np on 
the one haDd. and prov1ding a .011d boost to the .rtet on the 
other (Aktu, 1979 and Okwor, 1978) is IIOre appannt than real. 
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\nla.t led to the action was a result of a sequence of historical 
events. The oil Iloney which quadrupled in 1974 led. to import 
polia" liberalisation which was introduced b.1 the 1975/76 ~t 
speech. An unprecedented increase in the importation of goods 
followed and in the course of such importation this country witnessed 
the worst form of port congestion which vaa nick~ed, "the cement 
armada" in 1975 (Ani, 1982). The situation led. to protracted delays 
in the discharge of imported goods. Losses caused by delay and 
pilferage became very pralinent. This prompted overseas uncierai ters 
to giTe general cancellation on all open covers written in respect 
• 
of consis-ents destined for Nigeria. Although this notice was 
eventually wi thdravn, the withdrawal was not without SODle incon-
venience to the importers. This was because coverage under the 
contracts waa thereafter restricted in most cases to port areas 
thereby depriving the importers of protectian during transit to 
the hinterland where the majority of the warehouses were located. 
This was the prelude to the insertion of section 46 in the 
Act of 1976. It vas a panic action of govermaent taken in despera-
tion. Instead. of taking loss prevention Dleasure. in the form of 
the expansion of port faoilities, diversion of ships to neighbou-
ring countries and the II01mting of .ecurit7 units to counter esca-
lating thefts government thought it could solve the 
resulting insurance problems by indipn1aiDg the marine iDsu:ance 
of iaports. Hence the insertion of .eotion 46 in the Insurance 
Act of 1976. '!'he immediate explanation was to counter the over-
reaction of the overseas insurers. It was not to atem the drain 
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in the country· s foreign exchange per see The formation of NICOl 
in 1969 and Nigeria Re in 1977 was intended to do just that 
(Nigeria, 1976). 
The effect of the innovation on the insurance market in 
Nigeria has been very far reaching. First, there was the 
precipi tous increase in the volume of the marine cargo account. 
Table 2.4 shows that marine and aviation business has been the 
most rapidl7 expanding class of business in the insurance industry. 
Itsshare of the market increased frem 9.2 percent in 1975 to 19.2 
percent in 1982. As for the brokers on whom the- bulk of the 
administration of this class of business normal17 devolves the 
1976 Act has provided them a field day :in terms of increased 
business and higher commission rate. Secondly, the prospects of a 
substantial increase in their individual marine cargo po~trolios 
obliged the underwriting CCIIIPan1e. to .'bark on w.riou. types or 
training programme (I rukwu , 1979) to improve the quality and 
strength of their statt to cope with the resultant expansion. 
For the same reason, the brokers were obliBed to exert etfort 
to improve the quality ot their expertise. Thirdly, with the 
coming into existence ot the Act and the need to repatriate all 
accounts previously written abroad, the inauriDB public was 
presented with a unique opportunity to negotiate more tavourable 
terms 10cal17. In addition there is the advantase or eaq 
accessibilit,r to local inSurers resulting in expeditious settlement 
ot legitimate claims. These were the positive .rfects of 
section 46 ot the Act. 
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The negative effects have been equally varied and several. First, 
overseas markets in developed economies were critical of the localisation 
of marine insurance of imports. The criticism (FAIR, 1979) centred on 
technical limitations and underlined the inability of the local market to 
satisfactorily undertake the specialised field of marine and aviation 
insurance. Second, as explained by the theo:l"1 of comparative advantage 
(chapter 10.3.2), insurance rates have risen sharply, creating a situation 
(UNOTAD, 1980) which has increased the cost of imported goods and conse-
quantly worsened the rate of inflation because premiums charged by 
Nigerian underwriters on imported cargo far exceeded those Charged 
offshore (FAIR, 1979). Third, Nigeria had to contend with the difficult 
problem of sabotage and circumvention of the localisation regulation. 
A motorious circumstance of circumvention is double insurance though 
there were quite a number of ways (FAIR, 1979) in which circumvention 
is effected. These include mysterious losses, use of dubious ships, 
non-payment of charter dues, payment of general average guarantee in 
hard currencies, etc. 
The issue of sharply increased premium rates referred to above 
fOCWles attention on the assumption, uncritically made, that localisati~ 
automatically saves foreign eXcha.nge.42 yet to sa.feauard themselves the 
local insurers retain for their net account only a small proportion of 
the business they write and reinsure the balance usually facultatively 
abrot\d (table 8.2). This means that protection of local direct insu:!'ers 
shifts the balance of plqlDents burden to the reinsurance account. So, 
bearing in mind the higher premiums noted above, there is no reason to 
~uPpo ... that the overall balance of payments 1s improved since the overseas 
insurers have received higher premiums than they would have charged. 
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Table ti.3 shows that disbursement on insurance constitutes an increasing 
burden to the balance of payments. Therefore, payments overseas, whether 
as premiums for direct insurance or cession costs of reinsurance, constitutes 
avoidable drain on foreign exchange. Accordingly, if localisation does not 
conserve foreign exchange, other measures43 must be adopted to enhance the 
retention capacity of the direct insurers. 
year ~~ or Gross ltetained. Premiums premiums Ceded premium Ceded 
premiums Locally Abroad 
1977 49.38 )0.76 11.12 7.51 
1978 55.01 20.20 17.30 17.52 
1979 60.77 25.86 16.86 19.05 
1980 90.55 34.12 )3.08 23.)5 
1981 108.48 62.11 26.21 20.16 
1982 125.33 72.54 27.10 24.)6 
198) 118.15 52.76 35.61 29.76 
Source: The 8-man Insurance Investigating Panel (1986). 
Note: 
year 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
198) 
A substantial proportion of premiums ceded locally was 
retroceded abroad. 
Table 8.2 
Premiums Accepted and Ceded Abroad by the 
National Insurance Corporation of Niser1a(M m) 
Total Disbursements Disbursements 
on Services on Insurance 
5.1 
1,982.4 8.0 
1,797.2 10.3 0.6 
2,212.3 14.5 0.7 
2,995.) 42.0 1.4 
4,453.7 44.0 1.0 
3,953.0 118.0 3.0 
2,784.4 56.0 2.0 
3,602.6 64.0 1.8 
Sources Central !ank or Nigeria 
Table 8.3 
proportion of Foreign Exchanse Disbursement on 
Insurance to Total 
Disburs.ments on Services in Nigeria, 197;-1983 
~}!~_@1 .,,,., 
8.6 other Devices 
The other indigenisation measures worthy of mention are considered 
belows-
8.6.1 Compulsory Insurance 
Following the great technological advances made during the two world 
wars, mechanical transport made rapid pro~ss (chapter 2.2.2) and the 
number of motor vehicles plying the roads increased, so did the accident 
rate and subsequent deaths and injuries. Injured third parties often 
could not o'Qtain the damages to which they were entitled, as most motorists 
were without adequate funds to satisfy the judgement debts. The resultant 
outcry led in Great Britain to the introduction of the Road Traffic Act of 
1930 (Cockerell and Dickinson, 1980), making third party insurance in 
respect of death or bodily injuries compulsory. The Act made it an offence 
for anyone to use or permit the use of a motor vehicles on a road unless 
there was in force a policy of insurance covering the liability of the 
motorist for death or injur,y to third parties arising from the use or the 
motor vehicle. The usefulness or this legislation ensuring that money w<&s 
available to compensate innocent victims injured or killed in road accidents 
was reoognised by the colonial administrators (Langbotton, 1932) Who extended 
it to Nipria in 1945 under a dirferent title or "Motor Vehiole (third p&rtJ 
insurance) Ordinanoe." This legislation became operati" on 1 AprU 19$0. 
The Aot cover, which the iDauring publio taDd to mistake tor cOllpre-
henai" oover, made aD _ediate impact on the 1D8uranoe ma.rket. It 
broUlht such an increasing volume ot businesa that it rapidl1 enlarged 
the aarket (MeNe.ty, 1973). ~ 
Apart trom third. party motor insurance lIade oompulsory an soeial 
considerationa, SOll8 other olasses or insurance are made coapulaorr bT 
economic or polia.yholder protection ractora. lor example, seotion 46 ot 
the Insurance Act ot 1976 atipulate. that all ahipaentl to the count1'1 
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IlUst be insured against marine risks with Nigerian companies (chapter 
7.6.7.2). It is on the grounds of polia,rholder protectieD tbat sectieD 28 
ot the same Act makes it compulsor,y tor & broker to take out a protessional 
indemnity policY' betore he can obtain & licence to practice as such. 
8.6.2 Creation ot Insurable._ Liabilities 
From time to time the law has created a number ot civil wrongs which 
are redressible bY' the award of damages. Examples ot such laws are the 
occupiers' Liability4S in respect of persons who enter such land, breach 
ot statuto1"7 duty under the Factories Act,46 and the right to compensation 
UDder the Workmen's Compensation Act.47 The liabilities that these laws 
create are insurable and, therefore, increase the business and fortunes 
ot the insurance companies. The ettect is an increase in the size ot the 
insurance market and the entranoe of new firms into the industrr. 
The Workmen's Compensation Act of 1967, for example, imposes a 
strict liability (without fault or negligence) on all employers of labour. 
under the Act it a workman i. injured on killed while acting within the 
oourse of his employment, the employer BlUst pay compensation to the workman 
or his dependant in accordance with the provisions of the Act. An employer 
~ take out a workaen's compensation insurance policY' to protect himself 
against these risks. The passing of the Workman" Compensation Act was 
one of the exogenous factors tha. t boosted the 1D&uraDce business in the 
titties (McJesty, 1973). 
8.6.3 Administrative Control 
Althoqh the insurance control laws constitute the basis of insurance 
resulation in the count1'1. the auperviso1'1 authority 1s delegated the power 
by the legislature not only to enforce the statuto1'1 provisions but also to 
exercise discret10nar.r powers to interpret and to implement the statutes. 
A government department called the Insurance Department in a Federal 
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Ministry is charged with responsibility of administering insurance regula-
tions. This department, which up to 1979 was housed in the Federal Mmistry 
of Trade, has since been moved to the Ministry of Finance (chapter 9.5). It 
is headed by the Director of Insurance. 
The department, operating under legislative authorit,y, makes and 
enforces rules within that authority. Decisions and rulings of the Director 
are subject to judicial review if any affected parties wish to challenge 
them. In making decisions, the Director of Insurance creates "rules known 
as "adminisuative laws." These rules are made when it is necessary for 
government to intervene in the operations of insurance companies in the 
interest of the iIlsuring public. This was the case in 1975 when insln'anoe 
companies increased motor insurance premiums and the government, in its 
efforts to curb inflation, had to prescribe, against the wishes of the 
insurers, maximum rates to be charged for all classes of motor insuranoe 
business. It is with this experience in mind that the government introduced 
under the ourrent supervisory law a Rating Committee, headed by the 
Director of Insurance, to advise the government onicontinUing basis on the 
appropriate level of rates and commissians to be charged by insuranoe 
companies.48 (See chapter 7.6). 
8.6.4 Judicial Control 
The judicial process is an important medium of insurance super'lision. 
I 
The courts interpret. legisla.tion when the meBDing is challenged and also 
settle disputes among contracting parties. The.y may compel the Director 
of Insurance to issue a licence to an insurer or to prevent its cancellation. 
On the other hand. the Director of Insurance may. for example, petition the 
courts to enforce compliance with statutory or administrative lawe. A 
court ~ling on the cOrlsti tutionali ty or insurance legislation or actions 
of the supervisory authority becanes part or the bo~ of iDaurance legisla-
tion. It was in the course of litigation that it came to light that 80me 
230 
foreign owned insurance companies incorporated outside Nigeria were opera-
ting in this country in 1969 through local agents in spite of the passage 
of the Insurance Companies Act in 1961.49 
8.6.5 Manpower Development 
Government has always encouraged the development of manpower in the 
insurance industry. As far back as April 1955, the western Region 
production Development Board awarded the first scholarships in insurance 
to two Nigerians50 who now play a prolllinen t role in the market. In 1959 
the Federal Government gave six insurance buraries for two successive 
years. The recipients of these bursaries - Francies OZoCInah, yinka 
Lijadu and. Tony Lawson, to name some of them - returned home fran the 
Uni ted Kingdom to become leading personages in the Nigerian insurance 
market (chapter 2.2.3). 
In June 1967 the university of Lagos acceded to government's 
request of ts May that the university should mount a two-year post-graduate 
programmes in actuarial science (Chapter 9.3.3.1). After a lot of 
initial difficulties, the programme was commenced in 1970. Only two sets 
of students went through the course and owing to the perennial starfing 
problems ot the university, which were aggravated by the specialised 
nature of the course, the programme bad to be temina ted thereafter. 
In 1975, as a reaul t or technical assistance frcm 1JNCTAD's SPI, the 
university was able to restart the programme in the rom or .a.Jl undergraduate 
degree course. 
With an eye on the acute shortage ot trained and experienced 
manpower in the insurance industry, the Federal Government had proposed, 
in association with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), to 
establish in Nigeria an Insurance Education centre for English-speaking 
west African countries (ShuW&, 1977). Atter this institution was 
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eventually located in Monrovia in Liberia, the defunct Civilian .\iminis-
tra tion planned to set up an insurance school. 51 Meanwhile, some ins ti-
tutions of higher learning,52 financed by the government, have taken the 
initiative and are now offering degree or diploma courses in insurance. 
If this scheme succeeds, it may well constitute the manpower develop-
ment strategy for the insurance industr.y in Nigeria. 
8.6.6 Control by the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
The Immigration Act of 1963 requires the alien investor to seek 
permission from the Ministry of Internal Affairs before setting up a 
business or practising a profession in the country. The alien entrepreneur 
usually can obtain a visa for 28 d~s on the first occasion and subse-
quently a resident alien status. When the business is established, control 
is exercised through the regulation of the number of expatriate employees 
the foreign entrepreneur can bring in. The alien is generally not 
p~rmitted to acquire an interest in land without government permission 
(chapter 5.5.2). 
The pamphlet issued by' the Ministry in January 1985 on the granting 
of business pemits and expatriate quotas emphasizes that "no quota position 
would be renewed for more than five times or for a period in excess of 
10 years from the dar quota waainitially granted ••• "53 
8.6.7 Control by the Central Bank of Nigeria 
With ettect from A.pril 1978, the lending operations of insurance 
companies were brousht under the control of the central Bank (QaonJ1 
and Demuren, 1980). From then on all insurance companies are required 
to render monthly returns of their operation. to the Eank within 30 daye 
from the end of each month. The Central. Bank's control of the lenling 
operations of insurance companies is broadly similar to that exercised 
over bank lending. In terms of the availability, distribution and cost 
'. 
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of credit, the Bank's credit guidelines are designed to ensure that 
preferential treatment is given to the priority sectors of the economy. 
I~ lianklls In the Central I _ credit guidelines for 1985 fiscal year, for instance, 
insurance companies were enjoined to ensure that loans for residential 
building construction should be for a minimum period 15 years. The 
interest chargeSS4 for different categories of loans were fixed as 
shown in table 8.3. 
Economic Sectors 
Preferred Sector - Manufacturing, 
Agriculture, Mining, !uilding and 
Construction 
Favoured Sector - Residential 
Housing and Agrioul tural production 
1 
6 
6 
Less preferred Sector - General Commerce 8-'1 
7-9 
6 
-'1 
Source t OBN t Monetary policy Circular Nos 10 tel 15 
Table a.in 
Interest Rate Structure ( percentages) 
for Insurance Companies 
6 6 
Section 29' of the Central Bank of Niseria Act of 1967 stipulates 
penalties for defaulters on the rendering of monthly returns on lending 
operations.5S 
8.6.8 Control bl the MiniStry of Ftnance 
Apart from its fiduciar,y control of the insurance industr,y carried 
out by the Insurance Department, the 'ederal Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Development exercises fiscal control over the industry in two 
W8.78 - taxation and exchange control. 
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8.6.8.1 Taxation 
Al though the prime object of taxation is to raise revenue for the 
state, it can be used in a discriminatory way either to encourage activities 
of which the state approves or to discourage those about which it is less 
enthusiastic. 
Tax measures which encourage insurance by means of tax inducements 
are welcome. The Income Tax Mana.gement Act of 1961 offers tax relief on 
life insurance premiums to policyholders. This relief is at present in 
respect of premiums not exceeding N2,OOO for most t,ypes of life policy. 
The ground for the relief is the desire to encourage personal thri!t and 
provision for dependants. 
under the Companies Income Tax Act of 1979, the tax payable by 
insurance companies is computed by applying the standard rate of company 
tax to the investment income minus allowable expenses in that year. This 
mean3 that the tax payable on the life business of an int:uran~e company 
is being computed on the same basis as an ordinary' trading company, 
without due regard to the fact that the premium payable on a given life 
policy is normally fixed b.1 the actu~r,y throughout the term ot the policy. 
Moreover. the standard rate of tax has been varied from time· to t1lle,. 
Since the premiums ptqab1e to the companies on a life policy are fixed 
for the life of the contract, the actuBr1' s coaputation of the premium 
rates assumed the continuation of tax rates for a long period. The 
companies have had to protest unsuccessfully that the current tax policy 
on insurance income inhibits the development of life insurgnce business. 
A more equitable basis is to tax them on the basis of shareholders' profits. 
A substantial proportion of the life business of manr companies 
consists of pension basiness ~d this is taxed in the ~e manner as the 
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ordinary life business, but generally the uninsured pension schemes 
are free from tax. This means that the insured pension schemes are 
severely discriminated against vis-a-vis the privately administered 
ones (ogunshola, 19ti4). Thus the small employer bears the brunt of 
the taxation on insured pension sChemes. 
ti.6.8.2 Exchange Control 
The state has power to impose control on the movement of currency 
nows across the national frontiers. The Exchange Control Act of 1962 
as well as the various regulations and amendments made thereon subjects 
all foreign payments to the control of t."le Minister of Finance. Under 
the Act, prior permission of the Minister is required for all payments 
invol ving the use of foreign exchanee (P;':':Johl, 1965) • 
The control of foreign exchanee has serious implications for the 
inS1lriUlCe industry. The ceding companies are usually unabl~ to 
promptly settle their reinsurance premium liabilities in view of the 
perennial difficulties56 in obtaining foreign exChange approval. 
The delay may be due to actual prohibition b7 the authorities or as a 
result of bureaucratic delar or difficulties im complying with stringent 
regulations requiring documentation or even b7 just the unwillingness 
of officials to take action. Delays may also be due to a misunderstanding 
of the purpose and functions of reinsurance espeoially in view of it. 
intangible nature. For these reasons ceding companies find it 
difficult to settle their reinsurance accounts.57 
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For their part, the Qverseas reinsurers tend to react ~ 
imposing stringe~t reinsurance terms and conditions, such as 
increased cost of purchase, loaded commission terms, high interest 
on reserves, reluctance to settle claims and meet cash loss 
requirements and the imposition of premium payment warranties 
(Irukw, 1984). 
These restrictions also affect the operations of the 
national reinsurance corporation in view of their deleterious 
effect on effective competition in the international reinsurance 
community. Exchange control problems have proved the greatest 
stumbling block for Africa Re Which incurred a loss of w3.5 million 
for this reason only.5~ 1he aviation market in Nigeria has 
reacted to the situation by the fo~tion of the Nigerian Aviation 
pool by 11 insurance companies in January 19t54, with the aim of 
conserving foreign exchange by keeping all premiums on aviation 
insurance within the country without resorting to foreign reinsurance. 
This device led to foreign exchange saving to the tune of W750,ooO 
in 1984.59 
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CHAPrER 9 
IMPLBPInTATlON OF REGULATORY COB'l'ltOL 
9.1 Introductiaa 
SUccessive ~ederal Govermaenta have adopted a ll1llber ot 
legislative measures to colltro1 the operat1QD ot the 1Dsurance 
blaiRess. These measures have been examined ill eletaU ia 
chapten 7 anel 8. In this chapter, on the other hand, the 
admip1Btra. ti ve back-up _&Bures as well as the prob1ellll ot 
tlleir impl_entatioa are examined. 
9.2 Early period, Up to 196$ 
A1 thoup \he !asurance CoIIIpaniea Act ·vas passed in 1961. 
its provisions were Dot enforced until 1967 (sectiOll 9.3.2) 
because go'ft1'Dlll.ent could DOt acquire otticials with the 
expertise and knowledp ot insurance o~rations. lienee, the 
practical problems ot establishing an entorceMJlt machinerJ 
coulel Dot be r8sol,..d, ad the control ot the aotivities ot the 
insurance cc:apaa1e. vas turther c1elqecl. The 1JlteDt1cm ot the 
IOwraellt to co-orcU,.te aDd enforce the 1961 Aet &lid It. 1964 
nppl._t theretore ... to IlO1I8ht. It· aooa 'be .... elear that 
theft lIacl be .. a arked mereaee ill the ... bar of Saaura .. 
eoapaa1e.' but .. IOwa-at had. 110 _au ad .. the law ot 
eoatro111ac ..... 
9.3 ... AI! of lar1 .e1Ohel, 
,966 to 1970 
fte 1aa'billt7 to eatoroe the provl.1cu ot tbe Ianralloe 
Coapa.n1.. Ae" ot 1961 ad. the IDaurance (Mi ... U_ou. Prav1.1ODS) 
I 
1 
i 
1 
.let of 1964 (ehapter S.4.1) persuaded IOftrD8Jd to lUke a request to 
tke United KatioDS !eo8D1cal .lssistance !card tor aa expert to 
ad.rtake a compreheDlli'ft atucq of the Bipriaa 1aIIurane. aa.rket 
(cbapter 1.3.2). Ia 1966 goT8rnaent apprcmtd the appoiataeAt of 
Dr. ~arl Rai .. l, a Uait.d lIations upert ill !Muranoe, u the 
JK.ral Go-.enaent .ldTia.r oa wuraAce _tt.r. (lleiebel, 
1966-71). •• aniftd 1a lIipria CD 22 Oetober 1966, aD4 
.-plated ~. aa.ilP""'ut. ~ the end of 1970. .e so l11Dcle-
haDdedl7 dOlibaatecl til. iuur ... Raa 4viac Ida temare that 
it ... proper17 to ealled the ase of ~arl _eiOhel • 
• 111 u.1paeut. an eDllmed under tour headiDps the 
•• tab11shmen t ot the propolled na t10nal inauraDC. c~P&nJ to be 
OwnK 'b1 the laderal GoYernmentl the %'8via1011 ot the exiat1DC 
inauranC8 eODtrol leg1s1atico; the .. ttiDg up ot aD Inlluranoe 
D1Ti.ion in the hd.eral K1n1.trr of Trade tor the mlon.ent 
ot the Dlaurance ,.t cd • IIOUDtiDg ot & bul0 thi"'"' ot 
utuarial statt; 8Ild n.rloua other _ttar. 1D the t .. 14 ot 
9.3.1 -a_ P=poaecl ,atlO1U1l 
P1!urance CcI!p!& 
()Jl tla. e.tabllahaent ot & DAtiaaal iDauanoe Ooapa!JJ, 
Dr. 1.1 ... 1 bad, ... & worJd", 'baae, a zmaber of "pori. alread7 
publiallecl CD the 1u1mmo. busine.. 111 lipr1&. !la. tirat .. 
the lao teulbUl\7 .tu", ot 1962 (Ielohel, 1966-71). '!h. 
latlOD&l. ken.t!" Co •• ll had. adopted. •• npori 111 1964 
with tile aocl1fleatico that the natlOD&l oo.paq ahoald l1a1t 
ita •• ope to reiDnran .. , ariDe 1nauran .. and. other olaa ••• or 
buam. •• Dot undertaken bT the existing tvo repoD&l. IOftmaent 
owned 1Dauranc. eo.pani •• , 1 p%8l11DD&b17 in orclft to proteot the. 
£rca eoapeti tiOD. In 1I0 .... ber 196" 'baaed on ad.Yice bJ looal 
expert. in the iDsurano. -.rket that it Mould. DOt be po.aibl. 
to ocabin. &11 the aetiTitie. proposed in ODe o~, it "... 
&pHd at a .eeting 111 the 1UD1atrr or !nde tbat the reo~en­
datioa adopted bT tile Batioual Executi ... -CODeU .1lCRllcl be 
.oditied to t .. ilitate tbe t.aediate eat&bli8~Dt of & aatiaaal 
re1D8u:ranc. cQapBDJ' and aub .. quent17. the e.ta.bl1abMnt of & 
_tional ariDe 1Dauranoe 00JlP8l17. 
Koweftr, a re-euaiDatiOll of the i •• ue and & olos.r .'t1I:l1 
baaed. aD teuibUi V reports 'b7 toreip nww:er. rnealecl 
1:U.t it would be UDecOD01I1.cal to .stablish two D& tio_l iDsurance 
coapani.. iDa teacl of ODe which could part ic ipa te Foli tab17 in 
all branches of clire.t 1naurance and 1n reiDsurance buin... .. 
wll. !hereton, the M1D1str, ot !ra4. reeo_add the •• tabl18h-
_nt ot the lipr1M WatiODal :tnauran •• CoapanJ (le1ohel, 
',"-71) wlU.ela ... to a1ata,in & reiDsU'ranoe cl.pa.r_nt to vh1c1l 
all s-van_ .oapanie. oparatiag 1n •• enat%'J V01I14 'be 
oOlipelled to re1uuft & oe~ portioll ot tlutir .. iDe.";" It . 
"u tanlaer pzopo ...... t .. authori .. , -.pi tal _0111' ,. 
81 a1ll1on vi tll $0 parent paicl up anel 'the "!prial1 11& tlaaal 
DlBuranoe ~" woulel be in partnenbip vitll & ..-crt1_ 
or r.putable reinsuranc. oaapa.n1ea (I.lohel, 1~71). 
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DiffoftDt possible vqa of se1iUDg up ibia IOftrDEDtal iDst1ta-
tion were COD8idon4 1D 19&6. A. major problem vu vhet1aer or not 
the '.O]IOs.d cOllpBllJ' 111 which the J'ederal Goft~nt vaa to hole! 
the a40ri V of shal:es, should absorb the UDinraal lAsarmce 
CC8P8Zl7 and. the Great Bipria IDsu.rauo COIIp8DJ (lleichel, 
1966-71), two lCWerDMnt lDauranoe cOllpazdes owned. bJ' th • 
... tem and. Western GoTermaenta r&speoti .... 17. 
III JUJ' 1966, tho M1n1str7 of TraU ~epare4 & xeaorazul- to 
the beautift COUIlell np1'd1Dg the eatablialm."t of the nat10Dal 
COIIPSIlJ' anel & correspoDding working pa.pe~ tor an iDtem1Diaterial 
.. oting on this projo.t proposed to be held aD 29 Jul.J 1966. 
II tho. the CoUlloll X_orandma vaa cl.and. bJ' the M1D1atrr of 
Justioe, the intermiDiaterial meeting had to be postpone' oviDS 
to the po11 tical 'evelopaent. which overt.. ~"k the country. In 
ootobor 1966, 111 v1e" of the oOll8tituticaal. talk. wh1ch vore 
lOins on 111 '\he oount17, it vaa f0un4 nooosa&r1 to IIWIpoD4 further 
aotica _ this iDauranc. projeet until the situti. bocame 
cl .... r. 
Tho •• cozul &rOIl, of allOns available to 1):1:. le1.01 oelle.mad. 
tho ftrio. tribaDala ot ellQ.uirJ vh1ch ... be_ .0" lip bJlOftDment. 
'!\le.e b1buDal.. -.to &pp&lliDg reftlationa abo1lt tile OODduot ot 
scae 1Ilauranco broken and inaurance oollp&Dloa "Ii ..... v1. th.~ 
111 n.peot of the wuranoo ot the la"te~ (oht.pten ,.4.2 and. 
7.7.2.2). 
It vas allesed. tba t .,.. insured were otten 1ntla ted. b1 the 
brokers 111 order that hap prelli:ams could be cbarpcl to .nhance 
the brokers' commission income. Worse still, tlle brokers 
colleoted P1'ell1uu f'rca these government orpn1saticma and did 
not pass the aoneJ to the insurance . ccapanies up to & period. of 
two 78&:r:s inspi te ot repeated. rem1Dders b7 the 1Aaurance COIIlpalliea. 
It vas allepd. that SOM riw m respeet ot vhia1l pnai .. P4 
been colleoted ware never insured. Scae top official. of 
qua.i-ao.,.eruaent or8Nl1Bationsvere appointed Direotor. of 
insurance cOlllp8lli •• that iDaul:ed their organieatian. (A4ewale, 
1979). '!he logical conclusion ane caD Jl8ke i8 that such &11 anomalous 
81 tua. tion bred corruption and fraud which so.. or the reports of 
the tribUD&l8 vent to oontim. 
Notable out of these commissions of enqu!r.J was Justice 
Acletaraain Trib1mal of 1966 which invest1 ... ted. the atfaira of the 
11prian lai1_7 Corporation. The cosaia.1cm which vae 8et up QIl 
2 J1me 1966, IUba1tW ita report on 1$ :o.o_'ber 1966. '!be 
SOft:maent Wb1t. Paper OIl the report ,.. pub1iabecl in 1968. 
Aparl froa .. oept1q all the ft""'"MDcl&t1ona of the tr1baD&1 
re~t1ns to insurance, the IOwl.'DIl8nt vat fv.rt,1aer '\0 aq that, 
tlae iDauraDCe of the properties of the 
oor,pozaticma is henoetort)a to be \1Dder-
taken bJ' tb.e state cnae4 ~e 
ec:apa:tQ' to be •• tabliahed. in aooordallce 
with pararnph 23 of the Wbite Paper 
OIl St&tuto17 Corporatiou 1114 state 
0WDe4 Coap&n1e, (Adavale. 1979). 
In December 1961, an unexpected deftlopaent took place. 
D eapl07ee of the ~0JB.l ExchaDge AaBUrmoe iD the DaIle of Elijah 
Abiodun Oke (section 9.1) wrote a letter to the ~ederal Commissioner 
for 11Dance, Chief Obafell1 Awo1owo, oallinc for the f01"Jl&ticm of 
a national re1Daur8lloe oorporation. The tall terl of this letter is 
detailed in Appendiz 11. 
Daring an inteniev with Oke, the latter conf1med that 
further Terbal discuaaion were held with hia b.r officiala ot 
the ~ederal. Miniatrr of 1P1Dance who aa8lU:eCl hia that goTe~nt 
vould take aotioa in no diatant date. llthoush Oke stated that 
he had other 11I1derl7ing reaaans for hi. action, the .e.orandu 
carried a pure17 eoonoaio tone (.ldawale, 1979). 
Earlier, the Federal Gon1"Dlllent had. aet up OIl 22 April 
1966, a Pane12 of hisn ranking oivil .ervanta to iDTestigate the 
procedure for awarding contracts, etc. It 1ho1&l4 be observed 
that iDauranoe Wal not one of the subjects tor investigation. 
Newr'the18sa in 1968, nen the government publiabed the 
White Pape~ 011 the report of the CClllllittee it was oba.ned 
llJODl otber tb1np that • 
.u tboqb DOt dealt vi th b7 the 
vork1Dg Pa.rtJ, the gcmtrDII.,'t 
18 not satisfied vi th tA. vq 
ill which propertiea belQDC1Dc 
to oorpora. tiona and atate 
O'WDH cOll.p8ll.1e. are at pna.t 
iIlau.red and it baa, therefore 
dec1cled that 1mDeclia te .tepl 
should be taken to t01'll & 
state oaK 1J1aurance coap&lQ' 
vhicll ahould be reap0ll81ble 
tor 1naur1D8 properties 
belcmg1ng to ,,11 atatutoZ'J 
corporationa.4 
This White Paper was the JDOst llIlportant reaaoD that 
pereuad.ed the IOTerlD8nt to establish a Daticmal iDsurance CODlP&n1'. 
Such vas the state ot aftairs wheD Dr. Reichel arrived in 
Nigeria. Ie taa1.liariaed himselt with these reports, but could 
DOt do _ca ow1Ds to the political 1!paase .in 1966-67. However, 
in .lupst 1967, he reappraised the project and. sought tor its 
inclusion in the Second lIational. DeTelop_Dt plan. :BUt this 
was DOt possible .in the light of the prevailing oircumstances 
in the OOUll"trJ and it bad to vai t to be included in the Third 
lIational Development plan. 
Early in 1968, the project was ginD Dew impetus and there 
vas a ne.d to accelerate its implementation. '!bis was due first, 
to the White Paper t published in Febru&r)', .in which the government 
set out its polic7 towards statutory corporations and state owned 
coap8Zlies and which indioated goverzaent decision to .. t up ita 
own 1Daurance cCIIpID,.. Second, the CiTU war, ragiD8 in the 
countl'J. like all ware, had caused a scarcit7 ot toreign 
ezcbanp, and this neoes.i ta ted a sont1n7 of the aaoUllts which 
vere beiDa traDaterred abroad 111 re.peot ot .inl!lU1'll1oe bua1Des. 
reiuurecl outside the coun1ir1. Th1l:d, Dr. Reichel vu able to 
add.uce the beneficial etfect ot the proje." to the oOuntrJ'1 
'!'he pariici:patiOll or the 8O'ft1'lD8llt .in the iDauranoe 
busine •• which had. been proposed in 1967 111 the Second lational 
J)e'ftl~t Plan. would contribute IlUbltaDtiall,. towaril the 
dnelopaent ct a national iDsuranoe -rat .aDd the proposed 
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insuranc. c ••• iem. would create a local reiDaurance market. 
J'urthermore, thi. participation 'b7 the IO'ftrDment would provide 
reliable .tatistic. relating to all branches ot the non-lite 
insurance bu.ine.. which would serYe as a ba.i. for valuable 
ad:visorr senic. and would provide an 1Da1sht into the activities 
ot the looal in.uranc. -.rket, iDt01"lll&ticm which the SO"rament 
at the t1ae did not po...... Aa confidence in thi. ne" national 
COIlpaD7 increa •• d, Nigeria'. export produce V01Il.d b. 1Daured by 
it. Thi. w01lld iD tum malte it po •• ibl. tor the oountr7'. 
expori produce to be sold on c.i.t. teme. The propo •• d toreign 
partioipaticm in the aha.re capital ot the cODIpa.D7 would provide 
manaBarial and technical assistanc. which b7 all .em. would be 
requir.d for the op.ration ot the cOllp8ny during the initial 
period &Ad w01l1d help to train ind1pnoua .tatt (Reichel, 
1966-71). 
S .. k1nc 8.11 approach which woald pre.ent the lea.t tecbD1cal 
and ad.iDiatratift d1tticulti.a at the out •• t, Dr. leich.l put 
torward. propoaal. CD the varioQII pha.e. 'b1 wbica the proposed 
OOIlpaD7 wo.:Ld be at Q. He vaa ot _. op1D1oD that ooapel11:Dl 
all mnraAOe ooapmi .. operat1Dc 1IL Bipri& to .. de 10 per.ent 
ot their riata would oCD.titute t» IIOat suitable •• tbocl of 
noat1llc the Oca,paDJ'. .e f.~t tba t the w=anoe ot goftrDment 
properiJ oould be taokle4 in the .eoClld. pbaae ot operatica attez 
tile OozporaUOD would. haft po •••••• a teellD10al aDCl adaiD1.tza-
tift u.ob1Der;r U wll as .cae experteDOe ot reiDnrallce. !he 
thUd phaae voud pa7 special a ttenticm to JlariDe insuranoe, in 
partlcular the 1naurance of the Rige1'iaD Marketing !carel. .lfter 
this, the corporation would enter into tbe tield of lite insurarlce. 
In Tiev ot the oaapulsor,y cessi0D8, be sugpsted. that the corpora-
ti= should be tul17 goftrDIDeDt owned and. ahould be established 
b;r Decree (lleichel, 1966-71). 
Dr. ~eichel' s proposals were accepted aD 29 JanVllU:1 1969 
(Ieichel, 1966-71), and he proceeded witll •• tablishiq the Rational 
Innr ... Corporaticm ot 5ige1'ia (BlooB) whioA, hovner, had to 
cO_Dce buiDe •• em the seoond. phase, that i., that ot insuring the 
properi7 of the .tatu't0r7 oorporations and. .tate owned oCllpan1e •• 
Dr. Reiobe1 assisted iD drafting the Deoree establishing mCON and. 
the article. of a •• ociaticm by which it was incorporated. UDder the 
Companies Act ot 1968. Ie worked vi th the oftioials ot the Ministry 
ot Trade to reoruit .tatt for the Dev corporation, &Del to .ecure 
ottice aoca.odatiem. "e al.o macle tile iDitial ocmw.ot tor techD10al 
usistance vitia the Jlmloh Reinsurance &D4 the Svis. leiD.urance 
Coapanie., two ot ~e _jor RICOI reiD.uranoe parlIlera. OIl 1 J'lll7 
1969, the latiOD&l InllUX'aDCe Corpon.tiOD ot lipria _e into lepl 
exi.tenoe • 
• the t_ ~. leichel cc.pleted IU. lipl'i&u a •• l.-.nt 
OIl 31 Deoeabel' 1970, tb8 JederaJ. Goftrzaent po ..... ed ita 
own iDsurance GrPDiaatiOll, the latlcmal. lJI8UrC" Corporation 
ot lipria, with oaueet1cu with the lntena.tioaal 1nauraDce 
GO..miV and aJ..read.1 aokDovledp4 a repatable inaUtatiOD in 
the leoal arket. '!IIroqh IICOI the WU1'&DCe ot the property 
of the .,WrmMDt ... vel1 ae the etatutOZ'1 oorporations baa 
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been arranpd for the benefit of the natiODal ecanollT. The important 
marine oarp cover .t lUgeria' a agr~cultural produce baa BiDes 
been arranged through thia Corporation. Apart fro. other benefi ta, 
goTermHnt haa attained further inaigJlt into the inaurance industrJ' 
111 the proce.. of the COIDp1Ua017 ce •• iODll or reiDeurance UDder 
the BICOR Aot. Finally the lesal ce .. i.na were applicable to 
pl18ral Maident 1M.iDeee, they haw cODulbuteel to the buileling 
up .t the looal n:1uuranoe srket (llelebel, 1966-71). 
9.3.2 !be leTieian of the lZi.ties 
InauraDCe Control LepalatieD 
A. neted abow, the Insurance CollpBD1ee Aot .. paa .. el br 
parliaaent in 1961. It eought tc %eplate the actlviti •• ot the 
wurance ceapanle. through the meeli ... ot regis'b:atlOD &Del br 
requiring that oertain cenell tlona were tultilled thereafter (chapter 
7.3). Supplellent1Dg Insurance Regulations on which the operation 
mel enfor .. ent ot tM. Aot elepeneled wre approwel bJ the C01IIlcll ot 
M1n18tera ill Maroh 1963. However, oviac to adlaiDt.trat1ft 
elUt1cul tie. 11111. the M1D1atZ'J ot Trade at!olpatecl t. encounter 
when atteaptiDr te entoroe the legi.lation, tile A.t ot 1961 and. 
it. lleplatl_ cUd net 0 .. !Ato operat1_. ])aw •• t ___ oe-
.ent bad .e. t1Dcl .... ral t1M., bGt 1t W &1-JII be. ,..tpened. 
'!'ben. 1D 1964. a aUa1.ia:wr leg1alat1_. _other l.t, the 
Iuuance (MJ..oell8Z1e01l8 Pnvia1eu) bt. Uafted 'bJ tile 
JUa1atr, .t " ..... , .. ~W lIT P&rliallent. It. eIliet 
pupoae .. t. relQl.ate the 1Dw .... ' .t 1Ua1'D •• taada 1a 
.rier t. pnftDt the JIl'B1- !noaa. ...erated 1a l1seria ~. 
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'beiDe 1I1ftsted b7 1uunnce c~es 111 toreip C01IDtries (chapter 
7.5). 
In ~1I&Ust 1964. the JUDistry or Jl1DaDce 1Ja a Meting discussed 
vi til tile lipr181l eonalll ta ti ve COIIIIIli t tee the : regula tiona Wlich 
were requirecl aD4 8hnld be draf'ted tor the illpl_ntatlOD ot the 
1964 ~ct. '!'be tint dq ot OctobeJ: 1964 vaa augpated .. a 
pos.ible date tar .. Gill IDC __ t or tJaia Aot. It vu &110 
conaidered that it coud be coordilJated. witk the lDaU1'aIlce 
OClipanles Act ot 1961 which vas to be _torced. 'bJ tAe Min1str7 ot 
Trade. '. In the _8Zlt •• the Consultatift Oc:.aaitt .. sulD1ttecl a 
detailed • .,rand._ CD the 1964 ~ot &Dd. a dratt or tJae Inlurance 
legulatloDa relattng tbereto. 
In loft.ber 1964. the Mini.trie. ot liDaDce and Trade 
agreed that the latter should take Oftr the responsibility for 
clrattins the Ileplationl tor the 1964 ~ot aDl, further, tha. t 
tbe M1niatrJ of Trade vaa to enf'oroe the two Act.. .owner, 
alreadJ ill J.usust 1964, the Mjnil'tr7 of Trade reoo,rlJ.ed. and 
in ,ebru.rJ 1965, poiDte4 out the practioal proble. which bad 
to be O"rco. rirat betore the two Joeu oCMld ccae into torce. 
It vu telt that lt V01Ild .ene no parpo.e, aacl _ the otlle 
bu4 it V01Ild d.o 110ft ham, to briDe the ~ot. iDto toroe 
without tint 8IlnriDg that the neoe •• &rf eatoroeMnt aach1Derr 
lIad. b.en properlJ e.tablished. let CDlJ wu the .eotion 1D 
the 00-1"01&1 La" ])ivilion, which " .. 1& oUr .. ot lnaunnoe 
at tile t1.ae, 1Dlderatatfe4, but pe~l vi1i1a .peeial teolm1cal 
Dovleclp an nqu1recl trm the taak ot adaiaiawr1q ancl 
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enforcing the Inaurance Aota. It waa theretore decided 'bf the 
pemaent Secret&r7 tbat a Dew section 1D the lI1n1atr;r ot Trade, 
the Insurance SectiOJl, vas to be created and the len-ice, ot an 
actu,q were to be lecured betore 8.D7 turther i\.ction could be . 
takeD. A. there vaa DOt one actuarJ ava1lable 111 Nigeria, the 
M1DiatrJ ot Trade' wu obliged to reque,t the UDitecl latianl 
TeChnical Assistance Board tor ",ist&aca (Ieiebel, 1966-71). 
After that, 1l0thiDg ot iaportance occnarred. In :rebruazo;r 
1965, the J111D1atl:7 ot T2:ade requested the M1D1ltrr ot JUstice to 
dratt regulationl tor the 1964 Aot wita the aiel or the piclel1De. 
lulllitted. In Deea.bar 196$, the M1natr7 ot JUt1ca, while 
Itll1 avaitiDg .further adequate dratt1Dg iDatractioDa prepa1'ed 
0Dl.7 a tentati.,. tir.t dratt OIl so_ ot the proYiliou n~1recl. 
Thil val the ltate ot attain vbea Dr. leiobel uriftcl. 
Atter tamil1ariaiDg b1uel.t with the b ...... inf'Oru.tiOD 
MntiODecl abow, _ oritical17 exa mjllH the pronl1 .. ot iRe 
two Iuurance Acts .. ".11 al their IOrreapondins 'Regulations-, 
Thereafter, be cl1SCUled vi tb the llepstrar hil tindinp which 
weft ol ... iti_ iato two cmupa. !he tint ccaceme4 tile 1961 
J.ct (oMpte» 7.3). It Jaad beeD prepared vith little reprd to the 
100&1 ooaditiou, ocmta1De4 datail. which were la:raelJ irrelevant, 
1." 1Ilportaat _ttera O1It, CODta1De4 proy1.1_ wi_ were 
Dot loaacl and workable 8I1d tid not allow .1ziet adMrence to 
the te1'Jl8 d.etinecl. S 
The .ecODcl val d.notecl to the 1964 J.ct (chapter 7.S). Jintl:r. the 
nb.1cl1&rJ 1eli.1at1. vu prepa.ncl vi. 11 ttl. ftpft to the 
1961 Act. .n det1D1tlou were also iDtrodu0e4. Sec0D417 , 
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there was duplication of 1nformat1aD called for under the two 
Acts. Thirdly, whilst there was provision for a "liegistrar" in 
the 1961 Act, there was an "Inspector" in the 1964 Act wi~ 
apparently different functions, a situation which resulted in 
a very complicated arrangement respecting the supervision ot 
insurance business. And fourthly t parts of sections of the 
1964 Act were not specific and were difficult to interpret, 
and therefore not enforceable (Reichel, 1966-71). 
Dr. Reichel was very clear in his mind about the nature 
of the problems and their solutions. He believed that the 
existing legislation needed a lot of modification and simplifica-
tion. In a country where insurance vas in its first stage of 
development and government as well as the insurance companies 
did not yet possess th~ qualified teChnical personnel, 
insurance legislation shaUd be comparativel,. simple regarding 
technical requirements t suited to local condi tiona and eaar to 
interpret. The sUblidiarJ insurance legislatian of 1964 
would not bave 'been needed at all if aection 28 of the Insurance 
Coapaniea Act ot 1961 had cQlltained provi81eu which correapond 
to the aotual. requ1reaenta of the govermaent in respect ot the 
inve ..... nt ot ineuraDC8 tlmd. in Nipr1a. A 11aple amendment 
to this etfect would ba~ been adequate. 
Dr. leichel realised that to auaeat in detail what modi-
tications of the two euting Act. should be made in order to 
bring the. in haracmr and lI&ke th_ enforceable would not 
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onl 7 be a ve-q difficult task but would produce a result that would 
remain awkward and inconvenient to use. He was therefore much 
pleased to learn frca the Registrar of the Commercial Law Division, 
who vas then in charge of insurance in the Ministry of Trade that 
he was of the opinion that the two Acts, which were not 7et in 
operation a.n;y wa7, should be revoked and replaced b7 a nev 
Insurance Aot whioh merged the major provisiona ot the 
repealed Aots (Reiohel, 1966-71). 
Thereupon, Dr. Reichel commenced work OIl drafting a revised 
Insurance Bill together with the Insurance ReS'lla tiona. The latter 
mainl7 presoribed the torm in which annual returns and actuarial 
reports were to be aulai tted by insurance companiea to the control 
authori'tt... BY the end of November 1967, he had completed work 
on the draft bill (appendix 1) which contained the objeotives of 
the two existing Acta of 1961 and 1964 and which took into account 
the requirements and prevaUing conditions in the coantr;y. WhUe 
the 1961 Aot was baaed on the principles of • £reedeD vi th publici V t , 
the draft bill eaphasiud the stricter 87atem of insurance oontrol 
(seotion 9.4) which 18 the practioe in trsA, Japan, IDdia and the 
COIl\inent ot Europe where it has proved tor a long time aD effeotive 
method. Dr. Reichel telt that such a 8)'8tea val acre appropriate 
for developing countrie. where inauranoe has to be pided to a 
certain eztent, often froID its 1n1'ano,., to a aOUDCi stap of developDent 
(Reichel, 1966-71). 
At the begiJm1Dg of December 1966, he vu able to hand over 
his draft to the Registrar in the COIIIDIero1al J,av Divi.ion ot the 
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Ministr,y of Trade as a working paper for comments and discussion. 
These discussions were ver,y fruitful and resulted in a number or 
changes in the draft bill in order to coordinate it with the 
existing commercial la~, in particular the Companies Act of 1937. 
Provisions of aiDor importance were discarded and replaced by more 
essential ones. Provisions concerning co-operative insurance 
carriers, licenSing of insurance intermediaries and the adminis-
tration or the bill were included. At the end of January 1967, 
the revised draft was completed (appendix 1). 
In order to give those who were unable to go into a detailed 
study of the bill to gain an insight into the considerations 
underlying it, Dr. Reichel prepared a Memorandum to the Ministry 
of Trade in Febru&r7 1967 (Reichel, 1966-71). At the beginning 
of March this memorandum formed the basis ot a new Memorandum of 
the Ministry of Trade concerning the re-enactment of the Insurance 
Acts of 1961 and 1964 to the Ministries of Justice, Finance, 
Industries, Labour and Economic Development and to the Federal 
Executive Council, whoae members were reQ.uested to acre- that'"the 
A ttorney-General be requested to draft a new insurance legi8lc.17j.on;~· 
Upon completion of the draft bill, Dr. Reichel' a attention 
was focused on drafting the complementary Regul.a.tion. A review 
of the eziatiDg regulations revealed the nece •• i V to clarit;y 
and lIodifJ them and bring them into hal'mODJ vi th the prinoiple. 
underlying the draft insurance bill. Consequently, the tint 
draft of the Insurance Regulation waa overhauled. Renceforth 
financial and income statementa were to be presented on a 
'groas' ba.is. In de.i8l11ng the standard forms for insurance 
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accounts and statements stress was laid on simplicity and essentials. 
In April 1967. the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of 
Trade deemed it advisable to submit the draft bill and the 
supporting Regulations to representatives of the insurance industry 
to ascertain their views. Subsequent~, copies of the draft bill 
were sent to the Niserian Insurance Consultative Comittee, which 
represented 46 of the 92 insurance companies registered under the 
Companies Act of 1937. and also the Nigerian Corporation of 
Insurance Brokers. Memoranda . wc~e au'!:lmi tted by the two associa-
tions, and these were discussed with tbeir representatives in- -
three meetings held with the Ministry ot Trade during the months 
of April and May. The two associations both welcomed the bill 
since its objectives verQ to safeguard the interests of the insuring 
public as well as the insurance companies themselves. 
Meanwhile, on 4 M&1 1967, the Insurance Companies Act or 1961 
and the Insurance (Miscellaneous ProvisioDs) Act ot 1964 were brought 
into operatian bY' the Pederal Executive Council (lleiche1, 1966-71). 
This waa published in 811 Extraord1na.r7 Gasette and in all 1e&dJng 
newspapers 1D the countr;y. However, the intention persisted that 
the revised legislaticma would be brouaht into ettect as quictl.7 
as possible. 
on 6 Ma,. 1967. the DePUty Pe1'Dl&l1ent Secretal7, the llegistrar 
ot the Co.erei&! Law Division and. Dr. Iteichel, allot the Ministr7 
ot Trade held a .eeting with the AttorD81-General and the 
Solicitor-General at the Min1atr;y ot JWltice. The Deputy pemanent 
Secretar)' empbaaized that the M1n1atZ'7 or Trade had, dur1Dc 
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the previous five months, prepared a revised insurance legislation 
which was considered to have greater clarity and to be more compre-
hensive than the existing two Acts. He handed over to the Attorney--
General the draft insurance bill, the regulations relating to it, 
and copies of the Memoranda referred to above. The A ttorney-General 
tendered his appreciation of the work done and gave hil views on 
how to proceed. 
In May 1967, several meetings were held with various bodies-
the manager of the foreign legislation division of Lloyd's of 
London, representatives of the Ministries of Economic Development, 
Industries, Justice, Labour and Finance and _mbars of the 
Nigerian Insurance Consul ta ti ve Committee. After the lengthy 
consul ta tiona, the draft bill was again reviewed, resulting in 
al terations which were comp:'.led by the Ministry of Trade. BY the 
end of Mar, the revision was completed and the draft brought to 
its final form and titled "Insurance Supervision Decree 1967" 
(Reichel, 1966-71). 
In June 1967, Dr. Reichel commenced work on the regulations 
supplementing the proposed legislation. Here, too, the views ot 
interested bodies were sought and embodied in the tinal draft. 
!y the end of JUne this task was completed. The drafts of the 
proposed law and its regulations were handed over, in their 
fiDal forms, to the M1n1atr,y ot Justice for legal drafting. 
A t the beginning ot September 1967, the Federal Coai •• ioner 
for Trade submitted a memorandum to the 'ederal Executive Council 
seeking approval for legal dratting of a new 1naurance legisla-
tion on the basis of his Ministry's proposals. on 10 October 
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the EXecutive Council, however, deferred consideration of the memo-
randum to enable the Commissioners for Trade, Finance and Justice to 
examine the implications. 
On H December 1967. the Ministry of Trade held a second 
inter-ministerial meeting of the same Ministries, which met in June, 
to find out to what extent the draf't provisions had. conformed with 
the various amendments of the Ministries. Dr. Reichel made 30 
points upon which the existing legislation had been improved and showed 
how the proposals of the Ministries had been incorporated in the 
draft. Convinced that the draft legislation would serve the interest 
of Nigeria, the meeting agreed that the matter be referred to 
the Commissioners for Trade, Finance and Justice, who should meet to 
agree and advise the Federal Executive Council to approve the 
proposals. 
In March 196H, the Ministry' of Justice, confirmed its agreement 
with the Minist1"1 of Trade for the re-enactment of the Insu:ance 
Acts and discontinued work on the resulations to be made under the 
two existing Acta. Q.ui te unexpectedly'. the dratt Companies Decree 
which vas being oOl18idered br the Ministry of Finanoe created 
further complications. The latter Ministl'1 came out with the view 
that foreign insurance companies should not be permitted any longer 
to operate through branches or agents, but might transact busineas 
through subsidiaries. The proposed draft, on the other hand, 
admitted foreign inaurance companies, provided they lodged 
deposita and were registered to transact busineaa. In a memorandum 
which .Dr. Reichel waa requested to writ. OIl this subjeot, he 
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indicated that as a matter of fact, the objectives of both Ministries 
in this regard were identical and that disagreement lay only in the 
method of approach (Reichel, 1966-71). However, since the Ministry 
of Finance extended its views to the entire industrial sector and 
required tha.t any company' transa.cting business in any field in 
Nigeria should be incorporated in the country, the problem, directly 
linked to the Companies Act of 1968 was destined to further delay 
the regulation of insurance business in Nigeria. 
Insurance Companies Regulation 
or 1968 
After the Federal Ministry of Trade completed all preliminary 
work on the draft insurance supervision bill, it was, as observed 
above, expected that the Federal Executive Council would approve 
the re-enactment of the Insurance Acts or 1961 and. 1964 in 1968. 
!nstead,6 on 10 octocer 1968, Regulations7 supplem0u~a=y to the 
Insurance Companies Act or 1961 were published in the Gazette. 
After the Insurance Companies Act of 1961 was brought into 
operation on 4 May 1967, efforts were intensified to enforce the 
control law. The M1n1str,' of Justice was of the view that the 
Regulations approved in 1963 clarified certain provisions of the 
Act. The Minis try of 'trade was anxious tha. t something s."'1ould be 
done at least with reg.ard to the registration of insurance 
companies as insurers and realised that the regulations made under 
the 1961 Act could be used for t~e time being. Furthermore, the 
forma prescribed to be used in 'the . ,proposed legislation had been 
agreed b.1 both Ministries as useable for the purpose of the 
existing legislation 10 that they could be cont1nDed under the 
proposed legislation. It is therefore clear that the 196) 
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Regulations were merel7 poliShed up for the purpose of the 
Insurance Companies Regulations of 1968. 
As a matter of fact, it is of great significance that the 
1968 Regulations indicated alread7 the poliC7 which the control 
authority is going to pursue~e17 that mere registration of 
insurance companies will not meet the requirements of the 
public interests unless registration is followed ,:..up by a pro!),;;~ 
supervision of the companies. 
In view of the on-going amendments to the British insurance 
legisla.tion and the Financia.l Times Survey o~ Insurance8 which,.'·, 
was published in November 1968 the Ministry ot Trade concluded 
with satisfaction that it was on the right course regarding its 
policy on insurance matters, particularly its objecti7es tor 
the formation ot NICON. 
After the Insuranoe Companies Regulations came into torce, 
the supervision of the insurance business in Nigeria commenced 
wi th the registration of insuranoe companies as insurers. To 
cope with the work involved, the Insuranoe Section was raised 
to a Divisiaa. in the Ministry of Trade and the Registrar of 
Commercial Legislation was appointed by the Pederal pUblio 
Service Commission to be the Registrar of Insurance. 
The need for proper enforcement of' the insurance legisla.-
tion was felt iBlediately when during the first two months of 
activating the control legisla.tion hard17 any insurance company 
came forward to submit docu:nents for registration. It 
therefore, became necessary to remind the 27 campanies 
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incorporated in Nigeria and t!1e 59 foreign companies operating in 
the country through branch offices or agencies to comply with the 
requirements of the Insurance Companies Act of 1961 (Reichel, 
1966-71). 
9.).2.2 Local Incorporation of Foreign 
Enterprises 
Insurers operat~ in Nigeria had to be incorporated or 
registered as companies under the Companies Act of 1922. The 
revision of this Act commenced in 1964 and was completed in 1967. 
Meetings were held in the Ministry' of Trade with various 
interested bodies and institutions in order to ascertain their 
views on the draft. Dr. Reichel took part in these meetings 
where he was concerned with the proposed provi3ions of the 
Companies Act relating to insura.n-.::e business. Suddenl1 the 
Decree9 was promulgated late in 1968. 
The provisions of part X of the Companies Act of 1968 
were as brief as theY' were revolutionary. Their major effect 
was to sever the business operations of foreign enterprises in 
. 
Nigeria from their parent companies and to constitute them as 
separate independent entities of their own. 'l'm1s, as from 18 
November 1968, when this part of the Act came into force 10 
every foreign CCJll~ which, before the c01llllleDcement of the Act, 
was incorporated outside Nigeria and, having an established 
place ot businesa in Nigeria,11 was autcaaticallY' "deemed to 
have become incorporated under this Decree aa a separate 
entity from the compa.tl1' incorporated outside Nigeria in whose 
. 11-
name a place of business in Nigeria was established." 
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The problem immediately arose as t, what exemptions were due 
to insurance companies in vi-ew of the specified legisla.tion to 
which insurance business is subject. The Insur::mce Companies Act 
of 1961 had distingui"shed between "external" and "local" insurers, 
whereas under t."'le Companies Act of 1968, foreign companies were 
not permitted to carry on business in Nigeria through branch 
offices and agencies. 
· "Part X of the Companies Act ot 1968 cleared the last 
outstandins objection of the Ministry ot Finance to the proposed 
insurance supervision bill, WhiCh objection :waB conveyed to the 
Ministry ot Trade on 24 June 1968.. Dr. Iteichel was, therefore 
optimistic tha~ the proposed draft of the comprehensive insurance 
legislation would be submitted to the Federal Executive Council 
later in 1969 after the major problems caused by the on-going 
legislative measures in the field of insurance had been settled. 
He was also very optimistic that the coming into rorce or the 
Insura.n,ze Companies ltegulations ot 1968 and the Companies Act or 
the same year as well as the proposed establishment or BlCON 
early in 1969 would, apart rrom the advanta.ses and benefits to 
the national econOllJ, bring about substantial chanps in the 
structure of the insurance market in Nigeria. Numerous foreign 
companies now "deemed" incorporated in Nigeria, which were 
transacting li ttl. business would wind up. Indipnous companies 
which did not .. et the :requirements ot the control law would be 
compelled to cease operations. on the other hand, a number ot 
new, technically better qualified and rtnancially better equipped 
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insuranoe oompanies would emerge (Reichel, 1966-11). 
9.3.3 Enforcement Machinery 
A.1 though the Insura."l-"e Companies Aot was passed in 1961 and 
the supporting !egulations approved b,y the Federal Exeoutive 
COUDcll in 1963, the government had no machinery to direct 
insuranoe business on a sound footing (chapter 1.1.12). This is because 
the «OV8rmDent was tot all,. ignorant of the operations of insuranoe, 
was not aware of its malpractices (section 9.3.1), had no means to 
sateguard the interests or the public and therefore could not 
suooessful1y control the business (sections 9.6 and 9.8). This weakness 
led to uncontrolled increase in the number or insurers operating 
on the market (chapter 5.4.1). Although the Act provided tor the 
"Controller or Insurgnoe" to administer the legislation, nothing 
was achieved in this regard. 
Dr. Keichel felt that the establishment ot a new Division 
in the Ministry or Trade would be more appropriate rather than 
the creation or a new lection under the ~ivision of Commercial 
Law. Be l18d.e it clear tba tit was not necessat'1 to de lay the 
entorcement of the Insurance A.ct until the government posse.sed 
persannel qualified in actuarial work. This is because the 
setting up of an efficient administrative u.ohiner'7 takes & 
long tae to accomplish and can hardl,. be achieved on a theore-
tical baais. He, tberet"ore, recCllllllended that the revised. 
insuranoe bUl be put into operaticm as soon &s po.sible, aDd. 
whUe in operation, 01"fioials would be introduced into their 
new duties bJ the actua.ry and would be a1Jmltaneous17 trained 
in the principle. or insurdllce atld actuarial science (Keichel, 
1960-71). 
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J!lor the above reasons, provision was made for personnel of the 
Insurance Section to be established in the Ministry of Trade and was 
includal in the Estimates for the 1961-ots t'1nancial year in December 
1966. However, in January' 190°" the Ministry ot' Establishment proposed 
that personnel t~om other divisions or the Ministr,y be depleted to 
statOr the Insurance Section, apparently' not realising that insurance 
supervision requires personnel with technical knowledge and slc11l. 
Upon request by the Deputy pemanent Secretar,y in the 
M1nist~ of Trade, llr. 1teichel wrote a Memorandum, dated 7 Febru&r1 
1961, regarding the supervision of' insurance and the creation of the 
necessary enforcement machinery.. In the Memorandum he pointed out, 
among other things, the necessity to regulate and supervise the 
insurance business; and in order to do this there was need for an 
insurance legislation sui table for enforcement, a special administrative 
section and. personnel with sJ;lecial technical knowledge or insu.c:ance. 
In addition, the Memorandum gave a detailed description of the duties 
of' the Insurance Section and an estimate of the personnel needed to 
perform control functions in the com1 ng budget lear. ltegarding the 
proposed personnel of the Insurance Section, the following requirements 
were stated in & letter to the MiniBtr,J of Estab11aamentsl Registrar 
of Insurance, Actua:r:r, Aotuaries-in-traJnin" Executive Officer, 
Assistant Chief Clerk, clerks, stenog.ra.pher, tJpiats and messenger 
(lteicheI, 1966-71). 
A t the end of March 1967, the M1nist%'1 of' Establishments 
was wUlin, to create two posts of actuarial assistants in the 
Ministry of Trade, but on a salarr scale which the Ministry of 
Trade cpnsid,ered inappropriate. Owing to the publications of 
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the Institute of Actuaries, London, explaining the position and 
duties ot actuaries working in the government service in Great 
:Britain and a note prepared tor this purpose 'b7 the Government 
Actuar,y's Department in London, setting out the details of the 
pq scales, and owing also to the fact that the Insurance Acts 
of 1961 and 1964 were brought into operation on 4 MIq 1967, 
the endeavours of the Ministry of Trade were f!nally successful. 
At the end of May 1967, three posts of assistant actuaries-
in-training at the desired salaxy scale and the other posts 
requested fqr the Insurance Section, as mentioned above, with the 
exception of the executive officer, were created by the Ministry 
of Establishments. These three prospective actuaries worked 
under the guidance of Dr. Reichel in the Ministry of Trade and 
were given time off to attend training courses (Reichel, 1966-11). 
9.).).1 Training programmes 
The mos t dauntinS problem which Dr. lte ichel had to face 
was the training of actuaries. Without doubt, there is a case for 
the training of actuaries as there is presently only one actuary 
in the industry and such persons are needed in all countries b7 
government and. semi-sovermental institutions, insurance organisat1ons, 
pension funds, provident funds, social security schemes, bureau of 
statistics, etc. A complete lack of actuaries exists also in 
other African countries, therefore necessitating the training of 
African actuaries even 1f 1t 1s done on a reqional basis. 
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For the above reasons, nr. Reichel decided that the personnel 
of the Insurance Section would be introduced into their tasks. 
Therefore he proposed to conduct training courses for his starf in 
the principles of insurance, insurance legislation and supervision 
and insurance accounts. In addition, lectures were to be given in 
actuarial science combined with practical training to the three 
actuaries-in.training whom the Ministry intended to employ 
(leichel, 1966-11). 
At the beginning of March 1961, Dr. lleichel approached Dr. Farkas, 
Head of the Department of Ma. thema tics, Uni versi ty of Lagos, and 
learnt that stUdents of mathematics would graduate from the univer-
sity for the first time in June that year and that some of these 
and some of the graduates of mathematics of the University of 
Ibadan might be interested in specialising in actuarial science 
after graduation (lleichel, 1966-11). In April, he formulated his 
proposal regarding his planned training pro~~amme, resulting in 
a well reasoned letter dated 5 June 1967 (appendix 15). of the 
Permanent Secretar,r of the Ministry of Trade to the Vioe-chancellor 
of the Univerai ty of Lagos regarding a proposal to .stabliah a 
post-graduate course in actuarial science, COJIIII8Dcing in october at 
the Department of Mathe.tics or School of Administration (Iteichel, 
1966-11). 
In October 1961, the Vice-Chancellor of the university of 
Lagos confirmed to the permanent Secretar;y of the Ministry of 
Trade his agreement to the proposal to establish a two-rear 
postgraduate course in actuarial science after the Ministry 
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had offered to make available to the university the servioes of 
Dr. Reichel to supervise the course on a part-time basis (Re1chel, 
1966-71). In spite of " initial difficulties the course eventually 
started at the beginning of November 1968. Dr. Reichel, being 
the coordinator of the programme, lectured four hours a week and. 
conducted a seminar on insurance. His three assistants, being 
government officials, attended the lectures on a day release baais 
and were therefore able to attend to ,their official duties in 
the normal way. Owing to lack of scholarship, only the three 
assistant actuaries-in-training took part in the programme. In 
January 1969, the most promising of them quitted for overseas 
studies. In the May examinations, the remaining two candidates 
failed so badly that they were not allowed to continue the cou~se. 
The difficulties enunciated above did not da~nt the government. 
This is because the importance of tr~~ing actuaries for the benefit 
of the country was increasingly appreoiated by government officials 
as well as the authoriti~s of the university of Lagos. In order 
not to enc:>unter again the difficulties experienced at the end of 
1969 regarding financial sponsorship of admitted oandidates, the 
Ministry- of Trade took steps and reaohed an agreement with the 
Ministry- of 'inance in AprU". Aocording to the aareement siX 
fellowships in aotuarial science were to be awarded for the 
academic years 1969/70 and 1970/71. Together with the three 
new assistant actuaries-intraining who had to be recruited by 
the Ministr,r, the number of graduate students in actuarial Boienoe 
would go up. 
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In view of the preparations that should be made to make such 
a ~ourse a success, the universi~J of Lagos did not commence the 
course again until the academic year, 1970/71. In July it was 
advertised in the leading newspapers with the announcement that 
the Ministry of Trade would grant six actuarial fellowships for 
the period of two years (Reichel, 1966-11). With the recruitment 
by the Federal pUblic Service Commission of the three assistant 
actuaries-in-training for the vacant posts in the Ministry, it 
was envisaged that the course would get at least nine students. 
However, the main problem which was expected to confront the 
university at this time would again be the availability of 
qualified lecturers. 
9.3.3.2 Insurance Statistics 
The draft ins~ance bill provided under sections 3tl ~ld 39 
tha t the supervisory authori'~Y Should prepare an annual report 
including insurance statistios. The latter were to be compiled 
on the basis of the documents lodged under section 21 of the draft. 
For several years the Federal Otfice of Statistics in Lagos 
had requested through a .uestionnaire information under seotion 9, 
of the statistics Act, from insurance companies known to be in 
existence (46 companies in 1964) and compiled a Report on Insurance 
Companies Operations in Nigeria. Since an insurance control law 
was not in operation, these insurance statistics were the only 
source of information. 
In Januarr 1967. Dr. Reichel contacted the Federal Ottice 
ot Statistics in Lagos and was supplied with the insurance 
statistics for the years 1960, 1961 and 1962 (Reichel, 1966-71). 
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At the end of February the statistics office published the 
'insurance statistics for the years 1963 and 1964. Dr. Reichel 
examined them and hoped that with the enforcement of the new 
insurance control legislation it would be the task of the 
Insurance Section to compile such statistics. In March 1967., 
he therefore handed a copy of his observation to the Chief 
Statistician of the Federal Office of Statistics (Reicilel, 
1966-11). 
9.3.3.3 The UNCTAD ~uestionnaire 
In March 1961, the Ministry of Trade received from UNCTAD 
a questionnaire on insurance legislation, supervision and the 
nature of the market. The purpose or these questions was to 
gather information to support a study contemplated to cover the 
existing insurance systems and operations in developing coun~ries. 
Since the UNCl'AD questionnaire was received at a time when 
the improvement of the proposed insurance legislation vas well 
under way, special attention was given to it b7 the Ministr,-. 
Firstl7, the questions relating to licensing, examination of 
accounts, fiDancial guarantees, investment of funds, scope and 
organisation of supervision, etc, provided valuable hints as 
to the provisions which effective insurance legislatiam 
contains. Secondly, it induced the Ministr, to assemble trom 
other governmental de~ents relevant information on insurance 
as to foreisn exchange, tax regulations, statistics and other 
matters. Thirdly , it caused the MinisU7 to caDpile particulars 
as to the number, capital outlay and the place of incorporation 
of insurance caDpanies which were operating in Nigeria and which, 
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until 1967, were registered only as commercial enterprises under the 
Companies Act. Fourthly, it induced the Ministry for the first time 
to formally study the situation of ~~e insurance market in Nigeria 
(~eichel, 1966-71). 
The UNCTAD questionnaire indirectly contained valuable sugges-
tions from a completely independent organisation regarding the 
measures which might be taken by the government to strengthen the 
national market. It was particularly appreciated that some of 
these questions were in conformity with the plan of the government 
to establish a national insurance company. 
The Ministry of Trade was responsible for answering the 129 
questions on insurance and reinsura.~ee and was assisted in doing 
so by Dr. Reichel. The reply to the questionnaire was given on 
31 March 1967 (Reichel, 1966-71). In the reply it was assumed that 
the Insurance Act of 1961 and 1964 were at that time in operation. 
In view of the tact that the government was contemplating the 
replacement of these two Acts by a new insurance supervision 
decree, the replies which were probably not appropriate until 
the proposed bill was promulgated and enforced were specially 
indicated. 
9.3.3.4 Registration ot Insur~oe Companies 
Until Janua17 1969, the insurance companies, hitherto 
unperturbed, paid scant attention to the insurance legisla.tion. 
The companies had to be reminded by the Insurance Section of the 
necessity to have, henceforth, permission to carry on business. 
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out of the 27 insuranoe oompanies incorporated in Nigeria before 
the Insuranoe Companies Act oame into force, only 12 had submitted 
applioations for registration as an insurer by the end of March 
1969. Besides the documents and statements which had to accompany 
the application were often incomplete. The 57 companies incorporated 
outside Nigeria which had established a branch office or an agency 
in Nigeria for the purpose of transacting business had to be dealt 
with differently and presented other problems. As reported earlier, 
on 18 November 1968, these companies were deemed incorporated in 
Nigeria under under Part X of the Companies Act of 1968. Wi thin 
the prescribed period of three months, out of 57 companies 16 gave 
notice of their intention to continue transacting insurance business 
in Nigeria by forming a subsidiary company, 24 companies indicated 
the intention to wind up and 17 gave-no reply at all (Reic~el, 1966-71). 
In this connection, various problems arose not only from 
the administrative and legal point of view but also tram technical 
aspects, among others, the determination of the existing liabili-
ties, the valuation or assets, the winding up of life insurance 
business, the transfer of the existing buainess to other 
caapa.nies. Therefore, during the months of February and March 
applications with documents, statements of account and solvency, 
policy exhibits, policy forms and conditions were sullllitted to 
the Registrar of Insurance who was at the time concurrently 
the Registrar of Companies. These documents gave the 
M1nistr:r the first valuable insight into insurance operations 
in Nigeria, revealed facts and practioes hitherto unknown and 
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provided the basis for reliable insurance statistics. NUmerous 
inadequacies were discovered, among others such as inadequate 
capital and surrender values under life policies. 
During the second quarter of 1968, the registration exercise 
continued. Up till the end of June, 30 companies had submitted 
to the Registrar of Insurance applications for registration as 
insurers under the Act. out of these, 14 companies were incor-
porated in Nigeria and transacted business before the 1961 Act 
came into force. Five companies were incorporated atter that 
date; 11 expatriate companies deemed incorpor.ated were taking 
steps to~~s full incorporation and there were eiqht companies,' 
deemed inco~oratedwhich had submitted accounts and documents 
, 
for the purpose ot winding up under'the supervision of the' cou=t. 
In all, there were still about 40 odd companies, inc~rpo~ted or 
deemed incftPC)rated, which were yet to c·)mply wi~h the require-
ments ot the Insurance Companies Act of 19&1 (Reichel, 1900-11). 
In the third quarter ot 1969, the desired progress could 
not be achieved in respect of the registration exercise. The 
companies were slow in complying with the requirements or the 
legislation. Those companies deemed incorporated since 18 
November 196ts, altogether 11 in number, did not accelerate 
their steps toward. rullincorporation which was prerequisite 
tor obtaining the pem1ssion to carry on insurance business. 
Moreover, statements and documents submitted were otten not in 
accordance with the requirements. Thus, up to the end of 
September 1909, out ot a total of 33 companies which had. . 
applied tor registration as an insurer with the aim of 
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carrying on insurance business only seven companies could be 
registered as insurers. 
At the beginning of July 1970, a list ot 21 companies which 
had received permission to transact insurance business was 
published in the Official Gazette (Reichel, 19bb-11). This 
commented 
publioation which was J . on by a leading newspaper 
caused a great anxiety among the non-registered companies. 
perhaps for the first time in Nigeria, insurance companies paid 
full attention to the existing insurance legislation. For 
this reason more than 40 companies had to apply for registration. 
It was obvious to Dr. Reit'..hel that among those authorised were a 
great number of new and unknown companies while those companies 
which prior to November 19b~, transacted suostant.tal insu't"8Jlce 
business in Nigeria had, owing tc their retarded incorporation, 
not yet met all the legal requirements for registration at the 
time o~ the publioation of the list lReiChel, 19b6-1'). 
Dr. Reichel observed further that, since the end of the 
oivil war in January 1910, the desire of Nigerians to establish 
many an insurance oompany had. greatly increased. To cope with 
the situation and screen the multitude of new companies applying 
tor permission to transact insurance business he recommended 
that the lesal requirements had to be much more stringent. 
The demand for supervision by the public tor the wiping out 
of mushroom companies whiCh conducted insurance business by 
ignoring its prinCiples and technical requirements was 
steadily increasing in Ni8eria. 
273 
9.3.4 Miscellaneous Issues 
A number ot miscellaneous matters, mostly administrative, 
deal t with by Dr. Reichel is cons idered in sub-headings below. 
9.3.4.1 Cooperative Insurance Societies 
For some years the co-operative movement in Nigeria had 
planned to establish a national cooperative insurance society. The 
idea began to take shape in 1963 atter a mission ot the International 
Co-operative Alliance had visited Nigeria. From the beginning 
stress was laid on the setting up ot an insurance society on a 
\ 
Federal basis. The Registrar of the Co-operative Division, 
Federal Ministry ot Labour, pursued the plan and sought assistance 
for its iaplementation. He also represented his Ministry in the 
meetings held in the Ministry of Trade in respect of the proposed 
insurance legislation. He took advantage of ~~e presence of 
Dr. Reichel to obtain the latter's views on the cooperative 
insurance project. Thus, during the months of November and 
December 1961, the various aspects of the project were discussed. 
Dr. Reichel pOinted out that in the proposed new legislation 
provisions for establishing suCh a society on ~e co-operative 
basis had been specially made and that the setting up of an 
insurance carrier on a non-p:ofi t basis by members who After 
insurance to one another at cost (mutual insurance company) 
would be an asset (Reichel, 1966-11). 
In April 1969, the Federal M1n1str,( or Labour forwarded 
to the Federal Ministr,( of Trade for comment a copy ot the ILO 
report on the "organisation and Development of Co-operative 
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Insurance in Nigeria." The Report was discussed at the annual 
meeting :of the state Registrars of the Co-operative Societies 
in Nigeria held in Lagos from 21 to 23 May 1969. Dr. Reichel 
was invited to this meeting and he seized the opportunity to 
explain the issues involved as well as the step~ to be taken 
to implement the p:;,oject. And in January and F~bruary 1970, 
he assisted the cooperative movement in the drafting of the 
memorandum and articles of association of the Cooperative 
Insurance Society of Nigeria (Reichel, 1966-71). 
, 
9.3.4.2 Export payment Insurance Scheme 
At the meetings of the Ministry of Trade concerning projects 
to be included in the Second National Development_Plan, the 
establishment of an export guarantee corpc~~tion by the government 
was d:'sc".lssed at leni5-t."l. In a memorandum in t=o(~;;;.cing tht: subj~ct 
it was pointed out that in order to encourage and expand trade 
with countries outside Nigeria the government should provide a 
specialised range of insurance and guarantee facilities Which 
are not normally obtainable from private commerQial insurers. 
4' 'II. 
The government should gi va coverage to certa.in commercial credit 
risks, such as insolvency and default in payment by buyers, and. 
political risks which relate to changes in foreign countries' 
import policies and delays in the transfer of funds arising 
from exchanp control difficulties in the buyers' country, and 
war and civil unrest. 
The Central !ank, in its paper titled, "Export Financing 
in Nigeria", however, questioned whether .an insurance scheme 
on the suggested line was relevant and of positive economic 
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advantage to Nigeria at that stage. Dr. Reichel was pessimistic 
about the success of such a. scheme since it would confront the 
government with new technical problems since insurance facilities 
in thig.J:'espect.wftre not a.vailable in the country (Reichel, 
1966-71). The idea was therefore dropped. 
9.3.4.3 Pensions 
In November 1967, Dr. Reichel was approached by the National 
Libraries Board to assist in the setting up of a pension arrange-
ment comprising the staff of all libraries. The scheme was to 
be established on a similar basis as the scheme for the senior 
staff of the Nigerian Universities. Dr. Reichel's comments on 
beha.lf of the Insurance Section centred on a group en.f:.wment 
insurance contract rather tha..'1. on individua.l policies which the 
Boa.~ favoured bec~use su~~ a group contract wo~ld be mo~e 
benefici~l to the staff of the National Libraries (Reichel, 
1966-71). 
In December 1967, Dr. Reichel examined the Nigerian.. 
Universities Joint Superanuation Scheme on the basis of the 
available materials and found that the scheme needed improvement. 
9.3.4.4 Foreign Exchange Regulations 
In October 1967, the government announced a tighter control 
on the use of the foreign exchange reserves and announced, ~ 
respect of insurance, that premium payments would be effected 
in the Nigerian currency. This brought up the matter of foreign 
exchange regulations regarding insurance transactions which were 
made by the Ministry of Finance. For the purpose of co-ordinatiol'l 
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and assistance, Dr. Reichel established conneotions with the Ministry 
of Finanoe and the Central Bank of Nigeria, the latter being respon-
sible for the administration of the regulations (Reiohel, 1966-71). 
~urther discussions on the technical problems involved, suCh 
as exchange regulations and the transfer abroad of funds in oonnec-
tion with insurance business, were held in the Ministry of Finance 
with its EXchange Control Offioer and the Deputy General Manager 
of the Central Eank ot Nigeria. These disoussions resulted in a 
request by the Central ]ank to the Insurance Seotion to assist 
in the drafting of a questionnaire which insurance companies and 
insurance brokers would henceforth have to submit when applying 
for allocation of foreign exchange in respect of their insurance 
business. 
9.3.4., Moto:!' Ins·.z'l.n~e 
The Federal Ministry of Trade embarked upon investigation 
into the motor insurance business with the aim of determining the 
adequacy of p:remiums charged by insurers and exploring the 
feasibility of establishing as a supplement to the Motor Vehicle 
(third party insurance) Act an unsatisfied judgement fund for 
certain third part, liabilit,r claims resulting from road accidents. 
This work required collection of statistical data tram the 
association of accident insurance oompanies and fram traffic 
police departments and the collaboration of the Advisory 
Committee on Road Safety which was set up by the government. 
Dr. Keichel prepared a memorandum. on this matter, but owing to the 
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fact that the requested statistical data could not be obtained, 
this investigation was not concluded (ReiChel, 1966-71). 
9.).4.6 Insurance of Government property 
Discussion were held with the Deputy Accountant General in 
the Ministry of Finance on the marine insurance fund operated by 
the Crown Agents in London and on insurances in relation to 
aviation and cash-tn-transit risks which government placed oVerseas 
(Reichel, 1966-71). 
9.).4.7 Ij,laxation 01" Life Offices 
The Insurance Section welcomed a memorandum submitted to the 
Ministry of Trade by the Nigerian Insurance Consultative Committee 
on the taxation of the lire business. This afforded an opportunity 
to investigate the basis or taxation of insurance companies. 
Co-operation with the Inland Hevenue Department was established. 
Arter thorough preparation by the Ministry, the memorandum was 
discussed with representatives or the Insu=ance Consultative 
Comittee at length. This persuaded the CODIDittee to re-elarify 
their points and to submit a new memorandum 1ri due course 
(Reichel, 196b-11). 
9.4 Evaluation or the ReiChel 
-ModEtof Control 
The Reichel model or st,yle of control is the strict or close 
control system of regulation (appendix 1). Under this system 
there is control over premium rates-, commission rates, policy 
condition, investments, etc tchapter 4.4). Bence Dr. Reichel made 
detailed provision for working capi~al, methods of conducting business, 
investment portfolio choice. the licensing of agents and the 
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registration of insurance brokers~ This detailed system of super-
vision has failed to correct the major problems facing the insurance 
industry. suc."l as very limited retention capa.city and the inability 
of the market to provide good service to the consumer (Nigeria. 1986). 
In view of the continuing weakness of the market, it is essential 
to foous attention on why the ReiChel effort has failed: 
9.5 rhe Quinquennium Following the 
Depa;t-.lre of Dr. Reichel 
Following the departure of Dr. Reichel from the countrJ'. 
a vacuum was created in the Insuranoe Department. Ttle reason for 
this is not tar to seek. The insurance aectian in the Min1aU7 
ot Trade vas, at the tiM the repealed Insurance Caaapanies Act 
of 1961 was being implemented in 1967, under the Legal Adviser 
or the M1nistr,r. The Legal Adviser, in addition to his duties 
as the llegistrar of In8UI'8llCe was the Registrar of patents, 
Designs and '!Tade marks. II thoush assisted 'bJ the superintendent 
ot Insurance (appointed in 1970), the Legal Adviser va. in the 
absence ot an actu&r1, clearll W-equlpped to C&rrJ out the 
duties or 8D insurance Il0l11 tor1Dg and cantrol apnq (lU.pria, 
1986). 
'!he absence ot ettect! ve control led to the IlUshrooII1D« 
ot the msurance 1Dd.uatrJ bJ indigenous WUT&DCe cOJIp&n1ea 
(section 9.3.3.4). .ll thouch onl7 21 caapan1e. were authorilled 
in Jul7 1970, m 1971 the zraaber rose to 66 (Irukw, 1971). 
!J 1972 it turihe vent up to 69 (Irukw., 1971), in 1973 it 
cliabed to 71 (OlUDBhola, 1973) and b7 197~ it reached an 
all tiM h1ch ot 77 (Albaje, 1975). 
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As observed in Chapter 5.4.1, the flouriahtnc of over 10 
insurance cOlipanies, UDresulated created problema in tems of 
their conduct and performance. public coDtidence in the insurance 
indus'b.7 weakened because of "the mul. tiplici ty of insurance 
coapanies - both undervri tiDe a.nd broker" (Bipria, 1975). 
Ap1nst this backcround, it is pe:rba.ps not Surpri8inc that one 
of the .ajor problems fac1Dc the countr,y's ecca~, identified 
b7 the Thircllfat1C11&l »evelopaent pl8Z1 (1915-80), vas 
-the existenceot confidence weakeDiDc elements 
in the insurance industry' and the hish percentap 
ot reiDsurance which goes to overse.. coapanies. 
This vas said to have resulted in the treaendoua 
foreian exchanp leakage caused. 'b7 the reinsuring 
ot a large percentage of the risk outside the 
ecOJlCD7 and the dominance of foreicD ccapa.nie. 
in the sector" (Nigeria, 1975). 
Renee the Federal Gove~ent's proposal to undertake a 
"ccaprehenaive ~eviev ot the laws governillg insurance so as 
to reaove abuses nov rampant in the industrJ''' (Biseria, 197~). 
this 
In pursuance of / poliC7, a separate lleBistrar of Insurance, 
a nePUtr SUperintendent of IDsurance and &Il lMurance Auditor 
vere appoiDted 111 Wovembar 1974, despite opposition fro. the 
XlDistr.T of Justice which appoiDtecl the Legal Adviser 
(Bipr1a, 1986). 
The ne"q appo1Dted llegistrar ot IDSuraDce vas given two 
ass!&Daents. 'lbe first vas the revision of the . Dlsurance 
Ccapanie. Act of 1961 which had becca. domaDt ov1D8 to the 
1naclequacle. of the enforc_ent machmer'J. The .ecODd was the 
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1nd.ipniaation of the foreiBn owned iDsurance cQllP8D1es. 
OD 31 March 1976, the then Head of state announced tha.t a 
Financial Keviev Ca.aittee was set UPI 
" • •• to examine the adequacy, re levance 
or otherwise or the !nsti tutiona iD, 
and the atructure of the f1M.ncial 
system to meet the needs ot the econQIIT 
tor rapid development" (Biseria, 1976). 
The Committee'a iDvestigation of the insurance industry was 
part ot a nch larpr enquiry into the Bipriazl financial qstelll 
in conform! ty with its terms of reterence. Its report haa 
provided. very valuable information on the background that led to 
the forma. tion of IICOI in 1969 and Nigeria Ke and Africa Ke iD 
1977 (chapter 1.3.2). Ita recOllllllendations include. a further 
indigenisation of the torei8n owned subsidiaries; radical 
provisions to be iDcluded iD the Nigeria. Re Act, the 
review of the provisions ot the NICOl Act ot 1969 and the transter 
of the Insurance Department from the Ministry of Trade to Finance 
(chapter 1.3.2). 
On fiduciar,y regalatiana or the industry, its reoommendations 
vere far reach1Dc. First, it blamed. the muahrooa1Dg ot inll\11'ance 
corapanie. OIl the low capital. requireaent of the-·1961 Insurance 
Coapani.. Act and suppcrted government'. decision to raise this 
to _300,00 far nOD-lite and wSOO,OOO for lit.iDaurance cc.panies. 
SecoDd].7, it va. wonied. that the balance sheets of IIBD7 
insurance ca.panie. shoved substantial aaoanta due £1'011 &pnt. 
and brokers and therefore concluded that these int8mediaries 
required creat control. Thirdl1, it reco..-ded that the 
investment ot murance funds should be replaW.troa tille to 
tille 1n the li&ht ot the needs ot the econ_ and particularly . 
that the rate structure and investment !'lidelines should be 
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deterained by the MOIlet&.r7 Au thori ties so as to unit7 the determ1Da-
tiOl1 ot aOl1et&r7 poliCY' vi th regard. to both banldnc and non-banking 
finanoial institutions. Lastly', for lIore effective .upervision~ 
of the industr;y, it recClllllended the settincup ot a Board. by the 
controllinC MinistZ'7 vith powers under the control law to reaulate 
the 1Dd.ustr;y. It felt that the use ot the !oa.rd. would be more 
etticient than ~at obtaiDa at present where the control ia 
exercised. b,. the Xinist17 (ot Finance) vi thout clear-cut guidelines 
or &D7 clear iDd1catiaa of policy (Biseria, 1976). 
9.6 The IlIplementatiCID of the 1976 Act 
13 . The lecistrar ot Insurance led the ettort. which resulted 111 
the proIIIUlp tion ot the Insurance Act ot 1976. !7 the prOvisions 
of the latter (Chapter 7.6) all eAisttQg insurance companies had to 
re-register and those Which could not campl,. vith the new conditions 
the 
vere weeded out. Aa a result of'l exercise, the l1\111ber ot companies 
operating OIl the market vas reduced fraa 73 to 56 011 31 Ma1 1977 
(Bigeria. 1986). The remainder which could IlOt aeet the registration. 
requinaen'ta were not allowed to operate. The lDBurance ltegulations 
ot 1977 re-&tt1ma the patt.m ot rende~iIlc returna established 'bJ 
Dr. leichel ( .. ctio. 9.3.2). 
Al tboqh the Inaurance Aot ot 1976 and the IIlsvanc. 
lecuJ.atiOI18 •• tabliahecl a better 87st_ for the irlprOV_l1t and 
'ft'elo~nt ot the inclust%7. the Insurance Departael1t atatutorilJ 
•• povereel to enlorce the provision. or the control lqialatioa ia 
lll ... quippecl to aonitor and control th. indust%7 ( •• ction 9.3.3). It 
lacka .utticimt 8Ad cc.petent statt to II8D ita IDllpeotorate D1v1aiCll 
¥bich it l1eeda to enlorce the provisiODs or the lecislatiOD. Thia 18 
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due to the failure of the Department to attract qualified personnel 
\ 
frca the iDsurance -.rat because of its poor civil service salary 
atmcture. Apart trCII 1n&d.equate staf'fiDc, it i. iDadequatel7 funded. 
9.7 aecent Implementation (Since 1981) 
The 1976 Aot conta1na provisions which are irrelevant and 
unsoUlld (chapter 7.7). Commentator.14 and the practitioners1 S 
were quick in point1nc out the anomalie.. In apparent respCIlse to 
the criticisms, the Inaurance Department called a .. eting of the 
leacl1Dc practitioners operating in the indust1'7 in April 1981, to 
discuss the i.sue.. The discussiona, which luted till August, 
reaul ted in sucpstiona which were intended to correct the 
deficiencies. 
The totallJ unexpected deciaion b.J the Federal Minister of 
Finance at the end of 1983 that the registration fee (appendix 16) tor 
16 
all cla8se. of inauranee business was being redueed to .1,000, 
mited the entia market to mount a studied. pre.aure17 to ena.ct 
a new iIlaurance lec1.lation.18 The overthrow of the Shapri 
AdaiDi.tratiGa at the eo:1 or the year prompted the Insurance 
Depa.n.nt to _Cia work OIl the revision of the 1976 Act. !7 
March 1984, the prcposed ... ndment. vere clraVD up md circulated 
ill the arket. The tiDal proposal. vere then aulaitted to the 
rederal Executive Coacil. In April the Ila-riM Law lefom., 
Ca.a1 •• lon ar.ranse4 a latioDal SemiDAr OD the letora ot 
lnauranoe Law to oaD8ider the proposal.. Tharearter the 
reclenl Exeoutt". Comcil inatructed the Att0rD87-General and 
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Minister of' Justice to prepare a draft f'or consideration by the 
Council. In the aeant1ae the f'ormer Supnae Mili tar;y Uouncll 
vas replaced 'b7 the A%tI8d Forces RullDc COUDcil. This political 
impasse brought to aD a~t end the process ot concludlDc 
vork on the clratt aendaents (Nipria, 19ts6). 
lipria'lI rejeotion of' the IMP 108.1119 coapelled the 
Federal Govermaent to restructure the econ~. AccordinS1J' the 
President announced in his ~d8et Speech of' 1 Janua.r,. 1986 
that the softrmlent vall oonsidering the reduction of' it. 
holdinp in baDks, insurance caapanies and other tinancial. 
enterprise. vithout loatns control. It waa further announced 
that IOverDllent would aet in motion duriDs 1986 the proce.a ot 
another review exercise of' the Nigerian Financial Srstea as was 
dane in 1976. Aa a consequence an 8-1II8Il Insurance Investipt1ng 
panel20 waa set up 111 Januarr (appendix 14) to review the entire 
insurance aystell.21 !he 'Panel, whoae rec01IIIendationa include the 
establishaent ot a national insurance cOJlJli •• ion or board to 
aUp81'9'iae the iDd.ustr,r and a revision of the iDaurance lesial.&-
'iOll (appendix 17), aubaitted its report at the end ot JUne. 
,.8 -.aluation '~I!ple"DtatiOD 
'!he poor atate of the insurance 1Dd.usU7 in .!seria 1a 
ine'Yitable tor OIle major reasOll. Aa ob.e1'9'8d in aectioD 9.).) 
the covemaent baa DO .eana or directin, the iDd.ustrr on a 
aOUDd toot1nc because ot lack or efrecti~ aachiDer,r tor control 
(chapter 7.7.12). Moreover, the goverment doe. DOt realise that 
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inSurance eupenision reQ.uires technical statf. Even when it 
vaa realised that personnel quali£ied in actuarial work waa 
required, it haa not been possible to secure the services of an 
22 
actua.r)' on a full tille baais. The rev insurance clerks that 
are recni ted are difficult to re tain because of better remuneration 
elsewhere. 
The conatra.1Dts em effecti va supervision contained in a 
Memorandua aublli tted b7 the Insurance Department to the 8-ma1l 
Insurance Investiaat±nc Panel are summarised as 1'011owsl(1) !ecause 
01' the diapa.ri V in the aaJ.a.ry grad1nc 01' the star1' 01' the 
Insurance Depa,rtMnt and their counterparts in BIOON, Nigeria 
!e and the rest 01' the market, quali1'ied and experienced staff 
would not like to work in the Insurance Depa:rtaent. (2) In the 
civil serTice where the administrative cadre controls the progress 
01' the pro1'essiaaala the latter are at a disadvantage and 
therefore caDDOt ef1'ectivelY promote their interest. The impli-
cation 01' this is that the Insurance Departaent staffed by 
profes.icmals cazmot expand as the need arises. (3) striDpnt 
budptm. aDd reatrictiOl18 in statf strencth ill the wake 01' the 
utioat s ecoDOllic di.t'ficul ties ba:ve reaul ted in considerable 
natt turnowr. J. total of 35 profe.sicmals and gre.~ua.tes· 
left the Deput.ent tor the private .ectar during the past 
decade. 
'!he cunlati ft ettect 01' the above in the vords of the 
.ellOranda 1a as tollowa. 
28$ 
" • •• In an indus try which is one of hilb 
incaae earners, it (is) difficult, 1£ 
Dot apossible, to attract the expected 
qualified and experienced personnel to 
work in a d.partment where staff 
salaries and fringe benefits are far 
below what they can earn in the private 
coapan1ea. '!'his is especial17 the 
c .... vb_ a person with an ACII 
qualification jOins the s.rYic. of a 
lOod insurance caa.pany and finda 
hiaself aa .Chief Executive with all 
sarta of friDge benefits... His 
counterpart in the. civil service finds 
difficulty in securing goveraaent 
quarters. While it is practicable 
for an administrative officer aD 
salarr craci. level 12 to cllllb to 
G.L. 16 under a decade, it is 
difficult ~~ his prof.ssianal 
counterparts to go beyond G.L. 14 
aft.r 15 years of dedicated servic •••• 
An average professional in the 
civil service is, to say the least, 
demoralised. The professional 
personnel in the Insuranc. Department 
share this fate. Under thea. 
circuaatances ••• the insurance 
Department could not adequatel,. 
perfaca its fUnctions ••• " 
(llis-ria, 1986). 
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9.9 Notes 
1. The.e are Great Nigeria and The Universal. 
2. It wae officiaU7 called The Ani Work1nc Parv on 
Statutory Corporations and state Owned Caapaniea. 
). This wae known as the White Paper on Statuto17 
Corporationa and. state Owned. Companies. 
4. Ibid para. 23. 
S. For example, "insurer", "registered. insurer", "insurance 
cc.p&n7". 
6. ObTioua17 the pre.aure sroups were responsible for the 
change of course. 
7. See Lepl Notice 92 of 1968. 
8. See Londoa'. Filwlcial Times (26 NoveJlb,r 1968). 
9. See Caapanies Act 1968, Decree No 51 of 16 october 1968. 
10. The rest of the Act came into erfect retrespectively as 
from 1 october 1968, see section 398 (2), Companies Act 1968. 
11. See Akinkugbe (1979) and Aje (1978). 
12. Section 368(a). 
13. Information on "the efforts" baa not been f'orthccminS 
on the grotIDd that "covemment bus iDe sa i •• ecret." 
(Thanka to the directive to this eftect iasued b7 the 
~i Ad:aiDistration). Bot untU the tile. reach 
the archive. can the detail. be publi.hed. 
14. Se., for eDllple, hlepn (1976/77) and Cbapun (1977). 
15. See appendix 11 tor representaticm. to the Inaurance 
Departaent b.r prof ••• ional bodie •• 
16. S .. "Insurance Amendment Itegulation" siped 'b7 the 
Minister ot 7inaDce, Ma11aa AdUlU CirOll&, vide !he 
Panch (Dec_bar 1983). 
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17. The leader. of the industry rejected the aaenclaent. 
and de.cribed the reduced fee as politically 
aotivated and devised to give part,r patron.,. to 
a.abers of the IOverniDg party, the Rational party 
of lUpria. They cc.plained. that the proliferation 
ot insurer., and brokers vould lover .tandards. 
18. See The GuudiazL (21 and 30 AprU 1984). Dail1 Times 
(30.6.84). Daily Sketch (4.12.84) •• ev lUgeriaa 
(18.7.85), The Guardian (19.8.85). etc. 
19. See The Guardi&D (13.12.85). 
20. Otherwise known as Oke Panel. It has since come to 
. li8ht that PriDce E. A. Oke who petitioned. Chief 
Avolovo in 1967 (.ection 9.3.1) was instrwaental 
in the settin, up of the panel. See Financial 
pUnch (9-13 M~ 1986). 
21. S •• Daily Tim •• (12.2.86). 
22. The Department of Actuarial Science and Insuranoe 
of the lJJliveraity of Lagos bas .inee it. inception 
in 1970 not succeeded in producinc a .ingle act\1lLr7. 
288 
